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MODELS IN SCIENTIFIC PRACTICE
Yoichi Ishida, PhD
University of Pittsburgh, 2014
This dissertation presents an account of the practice of modeling in science in which scientists’
perceptual and bodily interactions with external representations take center stage. I argue that
modeling is primarily a practice of constructing, manipulating, and analyzing external represen-
tations in service of cognitive and epistemic aims of research, and show that this account better
captures important aspects of the practice of modeling than accounts currently popular in philoso-
phy of science.
Philosophical accounts of the practice of modeling classify models according to the cate-
gories of abstract and concrete entities developed in metaphysics. I argue that this type of ac-
count obscures the practice of modeling. In particular, using the analysis of the Lotka-Volterra
model as an example, I argue that understanding mathematical models as abstract entities—non-
spatiotemporally located, imperceptible entities—obscures the fact that the analysis of the Lotka-
Volterra model relies primarily on visual perception of external representations, especially hand- or
computer-generated graphs. Instead, I suggest that we apply the concepts of internal and external
representations, developed in cognitive science, to models, including mathematical models.
I then present two case studies that illustrate different aspects of modeling, understood as a
practice of constructing, manipulating, and analyzing external representations. First, using Sewall
Wright’s long-term research on isolation by distance, I articulate the relationship between the uses
of a model, the particular aims of research, and the criteria of success relevant to a given use of
the model. I argue that uses of the same model can shift over the course of scientists’ research in
response to shifts in aim and that criteria of success for one use of a model can be different from
those for another use of the same model. Second, I argue that in successful scientific research, a
iv
scientist uses a model according to the methodological principles of realism and instrumentalism
despite the tension that they create among the scientist’s uses of the model over time. This thesis
is supported by a detailed analysis of successful scientific research done by Seymour Benzer in the
1950s and 60s.
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1.0 PERSPECTIVES ON MODELS
1.1 INTRODUCTION
Nelson Goodman once observed that “[f]ew terms are used in popular and scientific discourse
more promiscuously than ‘model”’ (Goodman 1976, 171). His observation still holds true: Recent
historical works on models suggest that the meaning of the term ‘model’ in scientific discourse
significantly changed over the course of the last three centuries (Griesemer 2004, 437–439; de
Chadarevian and Hopwood 2004). This fluidity of the meaning of the term ‘model’ raises a basic
question that any scholar wanting to study the practice of modeling in science needs to confront:
What is a model?
This chapter explains some of the most influential answers to this question. Two of them un-
derly the formal and informal versions of the semantic view of theories, while others are responses
to the semantic view. I shall then argue that most of these answers employ concepts of abstract and
concrete entities developed in metaphysics. These answers represent what I call the metaphysics
based perspective on models and modeling. I then outline an alternative perspective that adopts
concepts developed in scientific studies of representations, especially studies in cognitive science.
Finally, I contrast this perspective with the perspective characteristic of those who regard models
as agents playing various roles in science.
1.2 THE SEMANTIC VIEW OF THEORIES
Since the 1950s, models in science have gained increasing and renewed attention in philosophy of
science (Bailer-Jones 1999). One of the impetuses for this development was the semantic view of
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theories. Although the semantic view was originally concerned with formal, mathematical analysis
of the structure of scientific theories, some philosophers have developed a more informal version
of the semantic view (Odenbaugh 2008, 510). The semantic view has provided the background for
some influential accounts of the practice of modeling today. Here I summarize this background
in order to highlight how my own account of modeling differs from the accounts based on the
semantic view.
1.2.1 A Formal Version
Applying Alfred Tarski’s (1953, 11) concept of model in mathematical logic, Patrick Suppes has
argued that a scientific model is a set-theoretical (i.e., mathematical) entity in which all theorems
of a theory are satisfied (Suppes 1960, 289–290). This idea underlies the set theoretic version
of the semantic view of theories (Suppes 1957, Ch. 12; 1960; 1967; da Costa and French 1990;
French and Ladyman 1999). The other formal version of the semantic view is known as the state
space approach (van Fraassen 1970, 1972; Lloyd 1984). Differences among the formal versions of
the semantic view are irrelevant to my present purpose, and here I use the state space view as an
example.
In presenting his state space approach, Bas van Fraassen states the shared commitment of both
the set theoretic and state space approaches:
Like Suppes, I shall take it that (the ‘pure’ part of) a theory defines the kind of system
to which it applies; empirical assertions would take the form that a given empirical
system belongs to such a kind (or, more precisely, that one of the mathematical structures
specified by the theory provides an adequate model for the empirical system). (van
Fraassen 1972, 311)
Applying the model theoretic concept of model, the system to which a theory applies is called a
model of the theory. According to van Fraassen’s state space approach, a physical theory defines a
system (i.e., its model) by specifying two things. First, it specifies the set of states that the system
can take. To do this formally, van Fraassen says, “what we specify is a collection of mathematical
entities (numbers, vectors, functions) to be used to represent these states” (van Fraassen 1972, 311).
That is, theoreticians use numbers, vectors, functions, and so on to specify the states of the system.
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The collection of these “mathematical entities” is called the state space of the system (van Fraassen
1972, 311). For example, a theory may define a system of gas by specifying its state in terms of its
temperature t, volume v, and pressure p. The collection of triples of real numbers < t, v, p > can
be used to represent the states of this system, and this collection of real numbers is the state space
of this system (van Fraassen 1972, 311). Second, according to van Fraassen, a physical theory
defines physical magnitudes (e.g., kinetic energy), which are represented by functions defined on
the state space (van Fraassen 1972, 311–312). Once its models are defined in this way, a physical
theory may also provide laws of succession that describe the ways in which its model can change
its state over time.
To the extent that it characterizes what models are and how they are defined, the formal version
of the semantic view suggests a particular way to understand the practice of modeling. On this
approach, to construct a model (of a theory) is to define its state space and physical magnitudes.
Scientists do this by using mathematical objects, such as numbers, vectors, and functions. Thus,
on the semantic view, mathematics is used to define or specify a model (van Fraassen 1970, 337).
1.2.2 An Informal Version
An informal version of the semantic view largely shares the basic commitment of the semantic
view that we saw above in a passage from van Fraassen. For example, Ronald Giere, who is a
major defender of an informal version of the semantic view, says:
My preferred suggestion [as an account of theory structure], then, is that we understand
a theory as comprising two elements: (1) a population of models, and (2) various hy-
potheses linking those models with systems in the real world. (Giere 1988, 85)
This statement is nearly identical to van Fraassen’s, but unlike the formal version of the semantic
view, Giere does not understand “models” strictly in model theoretic terms. Rather, he takes mod-
els to be abstract entities that have properties ascribed by scientists’ descriptions of it (Giere 1988,
78).
Giere has developed his informal version of the semantic view into a general account of the
practice of modeling. He understands the modeling practice hierarchically as shown in Figure 1.1.
Let us focus just on the top half of Figure 1.1. Giere thinks that mature scientific theories contain
3
Figure 1.1: Giere’s account of hierarchical relationships among models and the world. The arrows
indicate the generational relationships. For example, representational models are generated from
principled models, which are characterized by statements. Redrawn from Giere (2010, 270).
principles or laws, which are statements or equations, which describe models. To use his example,
Newton’s laws of motion are principles of classical mechanics that characterize “a class of highly
abstract models (principled models)” (Giere 2010, 270). Principles are “automatically true of the
principled models” (Giere 2010, 270). According to Giere, scientists generate representational
models by “adding conditions and constraints to the principled models” (Giere 2010, 270). Thus,
by adding Newton’s gravitational law to the principled models, scientists generate representational
models of the interactions of two bodies in space. In characterizing representational models, Giere
insists that they are abstract objects not to be identified with any particular description of them
(Giere 2004, 747, n.7; Giere 2010, 273) Representational models, he says, are “abstract objects
constructed in conformity with appropriate general principles and specific conditions. One might
think of them as artful specifications of the very abstract models defined by the principles” (Giere
2004, 747).
For Giere, representational models are representational because they are what scientists can
use to represent parts of the world. In his view, scientists can use models to represent parts of the
world because they can interpret parts of a principled model in physical terms and identify parts of
4
a representational model constructed from the principled model with parts of the real world (Giere
2010, 271).1 The empirical content is given to the representational model through what Giere
calls a specific “hypothesis,” which is a claim that “a fully interpreted and specified model fits a
particular real system more or less well” (Giere 2010, 271). To return to the Newtonian model
example, the representational model of a Newtonian two-body system gets empirical content when
one claims that the model fits the Earth-Moon system or any other real-world two-body systems.
Such hypotheses about representational models are tested by comparing representational models
with models of data rather than directly with data.
Giere says that his account “capture[s] a significant part of scientific practice. And most of
what scientists and other theorists of science want to say about this practice can be accommodated
within my framework” (Giere 2010, 272). But we might disagree with him in various ways. For
example, we might find that his hierarchical view is too simple. In this vein, Marcel Boumans ar-
gues that the actual process of modeling is not a linear progression from a body of theory (Giere’s
laws and principles) to models (Giere’s principled models and representational models). Rather, he
says, the actual process is one of integration of various elements—theoretical ideas, mathematical
concepts, analogies, empirical data, etc—into a representational model (Boumans 1999, 91–94). A
different kind of criticism, the one I pursue in this dissertation, is that the basic picture of the prac-
tice of modeling suggested by the semantic view is mistaken. Like the formal version, the informal
version of the semantic view presents a particular picture of modeling: Models are not linguistic
entities, and scientists use sentences, equations, graphs, and other representational devices to de-
scribe the properties of the models. Thus, the semantic view puts external representations to the
periphery of the practice of modeling. After all, external representations are not models. As I show
in Chapter 2, this picture of modeling obscures important aspects of the practice of modeling.
1As for interpretation, Giere insists that scientists do not begin with uninterpreted models and then provide inter-
pretations. Rather, principles already provide physical interpretations of what will become parts of principled models
(Giere 2010, 271).
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1.3 RESPONSES TO THE CONCEPT OF MODEL IN THE SEMANTIC VIEW
James Griesemer (1990, 1991) has argued that the concept of model in the semantic view is inade-
quate because there are models used in theorizing that are material objects.2 He draws our attention
to remnant models, which are material models “made from the very individuals modeled” (Griese-
mer 1990, 8). A specimen in a natural history museum, for example, is made from remains of an
organism it represents. According to Griesemer, natural history specimens are “physical objects
which, for specific scientific purposes, are taken to represent the whole, living individuals of which
they were once part. As such, specimens are remnant models of their wholes” (Griesemer 1990,
8). Using the work of Joseph Grinnell as a case study, Griesemer argues that in addition to being
representations of nature, remnant models can also serve as basis for theory construction, because
remnant models are robust against theory change, such as change in species concepts. In other
words, remnant models can be studied from multiple theoretical perspectives (Griesemer 1991,
80).
One response to Grisemer’s criticism is that it is possible to represent the representational
function of material models in terms of the model theoretic concept of model. Thus, referring to
the Watson-Crick model of DNA and Griesemer’s example of remnant models, Steven French and
James Ladyman say:
Of course, at one, superficial, level, these are simply what they are: bits of wire and
tinplate, or brightly coloured balls held together by plastic rods. The obvious, but im-
portant, move is to ask what their function is and this is equally clear: it is to represent.
The famous Crick and Watson model represents, not just a particular example of DNA
but all DNA (of that kind); likewise, the function of the coloured-balls-and-plastic-rods
model of benzene, gathering dust in the school laboratory, is to represent, not a particu-
lar molecule, but all molecules of benzene. And this function . . . can easily be captured
by the semantic view. (French and Ladyman 1999, 109)
I think French and Ladyman missed Griesemer’s point in a crucial way: Griesemer argues that
material models can serve scientific theorizing in different ways than abstract entities of the se-
2As Griesemer notes (1990, 7), this criticism echoes the points made by Max Black (1962, Ch. 13), Mary Hesse
(1966), and Peter Achinstein (1968, 209–211).
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mantic view (Griesemer 1991, 80–81). This difference occurs because of the material features of
models, and French and Ladyman cannot capture this difference if they reinterpret material models
as representing set-theoretic structures.
Another response to Griesemer’s criticism is to accept that not all models are abstract entities.3
This route has been taken by the defenders of the informal version of the semantic view (Teller
2001, Giere 2006, Weisberg 2013). But according to Giere (2004, 747) and Teller (2001, 397–
398), most models in mature science are abstract objects. For example, Giere says:
At first sight, the things that are commonly called models seem to form a quite heteroge-
neous class including physical models, scale models, analogue models, and mathemati-
cal models, just to name a few. Thus we have Watson’s original tin and cardboard model
of DNA, Rutherford’s solar system model of atoms, the Bohr model of the atom, and
the de Sitter model of spacetime. There are also equilibrium models in economics and
drift models in evolutionary biology. I think it is possible to understand models in a way
that usefully encompasses much of this heterogeneity. . . . [M]odels in advanced sciences
such as physics and biology should be abstract objects constructed in conformity with
appropriate general principles and specific conditions. (Giere 2004, 746–747)
Giere accepts that models can be abstract entities or concrete entities, but he insists that many or
most models in advanced sciences are abstract entities.
It is now commonplace among philosophers to categorize models into abstract entities and
concrete entities, regardless of whether these philosophers also accept the semantic view of theo-
ries. This classification then serves as a starting point for their analysis of the practice of modeling.
Here are some representative quotes from recent publications:
Models are abstract structures or physical structures that can potentially represent real-
world phenomena. Many different things can serve as models including physically
constructed scale models, model organisms, and mathematical objects such as sets of
trajectories through a state-space. (Weisberg 2007, 216–217; see also Weisberg 2013,
7)
3For the argument that this response leads to a deflationary version of the semantic view that does not pretend to
capture all forms of scientific theorizing, see Downes (1992).
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Models can range from being objects, such as a toy airplane, to being theoretical, ab-
stract entities, such as the Standard Model of the structure of matter and its fundamental
particles. (Bailer-Jones 2009, 2)
The words “scientific model” refer to such a variety of entities that it is difficult to say
anything that would be true about all kinds of scientific models. For instance, not all
of them are abstract entities, because the wood models of molecules, and their contem-
porary surrogates, namely, three-dimensional computer-generated images, are concrete
models, the interest of which being that they can be easily handled and looked at from
different points of view. Likewise, models are not all mathematically presented, even if
many of them are. (Barberousse and Ludwig 2009, 56)
Scientific models seem to be ontologically quite diverse, including physical scale mod-
els, diagrams, and abstract (or theoretical) structures. There are several ways of dealing
with this diversity. One way is to take physical models, diagrams, and so on as being
ontologically unproblematic and concentrate on the more problematic abstract models.
A second, more radical, solution is to regard physical models, diagrams, and so on,
as resources for partially characterizing abstract models. So, all scientific models are
regarded as being abstract, or at least having abstract counterparts. (Giere 2009, 249)
The authors of these quotes accept the classification of models into abstract or concrete entities. In
the last quote, Giere mentions two ways that analysis of models and the practice of modeling can
proceed, given this classification. The first way is pursued by, for example, by Giere and Weisberg,
and the second by French and Ladyman.
Other philosophers argue that some models are imagined concrete entities. For example, Peter
Godfrey-Smith says:
The move that most people have been tempted to make is to say that model systems are
“abstract mathematical objects” of some kind. This general outlook is familiar from the
literature on the “semantic view,” and it has been taken over by some writers within what
I see as the alternative project of analyzing model-based science. Giere seems attracted
to a view of this kind, and so is Weisberg . . . . My aim is not to reject this idea outright,
but I will argue that it is deficient in at least some cases. It is important to the practice
of model-based science, at least some of the time, that model systems can be conceived
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and treated in a more concrete way. Roughly, we might say that model systems are
often treated as “imagined concrete things”—things that are imaginary or hypothetical,
but which would be concrete if they were real. (Godfrey-Smith 2006b, 734–735)
Similarly, Roman Frigg says:
What kind of things are model systems? Some, for instance wood models of a car that
we put into a wind tunnel, are physical objects. But most models . . . are not. . . . The
view of model systems that I advocate regards them as imagined physical systems, i.e.
as hypothetical entities that, as a matter of fact, do not exist spatio-temporally but are
nevertheless not purely mathematical or structural in that they would be physical things
if they were real. (Frigg 2010, 253)
Godfrey-Smith and Frigg find the concept of abstract entities deficient, because abstract entities do
not have physical properties. But scientists talk about ideal systems—systems that do not exist in
the real world—as if they have physical properties. Thus, Godfrey-Smith and Frigg suggest that
these systems, which they refer to as “model systems,” are like concrete entities except that they are
purely imaginary. They go on to argue that how scientists think about imagined concrete entities is
analogous to how people think about imaginary events and characters in literarily fiction and that
philosophical theories of fictions can illuminate the practice of scientific modeling (Godfrey-Smith
2009, Frigg 2010).
1.4 METAPHYSICS BASED PERSPECTIVE ON MODELS
What is common among the informal version of the semantic view and responses to it is that
it answers the question of what a model is by applying the concepts of metaphysics: abstract
entities and concrete entities.4 The notion of abstract entity relevant here is the most popular one
in metaphysics. It says that abstract entities are either non-spatiotemporally located or causally
inefficacious or both. Paradigmatic examples of abstract entities are mathematical entities, such
as numbers, functions, and sets. On the other hand, tables and chairs are paradigmatic examples
4Other concepts, such as abstract structures and imagined concrete entities, are based on the concepts of abstract
and concrete entities.
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of concrete objects, and so are inscriptions on paper, diagrams on a board, pieces of cardboard
on a desk, and other material objects in scientists’ environment. Unlike abstract objects, they
are spatiotemporally located and causally efficacious (Rosen 2012). In other words, despite the
differences in their detailed views about models and the practice of modeling, many philosophers
take the metaphysics based perspective on models: their views about models and modeling are
based on the categories of objects developed in metaphysics.
Proponents of the formal version of the semantic view do not take or avoid the metaphysics
based perspective on models. For example, in advocating the application of Tarski’s concept of
model to scientific theories, Suppes’ goal was to suggest that this concept of model and model
theory are the appropriate tools for the formal analysis of scientific theories (Suppes 1960, 294–
295). For Suppes, models were set-theoretic entities, and he could have said that models are
abstract entities because mathematical entities, which include set-theoretic entities, are abstract
entities. But he did not make this move. This may be because he knew that physical objects are
also used as models in science (Suppes 1960, 291–292), but more importantly, I think he did not
explicitly make a metaphysical claim because it was not necessary for his purpose. Suppes wanted
to give formal analysis of scientific theories and argued that the right tool for this task is model
theory, which studies mathematical structures (models in Tarski’s sense). To use model theory, it
is not necessary to classify mathematical structures into categories developed in metaphysics, just
as we can use arithmetic without classifying numbers into categories developed in metaphysics.
But other philosophers we have seen above have a goal of understanding or analyzing the
practice of modeling. This goal is different from Suppes’ goal, insofar as the formal analysis
of theories omits the details of the actual practice of modeling. And van Fraassen (2008, 311)
explicitly says that the semantic view of theories (i.e., the formal version he advocates) does not
aim to capture how modeling is actually done. Further, these philosophers have criticized the
formal version of the semantic view by saying that models that scientists actually use are not
like models in model theory. Thus, to say what a model is, these philosophers need to use other
concepts, and since models are objects, it makes sense that they adopt general categories of objects,
such as abstract and concrete entities. In doing so, as noted above, they adopt the metaphysics
based perspective on models.
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1.5 COGNITIVE SCIENCE BASED PERSPECTIVE ON MODELS
My goal is also to understand the practice of modeling. But instead of the metaphysics based per-
spective, I take what I call the cognitive science based perspective. From the metaphysics based
perspective, we see models as objects that scientists use to represent the world and group them into
metaphysical categories of objects (abstract entities, concrete entities, imagined concrete entities,
etc). But we can also see models as representations that scientists use in service of their cognitive
and epistemic goals. From this point of view, to understand models and the practice of model-
ing, the natural place to look for conceptual resources is the scientific study of representations,
especially cognitive science. In this sense, the perspective I advocate is cognitive science based.
1.5.1 The Importance of External Representations
Among the conceptual resources available in cognitive science, I suggest that the concepts of in-
ternal and external representations can help illuminate the practice of modeling in science. Internal
representations are representations internal to a person’s mind: they are structures in the mind that
bear informational content. They are synonymous with mental representations. There is a long-
standing debate about the nature of mental representation: whether it is like a proposition in formal
logic, a rule, a concept, an analogy, an image, or a network of neuron-like units (for an introduc-
tory review, see Thagard 2005; for a critical discussion, see Ramsey 2007). But no one would
deny the importance of internal representations and operations on them (memory, inference, etc)
in cognitive and epistemic activities of scientists. Thus, my focus will be on external representa-
tions. Although there is a debate about the very boundary of the mind (Clark and Chalmers 1998),
it suffices here to stipulate the skin of an organism as the boundary between internal and external
representations. External representations are representations external to a person’s mind, that is, in
her environment: they are structures in the environment that bear informational content. A person
operates on them through perceptual means and hands-on manipulations.5
5This characterization of external representations is brief but sufficient for my purpose. It is a simplification of the
characterization given by Zhang:
In the present study, external representations are defined as the knowledge and structure in the environ-
ment, as physical symbols, objects, or dimensions (e.g., written symbols, beads of abacuses, dimensions
of a graph, etc.), and as external rules, constraints, or relations embedded in physical configurations (e.g.,
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Although the terms ‘structures’ and ‘information’ have technical senses, in saying that external
representations are structures in the environment carrying informational content, I am using these
terms in their colloquial sense. A structure refers to an arrangement or configuration of things in
the environment. A diagram, for example, is a structure in this sense: it is a configuration of written
lines, curves, and so on. Information carried by a structure is the meaning that a person can extract
from the structure. To interpret a structure as carrying information, that is, to see something as an
external representation, it is not necessary to be able to understand or express the meaning of the
representation. For example, we can say that a cuneiform inscription is an external representation
without being able to decipher it. Indeed, the fact that scholars tried to decipher it shows that they
saw the inscription as an external representation before they understood its meaning.
In the past few decades, important research on how external representations and operations
on them influence human cognitive activities has been done under the rubric of situated cognition
(Suchman 1987), embodied mind (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999; Varela et al. 1991), distributed
cognition (Hutchins 1995), and extended cognition (Clark 2008).6 This research emphasizes how
real-life human cognitive processes occur as people interact with other people and representations
in their environment. To put this in terms of distributed cognition, real-life cognitive processes are
not entirely internal to a person’s mind but distributed across a group of people and the external
environment.
No one would deny that external representations are useful for performing cognitive tasks and
that human beings frequently use them. To do a fairly complicated algebra, for example, it is useful
to write down each step; the written down steps serve as an external representation of our previous
moves. It helps our memory as well as our planning of next moves. All this seems trivial. But
the research in cognitive science just mentioned supports a nontrivial claim that external represen-
tations are important for human cognitive activities not merely in the sense that they are useful
tools but in the sense that they are constitutive elements of the processes by which human beings
perform cognitive tasks. If interpreted strongly, this claim implies that external representations
and perceptual and physical operations on them are required for performing cognitive tasks. But
spatial relations of written digits, visual and spatial layouts of diagrams, physical constraints in abacuses,
etc.). (Zhang 1997, 180)
6For reviews, see Hollan et al. (2000), Wilson (2002), Robbins and Aydede (2009). Norman (1993, Ch. 6) gives a
particularly accessible introduction to distributed cognition.
12
Figure 1.2: Addition in Arabic and Roman numerals. Left: Steps of longhand addition in Arabic
numerals. Right: Steps of addition in Roman numerals.
this is too strong, since some cognitive tasks, such as simple addition, can be done entirely in the
head.7 Rather, the claim should be interpreted to mean that if human beings use particular external
representations to perform a cognitive task, then those representations and perceptual and physical
operations on them are constitutive elements of the processes by which human beings perform
that task.8 This is not a trivial claim because it means that when external representations are be-
ing used, they are essential to the process by which the task is done so that if different external
representations are used, the cognitive process will be different.
To motivate this point, let us compare how Arabic and Roman numerals transform the pro-
cesses by which we add two quantities, 57 and 35. We have two different external representations:
‘57 + 35’ and ‘LVII + XXXV’. To do addition with Arabic numerals, suppose we construct a
representation for longhand addition (Figure 1.2). This external representation partially represent
the rule of place notation: as long as we add numbers that are aligned vertically—a pattern we
7Even so, there is evidence that mental calculations rely on internalized forms of external representations (e.g.,
place-value notation in Arabic numerals) and mental simulation of the operations on external representations (e.g.,
calculations with an abacus) (De Cruz et al. 2010, 91–94; Dutilh Novaes 2013, 51–52).
8This interpretation of the sense in which external representations and operations on them are constitutive of cog-
nitive processes is a natural extension of Catarina Dutilh Novaes’ interpretation of the sense in which manipulations
of mathematical notations are constitutive of mathematical reasoning (Dutilh Novaes 2013, 50). Her view is based on
research on mathematical cognition from the perspective of extended cognition (see also Dutilh Novaes 2012, Ch. 5).
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can easily perceive—we do not have to recall the rule of place notation. Of course, there is an
exception: this external representation does not represent the rule of carry, and when we have to
deal with carry, we also have to recall the rule of place notation in order to write down numbers
at appropriate places. Now, with this external representation, we still have to recall the arithmetic
combinations of the single digit numbers (there are forty five combinations to memorize) and ap-
ply them to the vertically aligned numbers, starting from the right most column. We then obtain
57 + 35 = 92.
Addition in Arabic numerals requires a lot of internal operations, but with the external rep-
resentation, we use pattern matching (vertical alignment), the right-to-left spatial orientation, as
well as the movement of our hand from one column to next in order to create the sequence of
single-digit additions needed for the task. Note that without the external representation, we will
have to rely entirely on the concepts (internal representations) of ones place, tens place, and so on
to organize the sequence of additions.
Roman numerals, however, call for very different operations. The internal operations involved
are recalling the symbols (there are seven) and the simplification rules (one rule for each symbol).
The rest are perceptual and bodily actions (Figure 1.2). Thus, to go from Step R1 to R2, we simply
write down all the symbols appearing in the problem next to each other. To go from R2 to R3, we
group the symbols according to perceived similarities of the symbols’ shapes and then write down
the symbols from left to right, following the rule that the symbol for the largest number goes to the
left (Norman 1993, 66–75).
This simple case illustrates how different perceptual and bodily processes are used to perform
a cognitive task, depending on the kind of external representations being used. For example, in the
case of Arabic notation, the perceptual process used is that of spatial alignment of symbols, and
the bodily (i.e., hand) movement used is a sequential movement from one column to next. In the
Roman case, the perceptual process used is that of similarity between shapes of symbols, and the
bodily movement used is rewriting similar symbols next to each other (moving symbols for larger
numbers to the left).
This case also illustrates how even in the simple case of addition, paying attention to external
representations is important for better understanding mathematical practice. In Chapter 2, I develop
this thought further in the context of mathematical modeling, arguing that paying attention to
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external representations and scientists’ engagement with them is important for better understanding
the practice of modeling. In that chapter, I also discuss Jiajie Zhang and Donald Norman’s (1994)
experimental study of distributed cognition that supports the claim that external representations, if
used, are constitutive elements of the processes by which human beings perform cognitive tasks.
1.5.2 Models as External Representations
If we adopt the cognitive science based perspective on models and use the concepts of internal and
external representations to say what a model is, we can make three claims.
C1 Models are representations, which can be internal or external.
C2 Models are internal representations.
C3 Models are external representations.
C1 is weaker than the other two claims and can be interpreted as representing the cognitive science
based perspective on models. C2 and C3 can be interpreted as representing possible focal points
of this perspective. That is, if we accept C1 and C2, we are adopting the cognitive science based
perspective and specifically taking C2 as a guiding idea. We will then focus on internal represen-
tations and operations on them in the practice of modeling. Research on model-based reasoning in
science (Magnani et al. 1999, Magnani and Nersessian 2002, Nersessian 2008) is a good example
of the cognitive science based perspective on models with the focus on internal representations.9 If
we accept C1 and C3, we are also adopting the cognitive science based perspective but taking C3 as
a guiding idea. Rather than internal representations, our focus will be on external representations
in the practice of modeling. These two focal points are complementary, and debating whether C2
or C3 is true would be futile.
9A prominent view in cognitive science is that mental representations are like models: humans think by construct-
ing and manipulating mental models (Johnson-Laird 1980, 1983). Unfortunately, it is not always clear exactly what
proponents of this view mean by model or mental model (Rips 1986; Nersessian 2008, 93). Clarifying and elaborating
on the idea of mental models, Nancy Nersessian characterizes what she calls a conceptual model (a complex type of
mental models) as follows:
A model, for my present purposes, can be characterized loosely as a representation of a system with
interactive parts and with representations of those interactions. . . . [Conceptual models] are imaginary
systems designed to be structural, functional, or behavioral analogues of target phenomena. The models
are dynamical in that future states can be determined through mentally simulating the model. (Nersessian
2008, 12; see also p. 93)
Drawing on research on situated cognition, distributed cognition, and embodied mind, Nersessian studies scientists’
external representations to infer what their conceptual models and internal operations on them are like (e.g. Nersessian
2005, 2008).
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1.5.3 Overview of the Dissertation
In this dissertation, C3 is my guiding idea: I shall see models as external representations. Each
of the following chapters defends particular theses about models and the practice of modeling,
and the entire dissertation is an extended argument for the claim that shifting our perspective on
models from the metaphysics based perspective to the cognitive science based perspective with the
focus on external representations helps illuminate the practice of modeling in science. But this
shift of perspective may not seem substantive. For, after all, I am not questioning that represen-
tations are objects and that a model is a representation of parts of the world. But the important
difference is found in conceptual resources that inform each perspective: the metaphysics based
perspective applies concepts from metaphysics to models, whereas the cognitive science based
perspective applies concepts from cognitive science and other studies of representations to mod-
els. This difference alone does not suggest any incompatibility between the two perspectives, but I
argue in Chapter 2 that the cognitive science perspective illuminates the practice of mathematical
modeling, while the metaphysics based perspective obscures it.
Chapter 2 presents Ronald Giere’s and Michael Weisberg’s accounts of the practice of mod-
eling. I show that their accounts are developed from the metaphysics based perspective. In their
accounts, some models, such as scale models, are concrete, physical entities, and they are called
concrete models. Other models, such as mathematical models, are abstract, non-physical entities,
and they are called abstract models. Giere and Weisberg then suggest that scientists use interpreted
equations (and other external representations) to construct, manipulate, and analyze abstract mod-
els. The idea that equations are descriptions of models rather than models themselves echoes what
the semantic view says about the practice of modeling. After presenting Giere’s and Weisberg’s ac-
counts, I argue that the category of abstract models obscures rather than illuminates the practice of
modeling and that to better understand this practice, including mathematical modeling, we should
see models as external representations. I analyze mathematical modeling from this perspective.
Given the overall picture of the practice of modeling defended in Chapter 2, Chapters 3 and 4
analyze different aspects of this practice in detail. Chapter 3 concerns the relationship among uses
of a model, particular aims of research in which scientists use the model, and criteria of success
relevant to a given use of the model. I argue (i) that the relationship between uses of a model and
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particular aims of research is dynamic in the sense that uses of a model can shift over the course
of scientists’ research in response to the shift in aim, and (ii) that criteria of success for one use
of a model can be different from those for another use of the same model. I argue for these theses
using a detailed case study of Sewall Wright’s research on a specific plant population (Linanthus
parryae). The case study reveals that the context of Wright’s research radically changed over the
course of research between 1941 and 1978, while he continued using the same models developed
near the beginning of his research. My analysis of Wright’s research shows that he put models to
a variety of uses and that some of Wright’s uses of models changed in response to the changing
aims of his research and that criteria of success for one use of his model were different from—even
irrelevant to—another use of the same model.
Chapter 4 argues that in successful scientific research, a scientist uses a model according to
the methodological principles of realism and instrumentalism despite the tension that they create
among the scientist’s uses of the model over time. I develop this thesis by reflecting on Howard
Stein’s idea on realism and instrumentalism. After giving precise formulations of the realist and
instrumentalist methodological principles, I argue for my thesis through a detailed analysis of
successful scientific research done by Seymour Benzer in the 1950s and 60s. I then argue that
epistemic realism or epistemic instrumentalism—forms of realism and instrumentalism familiar
in the philosophical literature—by itself prohibits a scientist from adopting both the realist and
instrumentalist methodological principles. This result poses new challenges to realists and instru-
mentalists, and I briefly suggest possible avenues of response that realists and instrumentalists may
take.
1.6 AGENTIAL PERSPECTIVE ON MODELS
One of the lessons of the case studies in Chapters 3 and 4 is that scientists use models in many
different ways to accomplish the aims of their research. This thesis is similar to one of the central
theses emerging from the contributions to Models as Mediators (Morgan and Morrison 1999).
Although I am very sympathetic to their focus on heterogeneous roles of models, the models-as-
mediators group adopts what I call the agential perspective on models, which results in descriptions
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of the practice that I find wanting. Thus, to further clarify my perspective on models, I briefly
contrast two perspectives.
From the agential perspective, we see models as agents playing some roles. Models are “au-
tonomous agents” (Morrison and Morgan 1999, 10) that plays a variety of roles in scientific prac-
tice. Models are autonomous in the sense that they are, at least partly, independent from back-
ground theories and the world. Margaret Morrison and Mary Morgan (1999) survey the roles of
various models found in the case studies in Models as Mediators and classify them into three
broad categories: “Models in theory construction and exploration,” “Models and measurement,”
and “Models for design and intervention” (Morrison and Morgan 1999, 18–25). For example, in
the first category, Morrison and Morgan include the use of models to introduce concepts and to
explore characteristics or implications of a theory in a concrete situation (1999, 18–19). In the
second category, they mention the use of models as measurement devices (1999, 21), and in the
third category, they include the use of models to design various technologies, including means of
intervention (1999, 23–24).
In my view, models can be autonomous agents only in a metaphorical sense, because they are
not in fact agents like human beings. As Daniela Bailer-Jones observes:
The terminology of “autonomy” clearly implies that there is an agent, especially as
Morrison talks about “autonomous agents,” yet it is clearly not the case that a model can
be anything like a human agent who “decides” to “act” in some autonomous manner. In
contrast, it is people who may decide how closely a model needs to relate to the world,
and how tightly empirical and theoretical constraints have to be adhered to in a particular
instance. (Bailer-Jones 2009, 136)
While the agential perspective may be useful to reveal various purposes for which models are used,
it tends to locate agency in a wrong place. In fact, the descriptions of scientific practice offered by
those who adopt the agential perspective often tell us what models do rather than what scientists
do with models. Morrison and Morgan frequently use the phrase “models function as . . . ” (e.g.,
Morrison and Morgan 1999, 18–24). This locution fits the agential perspective, but a consequence
of using this locution is that very rarely descriptions of the practice of modeling feature human
beings and their actions (see, e.g., Morrison 1998, 71–76; Cartwright 1999, 263–278).
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This must be an unintended consequence of the agential perspective. But the agential per-
spective on models seems to lack resources to capture embodied aspects of scientific practice. For
example, it does not help us to specify the perceptual and bodily processes that scientists use to
engage with models in order to perform cognitive and epistemic tasks, because from this perspec-
tive, it is models that perform these tasks. But the talk about models as agents playing various
roles is a metaphorical way of talking about a variety of purposes for which scientists use models,
and Morrison and Morgan sometimes talk in this way (e.g., Morrison and Morgan 1999, 11). And
they would not disagree with Bailer-Jones that it is in fact human beings (scientists) who perform
actions with models in order to accomplish some purposes.
The agential perspective does not seem to offer a distinct advantage over the cognitive science
based perspective. From either perspective, we can characterize various uses of models in science.
But the agential perspective can be misleading to the extent that it misattributes agency to models
and fails to describe human actions. The cognitive science based perspective does not have this
disadvantage.
1.7 CONCLUSION
In this chapter I have explained some of the most influential answers to the question of what a
model is. In the semantic view of theories, models are understood as mathematical entities (e.g.,
set-theoretical structures) or abstract entities (in the informal version of the semantic view). In
response to the latter idea, philosophers have argued that some models are concrete entities or
imagined concrete entities. I have argued that except for the conception of models as mathematical
entities, all these views take the metaphysics based perspective on models in the sense that they
apply the basic concepts of objects—abstract and concrete entities—developed in metaphysics. I
have sketched the alternative perspective that applies the concepts of internal and external repre-
sentations from cognitive science. My own perspective is the cognitive science based perspective
with a focus on external representations: I see models as external representations that scientists in-
teract with via perceptual and bodily processes in order to perform cognitive and epistemic tasks.
I then contrasted this perspective with the agential perspective characteristic of the models as me-
19
diators group. I have argued that the agential perspective is misleading because it tends to attribute
agency to models while neglecting human actions. This is not a tendency that the cognitive science
perspective has.
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2.0 MODELS AS EXTERNAL REPRESENTATIONS
2.1 INTRODUCTION
Mathematical modeling features equations and graphs that are interpreted as representing aspects
of real-world systems. Consider, for example, a typical textbook presentation of the Lotka-Volterra
model of the predator-prey system:
The simplest imaginable model for the predator-prey system . . . is to assume (1) expo-
nential growth of the prey [whose size at time t is X(t)] in the absence of the predator
[whose size at t is Y (t)], (2) a linear functional response for the predators [i.e., the rate
of prey capture increases linearly with the size of the prey population], (3) a numerical
response for the predators [i.e., the captured prey’s influence on the rate of increase of
predators] that is a constant times the linear functional response, and (4) a constant death
rate among the predators. With these assumptions we have
dX
dt
= rX − (aX)Y (2.1.1)
dY
dt
= b(aX)Y − dY (2.1.2)
[. . . ] The variable, r, is the intrinsic rate of increase of the prey; (aX) is the functional
response and a is the slope of the predator’s functional response curve; b is the constant
that relates the numerical response to the functional response; and d is the death rate of
the predators. (Roughgarden 1979, 434–435)1
1For convenience, I use X and Y to denote the dependent variables. Roughgarden uses V and P for X and Y ,
respectively.
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The presentation then goes on to show how scientists usually analyze Equations (2.1.1) and (2.1.2),
what conclusions they may or may not draw about the real-world predator-prey system based on
the analysis of the equations, and how they can modify the equations to accommodate different
assumptions (e.g. Roughgarden 1979, 435–450).
Mathematical modeling raises a number of philosophical questions. For example, (i) What is a
mathematical model? Is the Lotka-Volterra model the suitably interpreted equations or something
else? (ii) What is the practice of mathematical modeling? (iii) How should we understand the
representational relationship between a mathematical model and a real-world system of predators
and prey? The answers to (ii) and (iii) depend on what we identify as a model, and (iii) is further
complicated by the fact that some of the assumptions (e.g., the exponential growth of the prey)
appear to be idealizations. Questions like these, of course, are not restricted to mathematical
modeling and can arise for modeling more generally.
In this chapter, I focus on (i) and (ii). In an influential account of the practice of model-
ing that takes the metaphysics based perspective, (i) and (ii) are answered in the following way.
Some models, such as scale models, are concrete, physical entities, and they are called concrete
models. Other models, such as mathematical models, are abstract, non-physical entities, and they
are called abstract models. Equations and graphs used in mathematical modeling are not ab-
stract models because they are concrete entities. Thus, the Lotka-Volterra model is not Equa-
tions (2.1.1) and (2.1.2). It is an abstract model. This account goes on to answer (ii) by suggesting
that scientists use equations to construct, manipulate, and analyze abstract models. In this account,
then, mathematical modeling is a practice of constructing, manipulating, and analyzing abstract
models for the purpose of scientific research.
My aim in this chapter is twofold. First, I want to show that for the purpose of understanding
the practice of mathematical modeling, the metaphysics based perspective is misguided because
the category of abstract models obscures rather than illuminates this practice. Second, I want to
develop alternative answers to (i) and (ii) by showing that to better understand the modeling prac-
tice we should think of models as external representations. I argue that this cognitive science based
perspective is more useful for analyzing the modeling practice, including mathematical modeling.
The plan of the chapter is as follows: Sections 2.2 and 2.3 present the influential account of the
practice of modeling developed by Ronald Giere and Michael Weisberg. Section 2.4 criticizes this
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account by showing that the underlying metaphysics based perspective creates serious problems.
Section 2.5 states the basic commitments of the alternative account I favor, and Section 2.6 gives a
different analysis of mathematical modeling. Section 2.7 considers some objections to my account,
and Section 2.8 summarizes the main argument.
2.2 ACCOUNTS OF MODELING FROM THE METAPHYSICS BASED
PERSPECTIVE
Giere and Weisberg have articulated an influential account of the practice of scientific modeling.
Their account is developed from the metaphysics based perspective on models and is committed to
the following theses:
M1 Some scientific models are concrete entities (call them concrete models, while others
are abstract entities (call them abstract models).
M2 Scientists construct, manipulate, and analyze abstract models by constructing, manipu-
lating, and analyzing external representations of the models, such as equations, graphs,
and diagrams.
M1 represents the metaphysics based perspective outlined in Chapter 1 and applies the concepts
of abstract and concrete entities to models. According to the common characterization of abstract
entities, they are either non-spatiotemporally located or causally inefficacious or both.2 Paradig-
matic examples of abstract objects are mathematical objects, such as numbers, functions, and sets
(Rosen 2012). Unlike abstract objects, concrete objects are spatiotemporally located and causally
efficacious.3 M1 divides scientific models into abstract entities and concrete entities. The Lotka-
Volterra model is an example of an abstract model, and the double helix model that Watson and
Crick built from metal plates and rods is an example of a concrete model.
M2 states the relationship between abstract models and external representations, such as equa-
tions, graphs, and diagrams. These representations are not themselves models but are representa-
2This characterization follows what David Lewis calls “The Negative Way” (Lewis 1986, 83). For discussion of
other ways to characterize abstract objects, see Lewis (1986, 81–86).
3This ontological distinction is different from another abstract/concrete distinction discussed in the literature (e.g.,
Cartwright 1989, Ch. 5; Cartwright 1999, 259–261). The other distinction has to do with the relation between an
abstract (or general) description or concept and a concrete (or specific) description or concept.
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tions of abstract models. They are related to abstract models in such a way that when scientists
construct, manipulate, and analyze external representations, what they do is to construct, manipu-
late, and analyze abstract models. In other words, M2 says what it is that scientists do in practice
when models being used are abstract models.
In the rest of this section, I show that Giere and Weisberg are committed to M1 and M2. I also
explain their reasons for accepting these theses.
2.2.1 Giere’s Account
Giere argues for M1 through his observation of textbooks in classical mechanics:
Mechanics texts continually refer to such things as “the linear oscillator,” “the free mo-
tion of a symmetrical rigid body,” “the motion of a body subject only to a central grav-
itational force,” and the like. Yet the texts themselves make clear that the paradigm
examples of such systems fail to satisfy fully the equations by which they are described.
No frictionless pendulum exists, nor does any body subject to no external forces what-
soever. How are we to make sense of this apparent conflict? (Giere 1988, 78)
The descriptions of the linear oscillator and so on that Giere refers to are what Martin Thomson-
Jones calls the descriptions of “missing systems” (Thomson-Jones 2010, 284). As Giere observed,
the descriptions of the linear oscillator and so on in textbooks appear to be descriptions of actual
systems, but as scientists acknowledge, no real-world system satisfies the descriptions. There is
thus a puzzle about missing systems: How should we interpret the descriptions of missing systems?
Giere proposes M1 as a solution to the puzzle about missing systems:
I propose that we regard the simple harmonic oscillator and the like as abstract entities
having all and only the properties ascribed to them in the standard texts. (Giere 1988,
78)
Giere’s solution is to provide an ontology of missing systems. Missing systems exist not in the
physical world but in the realm of abstract entities, and missing systems are abstract entities that
have exactly the properties specified by descriptions of them. Thus, for Giere, the terms like ‘the
harmonic oscillator’ refer to abstract entities that have exactly the properties specified in mechanics
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textbooks. Moreover, he suggests that abstract entities like the harmonic oscillator are models
(Giere 1988, 79), which
function as “representations” in one of the more general senses now current in cognitive
psychology. Theoretical models are the means by which scientists represent the world—
both to themselves and for others. They are used to represent the diverse systems found
in the real world: springs and pendulums, projectiles and planets, violin strings and
drum heads. (Giere 1988, 80)
What he calls “theoretical models” are also called “abstract models” (Giere 1999, 51). Thus,
to resolve the puzzle about missing systems, Giere posits abstract entities exactly satisfying the
descriptions of such systems, and he further claims that scientists use these abstract entities to
represent the real-world systems.
There are three things in Giere’s picture so far: statements or equations in the textbook (i.e.,
descriptions of missing systems), abstract models, and the real-world systems. How are these
things related? According to Giere, statements or equations characterize or define models:
The relationship between some (suitably interpreted) equations and their corresponding
model may be described as one of characterization, or even definition. . . . The equations
truly describe the model because the model is defined as something that exactly satisfies
the equations. (Giere 1988, 79)
To characterize a model in Giere’s sense is to construct a model, because he thinks that abstract
entities are constructed by scientists with the help of representational devices, such as sentences
and equations (Giere 1988, 78; Giere 2004, 747). His view, then, is that when scientists write
down equations, such as Equations (2.1.1) and (2.1.2), and give them interpretations, scientists are
constructing an abstract model. In addition, Giere understands the relationship between models
and the real-world systems in terms of similarity, and scientists need to specify in what respect and
to what degree that a given model is similar to a given real-world system. Giere calls claims that
specify the similarity relation in this way “hypotheses” (Giere 1988, 80–81). Giere summarizes
these relations in a diagram (Figure 2.1), which has been adopted by other philosophers (see, e.g.,
Weisberg 2003, 8; Godfrey-Smith 2006a, 733).
M2 is a claim about relation R in Figure 2.1, and as we saw, Giere understands R to be charac-
terization or definition as well as construction. Scientists use linguistic entities, such as sentences
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Figure 2.1: Giere’s account of the relationship between external representational devises, models,
and the real-world target systems. modeling practice. Giere characterizes relation R as statements
characterizing or defining a model. Redrawn from Giere (1988, 83; 1999, 55).
and equations, to define and construct a model, which is not itself a linguistic entity (Giere 1988,
47).4 Giere proposes M2 as a better alternative to the logical positivist view of the relationship
between a scientific theory and the world. He thinks that the problem with the logical positivist
view is its preoccupation with language:
Most theories of science, whether old or new, assume that any representational rela-
tionship between theory and reality would have to be understood as a “correspondence”
between scientific statements and the world. The fate of any understanding of theories
as somehow representing reality has thus been linked to the fortunes of a correspon-
dence theory of truth. It is here that the battle is usually joined. The interpretation I have
offered . . . undercuts these arguments by denying the common assumption. There is, on
this account, no direct relationship between sets of statements and the real world. The
relationship is indirect through the intermediary of a theoretical model, as pictured in
[Figure 2.1]. (Giere 1988, 82; see also Giere 1999, 50, 55)
In other words, Giere wants to make the analysis of the relationship between models and the world
not dependent on the analysis of the relationship between language and the world. For Giere, this
means that linguistic and other representational devices used to construct and define models are less
important than models themselves: “When viewing the content of a science, we find the models
4As we saw in Chapter 1, Giere has developed a general account of how models are constructed from principles or
laws of a theory.
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occupying center stage. The particular linguistic resources used to characterize those models are
of at most secondary interest” (Giere 1988, 79; my emphasis). I highlight this point, as I argue
below that to understand the practice of modeling it is important to pay close attention to external
representations used by scientists.
2.2.2 Weisberg’s Account
Weisberg uses the Lotka-Volterra model and its analysis as his primary case of mathematical mod-
eling (Weisberg 2007, 210–212, 222–223; 2010; 2013, esp., 3–4, 10–13, 25–29, 36–37, 40–41, 74–
81). In summarizing his account of mathematical modeling, I want to highlight his metaphysics
based perspective, that is, his commitment to M1 (Weisberg 2007, 216–217; see also Weisberg
2013, 7). Weisberg argues that the modeling practice has three distinct stages: construction of a
model, analysis of a model, and comparison of a model with a real-world target system.5 I focus
on the first two stages where his commitment to M1 and M2 appears very clearly.
Following Giere, Weisberg distinguishes between a model and its description. In the case of
mathematical modeling, for Weisberg, an interpreted equation or graph is not a model but only
a description of a model, which is an abstract entity. Weisberg calls relation R in Figure 2.1
specification, which can be partial and is less strict than definition (Weisberg 2007, 217; 2013,
34–35). He says:
At its base, the [specification] relationship is representational; model descriptions rep-
resent models. And while the relationship is not one-to-one between models and model
descriptions, there is still a very tight link. Thus I will speak of model descriptions as
specifying models, and of models as realizing model descriptions. (Weisberg 2013, 35)
He also says that different model descriptions can describe a single model and that a single model
description, if it is vague or imprecise in some respects, can describe different models (Weisberg
2013, 34–35).
Weisberg gives two reasons for distinguishing between a model and a model description. The
first reason is that this distinction is an insight of the semantic view of theories: “One of the most
important insights behind the semantic view and other attempts to reconstruct theories as sets of
5Weisberg observes that the third stage is optional.
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models is that a theory should not depend on a particular linguistic formulation” (Weisberg 2007,
217). As we saw, Giere has also argued that this is an advantage of his account over the logical
positivist view of scientific theories. The second reason, according to Weisberg, is that in his view,
scientists themselves use equations and other external representations to describe models:
More importantly for understanding the practice of modeling, a modeler often conceives
of a model in a vague way, writes down some equations to describe the model she
thought she had in mind, studies the model actually specified by the equations, and
determines whether or not they pick out the right model. Situations can arise where the
modeler’s imagination picks out some set of models and her model description picks out
a different set of models, necessitating a refinement either to her imagination or to her
model description. (Weisberg 2007, 217)
I want to note in passing that Weisberg’s reasons are weak. First, an account of the practice
of modeling need not be compatible with the semantic view. As we saw in Chapter 1, some
proponents of the semantic view have a goal of formally reconstructing a scientific theory, and this
goal is not necessarily the same as the goal of understanding scientific practice (Bailer-Jones 2009,
127; see also Downes 1992). Second, the situation Weisberg describes in the above passage does
not call for abstract entities at all, for it seems to be the situation where a scientist uses external
representations to think further about the content of her internal representation. In fact, Weisberg’s
own words—“conceives,” “had in mind,” “the modeler’s imagination”—suggest that the situation
can be understood as concerning the interaction between internal and external representations,
rather than that between abstract entities and external representations.
Let us now turn to Weisberg’s account of the first two stages of modeling. The first stage is
the construction of a model. In the case of mathematical modeling, this means construction of an
abstract entity. Weisberg says that a mathematical model, which is an abstract entity, is constructed
by writing down external representations, such as equations and graphs, which describe the model:
“In mathematical modeling, construction is achieved by writing down the model description for
the model, typically in the form of equations or graphs” (Weisberg 2013, 75). The Lotka-Volterra
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model is described by Equations (2.1.1) and (2.1.2). The construction of the Lotka-Volterra model
is complete when the equations are written down and interpretations are given.6
The second stage of the modeling practice is the analysis of a model. As Weisberg says,
analysis is done in many different ways, and here I focus on his description of the analysis of the
Lotka-Volterra model. According to Weisberg, scientists can manipulate and analyze mathematical
models only by manipulating model descriptions:
Equations or other kinds of statements specify mathematical objects and these objects
satisfy their descriptions. However, unlike in the case of concrete models, mathematical
models can be studied and manipulated only via their descriptions. While the Lotka-
Volterra model itself is not a set of equations, it can be studied only through proxies
such as these equations. (Weisberg 2013, 36–37)
Thus, scientists can analyze the Lotka-Volterra model only by analyzing its descriptions. In his
presentation of the analysis of this model, Weisberg first says that the steady states of the model
are found “by setting both equations [Equations (2.1.1) and (2.1.2)] to zero and solving for [X]
and [Y]” (Weisberg 2013, 81). He then describes, by paraphrasing May (1973, 42), how the
stability of the solutions of the Lotka-Volterra model is studied “by constructing the community
matrix for the model” (Weisberg 2013, 81). I quote his description in full below; it will become
apparent in Section 2.6 that his description is an inadequate account of how scientists analyze
Equations (2.1.1) and (2.1.2).7 Here’s what he says (technical details are not important at the
moment):
To do this [i.e., to study the stability of the solutions], we start from the (unstable)
equilibrium point and write down the community matrix, which has the following form:
A =
 0 −αm/β
βr/α 0
 (2.2.1)
If we solve for the eigenvalues of this matrix, we get the complex conjugate:
λ = ±i(αβ)1/2 (2.2.2)
6Weisberg identifies four components—“an assignment, the modeler’s intended scope, and two kinds of fidelity
criteria” (Weisberg 2013, 76)—of interpretation of a model, which is described by an external representation. I skip
this detail as it is irrelevant for my purpose.
7That is, May’s (1973, 42) passage that Weisberg paraphrases concerns only a particular step in the analysis of
Equations (2.1.1) and (2.1.2).
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Because this eigenvalue has real parts equal to zero, the oscillations will be neutrally
stable. This means that they will continue indefinitely and, if they are disturbed in any
way, they will not have a tendency to return to their original amplitude, nor will they
become unstable. (Weisberg 2013, 81)
He concludes by saying, “We can learn about the behavior of the model over its entire domain
by doing mathematics” (Weisberg 2013, 81; emphasis mine). It is true that scientists analyze
mathematical models by doing mathematics, but this does not help us understand the practice of
modeling much. We still need to know how scientists do mathematics, which will be discussed in
Section 2.6.
2.3 THE METAPHYSICS BASED PERSPECTIVE AND DISTRIBUTED COGNITION
The accounts of the practice of modeling articulated by Giere and Weisberg are committed to M1
and M2. In this section, I first describe research on distributed cognition and then present the recent
attempts by Giere and Marion Vorms to interpret distributed cognition from the metaphysics based
perspective. Their attempts are important for my purpose because in my view they have exposed a
serious problem with M1 and M2.
2.3.1 Distributed Cognition
The theoretical framework in cognitive science known as distributed cognition emphasizes how
real-life human cognitive processes occur as people interact with other people and manipulate
objects in their environment (Norman 1993, Zhang and Norman 1994, Hutchins 1995, Hollan
et al. 2000, Kirsh 2006). In other words, real-life cognitive processes are not entirely internal to
a person’s mind but distributed across a group of people and the external environment. In this
framework, a cognitive process—a process performing a cognitive task—is said to be distributed
if it involves interaction between representations that are internal to the mind of a task performer
and those that are external, such as physical objects in the environment. Here I describe the aspects
of this research that I take to be important for understanding the modeling practice.
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Figure 2.2: Three versions of the Tower of Hanoi: (A) The Tower of Hanoi (standard), (B) the
Oranges Puzzle, and (C) the Coffee Cups Puzzle. Redrawn from (Zhang and Norman 1994, 92,
106; Norman 1993, 84, 87, 88)
Let us focus on a game often used in cognitive science, the Tower of Hanoi (TOH). Jiajie Zhang
and Donald Norman (1994) developed three versions of TOH. In the standard TOH (Figure 2.2 A),
the three disks are stacked on one pole at the start, and the task performer is to move one disk at
a time to create a designated configuration. For example, for the starting configuration shown in
Figure 2.2 A, the goal configuration has the large disk on the right pole, the medium disk on the
left pole, and the small disk on the center pole. The task performer is to follow two rules: (1) Only
one disk can be moved from one pole to another at a time, and (2) a disk can only be moved to a
pole where it will be the largest. There is another rule that is not stated in the standard TOH: (3)
Only the largest disk on a pole can be moved to another pole (Zhang and Norman 1994, 93). In the
standard TOH, if the task performer memorizes and follows Rules 1 and 2, then it is not necessary
to learn Rule 3, because the physical structure of TOH, together with Rules 1 and 2, guarantees
that Rule 3 be followed. Thus, Zhang and Norman say that in the standard TOH, Rules 1 and 2 are
represented internally, while Rule 3 is represented externally:
Internal rules are memorized rules that are explicitly stated as written propositions in the
instructions for experiments. External rules are not stated in any form in the instructions.
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They are the constraints that are embedded in or implied by physical configurations and
can be perceived and followed without being explicitly formulated. (Zhang and Norman
1994, 93)
Zhang and Norman developed two other versions of TOH to vary which rule is represented
internally or externally. In the version of TOH called “The Oranges Puzzle” (Norman 1993, 86;
Zhang and Norman 1994, 108), instead of disks on poles, there are three oranges with different
sizes that are placed on plates (Figure 2.2 B). At the beginning of the task, the oranges are placed
on one plate, and the task performer is to move one orange at a time to create a designated config-
uration. The rules are:
Rule 1: Only one orange can be moved from one plate to another at a time.
Rule 2: An orange can only be moved to a plate where it will be the largest:
Rule 3: Only the largest orange on a plate can be moved to another plate.
In the Oranges Puzzle, all these rules are to be represented internally: they have to be memorized.
In the third version of TOH called “The Coffee Cups Puzzle” (Norman 1993, 87; Zhang and
Norman 1994, 108), there are three different cups of coffee and plates (Figure 2.2 C). Each plate
has space for only one cup, and at the beginning, the three cups are placed on top of each other, the
smallest one at the bottom and the largest one on top. The task performer is to move one cup at a
time without spilling coffee to create a designated configuration. The rules are:
Rule 1: Only one cup can be moved from one plate to another at a time.
Rule 2: A cup can only be moved to a plate where it will be the largest.
Rule 3: Only the largest cup on a plate can be moved to another plate.
In this case, only Rule 1 is internal. Rule 2 is represented externally by the fact that coffee will
spill if a smaller cup is stacked on top of a larger one. Rule 3 is also represented externally by the
fact that a plate holds only one cup. Thus, physically, the only way to place two cups on a plate
is to stack a larger cup on top of a smaller one. So the task performer does not need to internalize
Rules 2 and 3.
In their experiments, Zhang and Norman had subjects do different versions of TOH and eval-
uated their performances. They found that the subjects took most time and most steps, and made
most errors when given the Oranges Puzzle, and the subjects took less time and fewer steps, and
made fewer errors when given the standard TOH or the Coffee Cups Puzzle (Zhang and Norman
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1994, 109–110). Zhang and Norman thus concluded that the presence of external rules improved
the subjects’ performance.
Solving TOH is a cognitive task, and all three versions of TOH can be shown to have the same
formal structure (Zhang and Norman 1994, 98–99). Thus, we can say that a task performer per-
forms the same cognitive task when she is given any version of TOH. But Zhang and Norman’s
study suggests that in order to understand what she actually does to perform the task, we must pay
attention to the particular combination of internal and external representations she uses, because
the actual cognitive process involves her interaction with external representations. For a task per-
former, according to Zhang and Norman, the three versions of TOH are “simply three different
problems” (Zhang and Norman 1994, 90).
2.3.2 Distributed Cognition and Abstract Models
In his recent work, Giere argues that cognitive processes in science, such as experiments and
modeling, are distributed cognitive processes (Giere 2002a,b; Giere and Moffatt 2003; Giere 2006,
100). After showing how we can easily understand cognitive processes involving concrete models
as distributed (Giere 2006, 101–105), Giere argues that interaction with abstract models can also
count as a distributed cognitive process. But he notes that there are special problems:
Abstract models provide what is probably the most difficult case for understanding rea-
soning with models as an example of distributed cognition. It is not clear in what sense
an abstract model can be external. Nor is it clear how a person can interact with an
abstract model. Yet many, if not most, models used in the sciences are abstract models.
Think particularly of models in quantum physics or cosmology. So some account of
reasoning with abstract models is needed. (Giere 2006, 105)
Distributed cognition involves an agent and a representation external to her. Thus, as Giere notes,
there are at least two ontological problems with abstract models. First, there is the problem of
externality. Diagrams, pictures, and other physical objects are unproblematically external to an
agent, but since an abstract object is not a physical object, it is not clear how an abstract object
can be external to an agent. Second, there is the problem of interactivity. It is unproblematic that
an agent interacts with physical objects, but since an abstract object is neither spatiotemporally
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located nor capable of standing in a causal relation, it is not clear how she can interact with an
abstract object. These problems are particularly serious for Giere’s account of modeling because
he believes that many scientific models are abstract models.
Giere responds to the externality problem by suggesting that we understand an abstract model
like a planned party, a possible but not actual entity. He insists that this response avoids philosoph-
ical problems associated with abstract objects. He writes:
[E]ven if we agree that abstract models are in some sense external, there remains a
question of just what this means. This question threatens to lead us into the arid land of
the philosophy of mathematics, where one worries about what numbers might be. I think
we would do well to avoid this detour and take a safer route. As in our understanding
of time, we traffic in abstract entities every day without worrying about what they are or
how we interact with them. Consider plans and planning, well-known topics in cognitive
science. Here abstract models are simply taken for granted. Suppose three friends are
planning a party. The planned party is, at least in part, an abstract model of a party. It is
assigned a date and time in the future and potential guests may even be designated in a
written list. The party starts out as an abstract entity, a mere possibility, because it may
in fact never materialize. (Giere 2006, 105–106)
Here Giere seems to think that understanding a planned party as an abstract object external to us is
not problematic because we do so without worrying about potential ontological problems, such as
what such an object is or how we interact with it. I will return to this response below, and for the
moment I note that this answer begs the question since the externality problem denies that what
Giere claims we do everyday—e.g., talking about a potential party as if it is an external object—is
unproblematic.
To deal with the interactivity problem, Giere argues that scientists interact with abstract models
by using language (Giere 2006, 106). Referring to the party example, he says:
The three friends in my example build up their model of the party by talking about
it. Moreover, they can reason about it as well, realizing, for example, that the number
of potential guests has become too large for the intended space. It does not follow,
however, that the possible party is itself in any way propositional, a mere linguistic
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entity. My three friends are not talking about what they are saying; they are talking
about a possible party. (Giere 2006, 106)
We saw above that for Giere, the relation R between language and other representational devices
and models is one of characterization of definition (Figure 2.1). He is now making a further claim
that language and other representational devices are the means by which we create and interact
with abstract models. Giere concludes his discussion as follows:
Even this rudimentary understanding of abstract models as abstract entities is enough to
support our understanding of the development and use of abstract models as an instance
of distributed cognition. Traditional scientists sitting alone with pencil and paper are
already distributed cognitive systems. They interact physically with their diagrams and
equations and, thereby, abstractly with an assumed more complex abstract model. (Giere
2006, 106)
Thus, for Giere, scientists interact with the Lotka-Volterra model by manipulating Equations (2.1.1)
and (2.1.2).8
In her critical discussion of Giere’s account, Vorms (2011) develops a potentially viable solu-
tion to the externality problem that does not reject M1 or M2. Vorms accepts M1 and M2 (Vorms
2011, 288, 290) but wants to resist the idea, explicitly defended by Giere (1988, 79), that particular
linguistic devices used to characterize abstract models are of secondary importance in an account
of the practice of modeling. Vorms argues that even if scientists have external representations of
the same system, the actual process and efficiency of their reasoning depend on how these repre-
sentations convey information about the system: they depend on what she calls the “format” of
representations (Vorms 2011, 289).9 She also insists that an abstract model “has to be accessed
by a representation of some sort, since one cannot have a direct perceptual access to it” (Vorms
2011, 290). In another sentence, she says: “Since [an abstract model] does not exist in the spatio-
temporal world, it has to be accessed by means of our representational capacities such as language”
(Vorms 2011, 290). Although the meaning of “access” is not entirely clear, these claims can be
seen as a version of M2. Vorms appeals to her version of M2 to argue that whenever scientists use
8As we saw, Weisberg also holds a very similar view.
9Very roughly, an equation and a graph of an equation convey information differently and thus count as having
different formats. For a more precise characterization of formats, see (Vorms 2011, 289–290).
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or reason with abstract models, they use external representations of those models (Vorms 2011,
293).10
Perhaps Vorms could evade the externality problem by saying that we do not need an expla-
nation of how abstract models can be external objects since scientists never reason with abstract
models themselves. Scientists must use representations of abstract models, and these representa-
tions are external to them. But this response works only if there is an explanation for M2, because it
is Vorms’s version of M2 that supports the claim that scientists must use representations of abstract
models.
I agree with Vorms that external representations are important in the practice of modeling
and that their importance is suggested by research on distributed cognition. But as I argue in the
next section, I think her acceptance of M1 and M2 undermines her account as well as Giere’s and
Weisberg’s.
2.4 PROBLEMSWITH THE METAPHYSICS BASED PERSPECTIVE
In my view, the problems of externality and interactivity that Giere has identified undermine the
metaphysics based perspective.
As we saw, Giere tries to reconcile his view that many or most scientific models are abstract
models—i.e., M1–with the idea that modeling is a distributed cognitive process where models are
external to scientists. Giere offers what he considers a safe response: ontologically, an abstract
model is like a possible object, such as a planned party, which in everyday life people talk about as
if it is an external object. I think Giere is convinced of the safety of this response because he simply
takes for granted the idea that possible objects (e.g., plans) are abstract entities.11 But this amounts
to the claim that possible objects exist outside of our minds and are abstract entities. This is hardly
10Ultimately, Vorms argues that philosophers should focus on a representational relationship between statements,
equations, and diagrams (which characterize an abstract model) and the target system rather than the relationship
between an abstract model itself and the target system (Vorms 2011, 294). In other words, using Figure 2.1, we can
say that in Vorms’s account, there is an arrow emanating from statements and other things displayed at bottom left to
the target system displayed at bottom right. And she questions the value of wondering about the double-headed arrow
connecting a model and a target system in the figure.
11Giere appears to think that it is taken for granted in cognitive science that plans are abstract entities (Giere 2006,
105–106). But at least some cognitive scientists think of plans as internal representations (Suchman 1987).
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a safe route, for it is a substantive ontological position about possible objects, which should force
Giere to deal with ontological problems about possible objects (see Yagisawa 2013). In short,
either Giere substituted one ontological problem (the problem of externality of abstract entities)
with another (the problem of possible objects), or he reintroduced the problem of externality in his
response by suggesting that possible objects, such as a planned party, are abstract entities.
We also saw that both Giere and Weisberg argue that external representations are means for
constructing, manipulating, and analyzing abstract models. For example, manipulation of Equa-
tions (2.1.1) and (2.1.2) results in manipulation of an abstract model called the Lotka-Volterra
model. This is M2. Now, since abstract models cannot stand in a causal relation, it needs to
be explained just how our constructing, manipulating, and analyzing external representations like
Equations (2.1.1) and (2.1.2) result in the construction, manipulation, and analysis of abstract enti-
ties. But in both Giere’s and Weisberg’s accounts, no such explanation is provided: their accounts
are committed to M2 but do not explain how it can be true. I suggest that the failure to provide any
explanation for M2 tells us that there is a basic problem with the metaphysics based perspective.
That is, the metaphysics based perspective does not provide a viable explanation for M2 because
such an explanation is not forthcoming or extremely hard to develop. This makes sense, because
providing a viable theory of how concrete objects like external representations interact with math-
ematical objects conceived as abstract entities is one of the most difficult problems in metaphysics
and philosophy of mathematics.12
Two lessons emerge from the above discussion. First, if we hold M1, it is hard to develop an
account of the practice of modeling in which many aspects of the practice are seen as distributed
cognitive processes. Second, although it is natural to hold M2, given M1, it is very hard to give
an explanation for M2. But such an explanation is needed if M2 is to give us an insight into the
practice of modeling. Both lessons suggest that for the purpose of understanding the practice of
modeling, M1 and M2 are problematic commitments to base our account on. The metaphysics
based perspective obscures rather than illuminates the practice of modeling in science.
12It is worth mentioning another problem with M1 and M2 that is independent of the problems I just raised. For
Giere and Weisberg, Equations(2.1.1) and (2.1.2) characterize an abstract entity, which scientists use as a model of
a real-world system. Equations(2.1.1) and (2.1.2) say that the values of X and Y change over time. But an abstract
entity cannot have a temporal property as it does not exist in space and time. So a model description cannot be true
of an abstract entity that it is supposed to characterize or define. For a discussion of this problem, see Thomson-Jones
(2010).
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2.5 THE COGNITIVE SCIENCE BASED PERSPECTIVE: MODELS AS EXTERNAL
REPRESENTATIONS
In this and subsequent sections, I develop the cognitive science based perspective as an alternative
to the metaphysics based perspective.
My account of the practice of modeling draws on research on distributed cognition. As we
saw, when the task performer solved the standard TOH and the Coffee Cups Puzzle, her cognitive
process was distributed and was more efficient and reliable than the process for the Oranges Puzzle.
For my purpose, the important lesson of distributed cognition research is that our perceptual and
bodily interactions with physical objects in a given environment are part of how we perform a
cognitive task and that difference in our cognitive and epistemic performance can be explained in
terms of how we are able to use our perceptual and bodily processes. As Zhang and Norman argue,
external representations transform a cognitive task in the sense that for a task performer, external
representations are constitutive of the task (Zhang and Norman 1994, 118–119).
I will develop my account by gradually extending the framework of distributed cognition to
modeling. My account differs from Giere’s and Weisberg’s accounts because the central analytic
categories are those of internal and external representations rather than those of concrete and ab-
stract objects. My account is based on the following theses:
E1 Scientific models are external representations.
E2 Scientific modeling is a practice of constructing, manipulating, and analyzing external
representations in service of cognitive and epistemic aims of research.
E1 represents the cognitive science perspective outlined in Chapter 1. E1 may be interpreted to
mean that models are concrete entities, since external representations are concrete entities. But
this interpretation is misleading as it can encourage those who accept M1 to react that E1 leaves
out abstract models. Rather E1 should be understood as a rejection of the use of the categories of
abstract and concrete entities.13
13In a series of papers, Tarja Knuuttila has argued that to understand how a model gives us knowledge, we should
regard a model as a concrete, artifactual entity. If a model is a concrete artifact, she argues, it is not difficult to see
how scientists’ manipulation of it can be cognitively and epistemically valuable despite the fact that a model is not
an accurate representation of its target (Knuuttila and Voutilainen 2003; Knuuttila 2005; 2011; Boon and Knuuttila
2009; Knuuttila and Boon 2011). Although her question (how do models give us knowledge?) is different from mine,
the characteristics of models (understood as concrete entities) that she highlights (Knuuttila 2011, 267–270) are also
characteristics of external representations. Thus, in this sense, my account is complimentary to hers. But her argument
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A more detailed formulation of E1 is needed if we want to tell whether a given external rep-
resentation counts as a model. Clearly not every external representation is a scientific model. For
example, the inscriptions on this page are external representations of English sentences. We in-
terpret them as representing sentences in English. But these inscriptions do not count as scientific
models because, as I noted in Chapter 1, models are representations of parts of the world that
scientists use for cognitive and epistemic purposes relevant to their inquiry. I will combine this
point about models and the characterization of external representations given in Chapter 1 into a
more detailed formulation of E1. To do so, I adopt the following terminology. I use the noun ‘rep-
resentation’ to refer to a structure that bears informational content: a representation is a vehicle
that carries information about something. I use the verb ‘to represent’ to mean “to carry infor-
mation about.” To say that the inscriptions on this page represent English sentences is to say that
the inscriptions carry information about English sentences, and the information in this case is the
meaning or content of the sentences. I also use ‘representation of’ to mean the same thing: ‘X is
a representation of Y ’ means X represents Y .
SCIENTIFIC MODELS AS EXTERNAL REPRESENTATIONS (E1): External representa-
tions are structures in a person’s external environment that bear informational content.
A given external representation is a scientific model if a scientist interprets some part
or property of the representation as representing (in the sense of carrying information
about) some part or property of the object of an investigation and if the scientist uses the
representation as a tool to approach the scientist’s specific research questions or aims.
Not all external representations satisfy this criterion, and thus we can see scientific models as
forming a class of external representations.14
against the view that some models are abstract entities (e.g., Knuuttila and Voutilainen 2003, Knuuttila and Boon
2011) can be easily countered by the defenders of this view. For they can accept her positive claims about models as
claims about concrete models while maintaining that abstract models require special treatment, or they can accept her
claims about models as claims about model descriptions.
14My criterion is compatible with but narrower than Paul Teller’s. His view is that “in principle, anything can be
a model, and that what makes a thing a model is the fact that it is regarded or used as a representation of something
by the model users” (Teller 2001, 397). In my view, it is not just “something” but specifically a part or property
of of a model that is interpreted as representing a part or property of the object of an investigation. In addition, a
model is used as a tool to approach research questions or aims. I also assume that a part or property of a scientific
model that is interpreted as representing a part or property of the object of an investigation can stand in a variety
of relations with the latter that interest a scientist, depending on the sort of an object the model is, the scientist’s
interpretation of its parts and properties, and the sort of analysis the scientist plans to apply to the model. For example,
if a scientist had a mathematical model with structural properties that she interprets as representing properties of the
object of her investigation, and she planned to use algebraic techniques to analyze her model, then she would be
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There is an obvious objection to E1, which has to do with the identity and individuation of ex-
ternal representations. For example, the system of Equations (2.1.1) and (2.1.2) counts as a model
according to E1, but so do the system of equations that we obtain by substituting different letters
into Equations (2.1.1) and (2.1.2) (N1 for X , N2 for Y , etc). So too does a graph of solutions to
these systems of equations. It is absurd, so the objection goes, to say that these systems of equations
and graphs of their solutions are all different models. Giere and Weisberg, taking the metaphysics
based perspective on models, can simply say that these systems of equations and graphs are dif-
ferent descriptions of the same abstract model, but E1 does not allow me to resort to this solution.
So what can we say about the identity of models understood as external representations? I address
this question in Section 2.7.
E2 means that scientists’ perceptual and bodily interactions with models, understood as ex-
ternal representations, are central to the practice of modeling.15 This incorporates the insight of
distributed cognition research. In the next section I develop an account of mathematical modeling
based on E1 and E2, using the Lotka-Volterra model as an example.
2.6 AN ACCOUNT OF MATHEMATICAL MODELING FROM THE COGNITIVE
SCIENCE BASED PERSPECTIVE
From the cognitive science based perspective I favor, Equations (2.1.1) and (2.1.2), together with
their interpretation in biological terms, are a model. Mathematical modeling is then seen as a
practice of constructing, manipulating, and analyzing these interpreted equations. In this section,
I show how this perspective illuminates the standard method—phase plane analysis—of ordinary
differential equations (ODEs) like Equations (2.1.1) and (2.1.2).
interested in isomorphism or other morphic relations between the structural properties of the model and the structural
properties, themselves described mathematically, of the object of her investigation described. If her model were a
concrete, physical object some parts of which she interprets as representing parts of the object of her investigation and
if she planned to use analogical reasoning to analyze the model, then the relevant relation would be a certain type of
similarity relation between parts of a model and parts of the object of her investigation.
15Of course, E2 does not imply that scientists’ internal representations are not involved in modeling.
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2.6.1 Phase Plane Analysis
To summarize the phase plane analysis of ODEs, I rely primarily on Garrett Odell’s (1980) insight-
ful presentation of the method. His presentation distills the basic results of the qualitative theory
of ODEs (e.g. Andronov et al. 1973) but does so by highlighting the importance of graphical tech-
niques. Speaking about the aim of qualitative theory, Odell says:
To use differential equations for mathematical modeling, it is not necessary to know how
to write down formulae for their solutions (or approximations thereunto). In most cases,
no such formulae exist. In many cases for which an exact or approximate (asymptotic)
analytical solution can be discovered, the solution formula is so complicated that it
discloses nothing about the nature of the solution until a (geometrical) graph of it is
drawn. We aim to generate the graphs, at least their general shapes, directly, without
bothering with formulae for them. (Odell 1980, 649)
A particular solution to an ODE tells us how the value of the dependent variable (e.g., population
size) changes as the independent variable (e.g., time) changes. For example, as the value of the
independent variable increases, the value of the dependent variable may increase monotonically
until it reaches a stable steady state, or it may oscillate between certain values without settling
down to a particular state. Odell is referring to these characteristics when he says “the nature of
the solution.” A solution to an ODE is a curve, so it may be written down as a function. But
as Odell says, for most ODEs, such a function does not exist, or even if it did, it would be so
complicated that we would not be able to infer the nature of the solution from it. Either way,
Odell says, we have to make a graph of a solution. In other words, as I illustrate further below, to
analyze ODEs, scientists rely on external representations like graphs that will enable them to use
their visual perception, especially their ability to detect spatial patterns, to identify characteristics
of a solution.
To take a closer look at phase plane analysis, consider a system of two ODEs:
dX
dt
= F (X, Y ) (2.6.1)
dY
dt
= G(X, Y ). (2.6.2)
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We want to know the characteristics of the solutions to Equations (2.6.1) and (2.6.2): our cognitive
aim is to understand the nature of the solutions. In phase plane analysis, we construct a phase por-
trait—a graph of particular solutions in theX–Y plane—without finding formulae of the solutions.
Following Odell, I divide the method into three steps:
Step 1: Find all the steady state points and draw a graph of tangent vectors.
Step 2: Use linearization to identify the nature of each steady state point.
Step 3: Draw a phase portrait, combining the results of Steps 1 and 2.
Odell nicely summarizes these steps in one sentence: In phase plane analysis, he says,
geometry, graphical sketching, and local magnifying glass views via linearization, col-
laborate in a simple way to determine (rigorously) most information about the behavior
of a class of [ODEs]. (Odell 1980, 650)
Equations (2.1.1) and (2.1.2) are instances of Equations (2.6.1) and (2.6.2), and phase plane anal-
ysis is routinely applied to this external representation. I argue that each step of phase plane anal-
ysis involves the construction, manipulation, and analysis of models (external representations), in
which scientists use various perceptual and bodily processes as well as internal processes to inves-
tigate the nature of the model. This means that external representations are essential for achieving
the aim of understanding the nature of the solutions to Equations (2.6.1) and (2.6.2).
2.6.1.1 Phase Plane Analysis: Step 1 We begin the first step of phase plane analysis by finding
the steady state points for ODEs. That is, for Equations (2.6.1) and (2.6.2), we want to find the
points (X0, Y0) at which both F (X, Y ) and G(X, Y ) are zero. For example, Equations (2.1.1) and
(2.1.2) have two such points: (0, 0) and (d/ba, r/a). To find these points, we manipulate Equations
(2.1.1) and (2.1.2). If we set dX/dt = 0, we can solve for Y :
0 = rX − (aX)Y
(aX)Y = rX
Y =
r
a
We apply the similar procedure to the other equation to obtain X = d/ba. Instead of using the
pencil-and-paper technique just described, we can use a computer program to find these points (of-
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ten the only way to find the steady state points for complicated equations) (see, e.g., Roughgarden
1998, 267).
Note that these methods—paper or computer—call for different sets of internal (mental) and
bodily (perceptual and motor) processes. In manipulating Equations (2.1.1) and (2.1.2) on paper,
we recall the rules of algebra (internal process) and write down symbols accordingly (bodily pro-
cess). That is, we follow our internalized rules of algebra when we move symbols to the left or
the right of the equation or eliminate them from both sides. In addition, by writing down a new
line of the equation each time we make changes to the previous one, we create a spatial represen-
tation of the sequence of our manipulation and application of the rules of algebra. In the example
above, I used a spatial orientation (top to bottom) to represent the temporal sequence. This record
is useful for planning our next move, and can be inspected if we want to check the accuracy of
our result: the record provides both cognitive and epistemic benefit. On the other hand, if we
manipulate Equations (2.1.1) and (2.1.2) on a computer, we need a different set of internal and
bodily processes. Instead of recalling and applying the rules of algebra, we have to recall the rules
of the programming language being used. Instead of creating the external record of our algebraic
manipulation, we type (and save) our code on a computer.
Now consider any point in the X–Y plane. Each point has a vector, whose components are
[F (X, Y ), G(X, Y )], and it can be drawn as an arrow. Call this arrow a “flow arrow” (Odell 1980,
664). In this step of the analysis, our goal is to draw flow arrows in the X–Y plane. If we use
a computer, we can draw many arrows as shown in Figure 2.3, but it would also be sufficient
if we chose several points and drew flow arrows by hand. Once we draw flow arrows, we can
sketch trajectories that are tangential, at every point, to the flow arrows. Such curves are shown in
Figure 2.3, and these curves depict parts of solutions to Equations (2.1.1) and (2.1.2).
As in the example of finding steady state points by hand, to find tangent vectors by hand,
we have to recall the rules of algebra and arithmetic as well as the concept of vector space. We
then have to draw a graph like Figure 2.3. Alternatively, to let a computer program to generate a
graph like Figure 2.3, instead of recalling the rules of algebra and arithmetic and the concept of
vector space, we need to recall the rules of the programming language we are using and type our
instructions in that language.
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Figure 2.3: Flow arrows for Equations (2.1.1) and (2.1.2), with r = 1, a = 0.1, b = 0.05, and d =
0.5. The dot indicates the nontrivial steady state point. Three trajectories are partially sketched.
Thus, our interaction with Equations (2.1.1) and (2.1.2) result in our performing a particular
set of internal and bodily processes, and these processes are done in service of the cognitive aim
of understanding the nature of the solutions to Equations (2.1.1) and (2.1.2).
2.6.1.2 Phase Plane Analysis: Step 2 The second step is to identify the nature of the steady
state points. In particular, we study the characteristics of Equations (2.6.1) and (2.6.2) at the points
near (X0, Y0). As quoted above, Odell describes this step as providing “local magnifying glass
views via linearization” (Odell 1980, 650), and this description, though metaphorical, should be
taken seriously. For the goal of this step is to get a visual understanding of the behavior of the
solutions to ODEs at points in a very small neighborhood around a steady state point. We cannot
do this, however, by literally magnifying Figure 2.3 around a steady state point, because we are
interested in the points whose distance from the steady state point is infinitesimally small. Thus,
we use a technique called linearization and a mathematical theory known as stability theory as our
“magnifying glass.”
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To do this, let x and y be small displacements from (X0, Y0). We then substitute X = X0 + x
and Y = Y0 + y into Equations (2.6.1) and (2.6.2). Taking the Taylor series expansion of F near
(X0, Y0) and ignoring the higher order terms, we obtain the linearization of Equation (2.6.1):
d
dt
(X0 + x) = F (X0 + x, Y0 + y)
= F (X0, Y0) +
∂F
∂X
(X0, Y0)x+
∂F
∂Y
(X0, Y0)y.
The similar procedure will yield the linearization of Equation (2.6.2). Since (X0, Y0) is a steady
state point, F (X0, Y0) and G(X0, Y0) are both zero. Thus, the linearization of F and G leads to:
dx
dt
= a11x+ a12y (2.6.3)
dy
dt
= a21x+ a22y (2.6.4)
where
a11 =
∂F
∂X
(X0, Y0), a12 =
∂F
∂Y
(X0, Y0),
a21 =
∂G
∂X
(X0, Y0), a22 =
∂G
∂Y
(X0, Y0).
There is a well-developed mathematical theory, called stability theory, that allows us to analyze
Equations (2.6.3) and (2.6.4). To apply this theory, we let β = a11 + a12 and γ = a11a22 − a12a21.
Then, according to the values of β and γ, the theory allows us to identify the nature of the steady
state point as one of the six types displayed in Figure 2.4.
If we linearize Equations (2.1.1) and (2.1.2) near (d/ba, r/a) and apply stability theory, we
will find that β = 0 (Odell 1980, 687; Edelstein-Keshet 2005, 219–220). In Figure 2.4, we see
that this result implies that the steady state point is a center. If the steady state point is a center,
solutions do not approach or run away from it: they circle around the steady state point. This
property of the steady state point is also called neutral stability (Odell 1980, 672).16
Like the first step, this step involves manipulation of Equations (2.1.1) and (2.1.2). In this
step, we also construct a new external representation like Equations (2.6.3) and (2.6.4). Applying
stability theory to the new model, we gain visual or geometric understanding of the nature of the
16Weisberg notes this result, but not the graphical method, in his discussion of the Lotka-Volterra model (Weisberg
2013, 81).
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Figure 2.4: Types of steady state point. From Odell (1980, 673). Copyright c© Cambridge Univer-
sity Press 1980. Reprinted with the permission of Cambridge University Press.
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Figure 2.5: The phase portrait for Equations (2.1.1) and (2.1.2), with r = 1, a = 0.1, b = 0.05, and
d = 0.5. The steady state point is a center.
steady state point of Equations (2.1.1) and (2.1.2). That our understanding is visual is illustrated
by the fact that the types of steady state points shown in Figure 2.4 are characterized by visual
concepts, such as a spiral, a saddle point, and a center.
2.6.1.3 Phase Plane Analysis: Step 3 The last step is to construct a phase portrait. To do this,
we finish the diagram (Figure 2.3) we began in the first step by taking into account the visual un-
derstanding of the steady state point gained in the second step. We have learned that the nontrivial
steady state point of Equations (2.1.1) and (2.1.2) is a center. Thus, our solution curves should
form closed loops. Figure 2.5 shows the finished portrait.
As in the first step, we can draw a phase portrait by hand or let a computer to make one. I
used a computer to make Figure 2.5. Note that we do not know and did not even try to find the
formulae for any of the solution curves in Figure 2.5. Thus, Figure 2.5 is indispensable for gaining
any understanding of the solutions to Equations (2.1.1) and (2.1.2).
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In sum, each step of phase plane analysis involves the construction, manipulation, and anal-
ysis of models understood as external representations, which enable us to use perceptual and
bodily processes to achieve the goal of obtaining an understanding of the solutions to Equa-
tions (2.1.1) and (2.1.2). Thus, in phase plane analysis, external representations play an essential
role for understanding the nature of the solutions to a system of ODEs.
2.6.2 Advantages of the Account
I want to highlight two advantages of my account of mathematical modeling over Giere’s and
Weisberg’s. First, my account overcomes the problems with the metaphysics based perspective
discussed in Section 2.4. As noted above, Giere’s account faces the problem of the externality of
abstract models, and as a consequence it is difficult to characterize mathematical modeling as a
distributed cognitive process. My account does not face this problem, because models are external
representations. Thus, it easily incorporates the insight of distributed cognition research into an
account of the practice of mathematical modeling. We also noted above that Giere’s and Weisberg’s
accounts face the problem of interactivity, which makes it difficult to explain M2. That is, their
accounts have so far failed to explain how constructing, manipulating, and analyzing external
representations, such as equations and graphs, result in the construction, manipulation, and analysis
of abstract models. Without an explanation of this relationship between external representations
and abstract models, we cannot hope to have an account of how scientists use abstract models. It is
hard to explain how what we do to an equation (say) is an interaction with an abstract entity, which
does not stand in any causal relation. My account does not face this problem, since this particular
explanatory need does not arise in the first place.
Second, as illustrated by phase plane analysis, scientists’ perceptual and bodily interactions
with external representations are crucial for achieving their cognitive and epistemic aims. My
account brings this embodied aspect of scientific practice to the center stage of a philosophical
account of the practice of modeling.17 By doing so, my account also explains why manipulation
of a model is important for gaining better understanding of the model. Manipulation of an external
representation allows scientists to use their perceptual abilities to interact with the model. This
17In this sense, my account is in line with Vorms’, although Vorms takes the metaphysics based perspective on
models.
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interaction can give scientists a perceptual (e.g., visual) understanding of the nature of the model.
By contrast, Giere’s account makes external representations peripheral to a philosophical account
of scientific practice (Giere 1988, 79). Vorms tries to resist this tendency, while holding, as Weis-
berg does, that external representations are the only means by which scientists can have access to
abstract models. But without an explanation of the nature of scientists’ access to abstract models,
that is, without an explanation for M2, Vorms’s or Weisberg’s accounts ultimately fail to illuminate
how manipulation of an external representation helps scientists gain better understanding of the
model.
2.7 THE PROBLEM OF IDENTITY
In Section 2.5, I mentioned an important objection to E1, which is the claim that models are
external representations: it leads to an absurd answer to the identity question, whereas M1, which
allows models to be abstract entities, does not. I now respond to this objection.
To illustrate the objection, consider Equations (2.1.1) and (2.1.2). By writing u(τ) = baX/d,
v(τ) = aY/r, τ = rt, and α = d/r, we obtain the following equations (Murray 2002, 80):
du
dτ
= u(1− v) (2.7.1)
dv
dτ
= αv(u− 1). (2.7.2)
Since Equations (2.7.1) and (2.7.2) are the result of substituting new symbols into Equations (2.1.1)
and (2.1.2), the two sets of equations are logically equivalent. The objection is that given my
account, we have to say that the two sets of equations are two different models because different
symbols are used. This cannot be an important difference, so the objection goes, between two
models.
This objection, however, ignores other ways in which two sets of equations can be different
that we would want to recognize as important. For example, although Equations (2.7.1) and (2.7.2)
are logically equivalent to Equations (2.1.1) and (2.1.2), the variables in the former set of equations
are defined in such a way that they do not have units (i.e., non-dimensional), while those in the
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latter do.18 Thus, if scientists want to compare a model with data on the sizes of predator and prey
populations over time, a more useful model is Equations (2.1.1) and (2.1.2). This is one way in
which these models differ.
The two models make another difference in the practice of modeling. If scientists do phase
plane analysis of Equations (2.7.1) and (2.7.2), their first step is to find the steady state points—
(0, 0) and (1, 1) in this case—and draw some flow arrows, and the second step—linearization—is
to identify the characteristic of the steady state points (see Murray 2002, 81–82). The cognitive
processes, including both internal and bodily processes, involved in these steps will be similar to
those in the case of Equations (2.1.1) and (2.1.2). But the cognitive processes involved in the third
step—drawing a phase portrait—may be different from those discussed earlier. Recall that in the
case of Equations (2.1.1) and (2.1.2), we did not find or even try to find the formulae of the solution
curves in Figure 2.5. Rather we finished drawing the solution curves we started in the first step.
But Equations (2.7.1) and (2.7.2) enable scientists to deploy a different set of processes in this step.
In the u–v plane, scientists can transform Equations (2.7.1) and (2.7.2) into
dv
du
= α
v(u− 1)
u(1− v) . (2.7.3)
This equation can be integrated exactly. In other words, scientists can obtain a formula for the
solution curves in the u–v plane:
αu+ v − lnuαv = H, (2.7.4)
where H is a constant. In the third step of phase plane analysis of Equations (2.7.1) and (2.7.2),
scientists can write down a formula for the solution curves. But as Odell says, it is hard to under-
stand the nature of the solutions simply by looking at Equation (2.7.4) alone, so scientists would
have to graph Equation (2.7.4) for some values of H to obtain a phase portrait in the u–v plane.19
The solution curves form closed loops as in Figure 2.5 (see Murray 2002, 81).
Thus, even if we accept E1, we can say that Equations (2.7.1) and (2.7.2) are not the same
model as Equations (2.1.1) and (2.1.2) because these external representations make difference in
18In Equations (2.1.1) and (2.1.2), t has the unit of time, r, a, and d have the unit of per time, and other variables do
not have units. To produce Equations (2.7.1) and (2.7.2), we define new variables so that the units cancel out.
19For a detailed discussion of the roles of sentential representations like Equation (2.7.4) and diagrammatic repre-
sentations like a phase portrait in human cognition, see Larkin and Simon (1987).
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the practice of modeling.20 We can say this even though the two sets of equations are logically
equivalent. And if two models do not make any practical difference, we can say that they are
practically equivalent models.
Underlying this response is the strategy of individuating models by citing differences they
make or do not make in the practice of modeling. This strategy helps us individuate other mod-
els that we saw in the discussion of phase plane analysis. For example, we can say that the
system of Equations (2.1.1) and (2.1.2) and the phase portrait (Figure 2.5) are different models,
because the phase portrait enables us to visually understand the nature of the solutions to Equa-
tions (2.1.1) and (2.1.2), an understanding that we cannot obtain by looking at the equations.
This strategy, of course, is implicit in Zhang and Norman’s view, noted in Section 2.3, that the
three versions of TOH are different problems for a task performer although they can be represented
as having the same formal structure. The three versions of TOH require a task performer to use
different sets of internal and external representations, and thus her internal processes as well as
perceptual and bodily activities will differ depending on which version of TOH she does. These
differences legitimize Zhang and Norman’s individuation of the TOH games. Similarly, my strat-
egy appeals to differences that external representations make in the modeling practice as basis for
individuation.
2.8 CONCLUSION
This chapter has focused on two questions regarding mathematical modeling: (i) What is a math-
ematical model? (ii) What is the practice of modeling? Taking the metaphysics based perspective
on models, Giere and Weisberg developed accounts that answer these questions. According to their
accounts, mathematical models are abstract, non-physical entities, which are not to be identified
with equations and graphs used in mathematical modeling. Moreover, in their accounts, scientists
use equations to construct, manipulate, and analyze abstract models. Mathematical modeling is a
20For additional cases that support my point, see Vorms (2010, 539–543). Vorms discusses cases in which logically
equivalent external representations in physics make differences in scientists’ inferential processes.
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practice of constructing, manipulating, and analyzing abstract models for the purpose of scientific
research.
I have argued that the basic commitments—M1 and M2—of Giere’s and Weisberg’s accounts
obscure rather than illuminate the practice of modeling. I have then developed an alternative ac-
count from the cognitive science based perspective on models. In my view, scientific models are
external representations, and modeling is a matter of constructing, manipulating, and analyzing
external representations in service of cognitive and epistemic aims of research. This account suc-
cessfully takes into account the insights from research on distributed cognition and gives pride
of place to the embodied aspect of the practice of modeling. I have shown how this account il-
luminates and is reinforced by phase plane analysis, the standard method of analysis of ordinary
differential equations models. Finally I have argued that my account can deal with the identity
question regarding models.
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3.0 USES OF MODELS, CRITERIA OF SUCCESS, AND AIMS OF RESEARCH: A
CASE STUDY OF SEWALLWRIGHT’S RESEARCH ON LINANTHUS PARRYAE
3.1 INTRODUCTION
In the previous chapter I argued for the cognitive science based perspective on models: a scientific
model is an external representation of aspects of the real-world system being investigated. I also
suggested that to analyze scientists’ uses of models in the ongoing process of inquiry, we focus on
the perceptual and bodily interactions between scientists and models. To do so, in this and next
chapters, I examine the historical records of scientific research to analyze how scientists used them
in their research.1
This chapter concerns the relationship among uses of a model, particular aims of research in
which scientists use the model, and criteria of success relevant to a given use of the model. The
main theses of the chapter are:
1. The relationship between uses of a model and particular aims of research is dynamic:
uses of the same model can shift over the course of scientists’ research in response to
the shift in aim.
2. Criteria of success for one use of a model can be different from those for another use of
the same model.2
1Hereafter I simply write ‘model’ to mean models understood as external representations.
2To forestall a potential misinterpretation of my thesis, I emphasize that what I am going to argue is that a model
can have many different uses, that there are certain criteria of success that are relevant to each use, and that the criteria
of success for one use may be quite different from those for another use. I will not be claiming that different criteria
of success necessarily or often stand in trade-off relations of the kind discussed by philosophers of science following
Levins’s work (see, e.g., Levins 1966; Orzack and Sober 1993; Levins 1993; Odenbaugh 2003). The uses of a model
and relevant criteria of success are important to know, even if the criteria do not stand in any trade-off relations,
because such knowledge helps the evaluation of the model in a given context of scientific research and the search for
ways to improve the model.
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After clarifying the key concepts—a use of a model, a criterion of success, and an aim of research—
I argue for these theses using a detailed case study of Sewall Wright’s research on a specific plant
population (Linanthus parryae). The case study reveals that the context of Wright’s research rad-
ically changed over the course of research between 1941 and 1978, while he continued using the
same models developed near the beginning of his research. My analysis of Wright’s research
shows that he put models to a variety of uses and that some of Wright’s uses of models changed in
response to the changing aims of his research and that criteria of success for one use of his model
were different from—even irrelevant to—another use of the same model.
3.2 USES OF MODELS, CRITERIA OF SUCCESS, AND AIMS OF RESEARCH
In this section, I clarify what I mean by an aim of research, a use of a model, and criteria of success,
and explain how these are related. My aim here is to characterize these concepts in such a way
that it makes sense to interpret uses of models as part of scientists’ activities toward the aims of
research.
3.2.1 Aims of Research
When I say aims of research, I am concerned with aims that we would understand as cognitive,
epistemic, or practical rather than those that we would understand as social (e.g., to prove oneself to
be a legitimate member of a particular community of scientists), political (e.g., to gain more power
in the community), or financial (e.g., to secure more grant support). As long as we can identify
a given aim of research as cognitive, epistemic, or practical, it is not important for my purpose
to decide exactly which sort of aims they are. For example, we can say that to obtain knowledge
of some phenomenon is an epistemic aim, but if we also think that to have knowledge is to be
in a particular cognitive (mental) state, then we can also say that this is a cognitive aim. To give
another example, we can say that to understand a causal process that produces some phenomenon
is a cognitive aim because to have an understanding is to be in a certain cognitive state, but if we
also think that to understand a causal process is to be able to perform intervention in that process
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to produce a desired effect, we can also say that it is a practical aim. For my purpose, these
ambiguities do not matter as long as a case of research we want to analyze has an aim that can be
understood as cognitive, epistemic, or practical.
We can characterize an aim of research with varying details. At the most general end, there
are various views about the aims of science. For example, according to Philip Kitcher, one of the
most traditional and popular views of science regards science as aimed at “discovering the truth,
the whole truth, and nothing but the truth about the world” or, more specifically, “discovering
truth about those aspects of nature that impinge most directly upon us, those that we can observe
(and, perhaps, hope to control)” (Kitcher 1993, 3). Larry Laudan, to take another example, sees
problem solving as the aim of science (in order to explain the development of science) (Laudan
1977, 11–12). Ian Hacking highlights representing (theorizing) and intervening (experimenting)
as the aims of science (Hacking 1983, 31). Bas van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism holds that
science aims at empirically adequate theories (van Fraassen 1980, 12). At the more specific end,
there are particular aims of particular research projects. For example, James Watson and Francis
Crick’s research between 1951 and 1953 aimed at determining the molecular structure of DNA.
This was their epistemic aim. To figure out what a given case of research aimed at, we often need
historical investigations.
In this chapter, I am interested in the relationship between uses of models and specific, rather
than general, aims of research, because this relationship can be dynamic. General aims of science
are typically understood as defining features of science; thus, they are not supposed to change
over time. But specific aims of research can change over time: scientists can redefine or redirect
their research programs. Such change is routine in actual science, and a question arises as to what
happens to the ways in which scientists use their models when the aims of research change.
3.2.2 Uses of Models in Science
I have mentioned the aim of Watson and Crick’s research, and I will use their research to explain
what I mean by uses of a model. I quote passages from Watson’s The Double Helix where Watson
describes how he used models. Here’s how Watson recounts his work3:
3This event took place on February 27 and 28, 1953 in Watson’s office, which he shared with Crick and Jerry
Donohue (Olby 1994, 410–412; Olby 2009, 165–167; Judson 1996, 148–149).
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Fortunately, when [Crick and I] walked upstairs [in the Cavendish Laboratory], I found
that I had an excuse to put off the crucial model-building step for at least several more
hours. The metal purine and pyrimidine models, needed for systematically checking all
the conceivable hydrogen-bonding possibilities, had not been finished on time. At least
two more days were needed before they would be in our hands. This was much too
long even for me to remain in limbo, so I spent the rest of the afternoon cutting accurate
representations of the bases out of stiff cardboard. . . .
When I got to our still empty office the following morning [on February 28], I
quickly cleared away the papers from my desk top [sic] so that I would have a large,
flat surface on which to form pairs of bases held together by hydrogen bonds. Though
I initially went back to my like-with-like prejudices [i.e., each base bonds with another
base of the like kind], I saw all too well that they led nowhere. When Jerry [Donohue]
came in I looked up, saw that it was not Francis, and began shifting the bases in and out
of various other pairing possibilities. Suddenly I became aware that an adenine-thymine
pair held together by two hydrogen bonds was identical in shape to a guanine-cytosine
pair held together by at least two hydrogen bonds. All the hydrogen bonds seemed to
form naturally; no fudging was required to make the two types of base pairs identical in
shape. Quickly I called Jerry over to ask him whether this time he had any objection to
my new base pairs.
When he said no, my morale skyrocketed, for I suspected that we now had the
answer to the riddle of why the number of purine residues [i.e., adenine and guanine]
exactly equaled the number of pyrimidine residues [i.e., cytosine and thymine]. (Watson
1968, 114; see also Olby 1994, 411–412; Judson 1996, 148)
The next morning Watson saw Crick in the lab, “flipping the cardboard base pairs about an imag-
inary line. As far as a compass and ruler could tell him, both sets of base pairs neatly fitted into
the backbone configuration” (Watson 1968, 117). Soon after, in the first week of March 1953, the
metal models were delivered, and Watson and Crick began holding the metal pieces together by
clamps and rods and eventually built the double helix model on the office table. Next they put
a plumb line and a measuring rod against the model and read off the coordinates of atoms mak-
ing up nucleotides (Watson 1968, 117–118). During the following weeks, they showed the model
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to other people, including Lawrence Bragg, Maurice Wilkins, Rosalind Franklin, and Alexander
Todd, letting them inspect various aspects of the model (Watson 1968, 118–127).
What was the use of Watson’s cardboard models of bases? We might say that Watson used the
models to find the plausible patterns of base pairs in DNA. This answer, however, is too general for
my purpose. The aim of Watson and Crick’s research was to determine the structure of DNA, and
part of this aim was to find the plausible base paring patterns. So the answer we just gave simply
says that the use of the cardboard models was to achieve part of the aim of Watson and Crick’s
research. A more adequate answer needs to say how Watson used the models or what activity the
models enabled him to do that helped him find the correct base paring patterns. This activity that
scientists do with a model is what I mean by a use of a model. Thus, I would say that the use
of the cardboard models was to systematically check the possible patterns of hydrogen bonding
among four nucleotide bases (adenine, guanine, cytosine, and thymine). Moreover, Watson and
Crick used the models to see if the base pairs would fit into the backbone, and to do that, they took
measurements by applying a compass and rule to the cardboard models. Note that checking all the
hydrogen-bonding possibilities for their plausibility is not the same as finding the plausible base
paring patterns, but it is an activity that could (and did) help Watson find them.
Let us also consider the use of the double helix model, the mockup built from metal plates and
rods. Again it would be too vague to say that the use of the double helix model was to determine
the three-dimensional structure of DNA—i.e., to achieve the aim of their research. It does not tell
us what activity Watson and Crick did with the models that helped them achieve their aim. I would
say instead that the model had at least three uses. First, Watson and Crick used it to visualize a
structure that would satisfy their assumptions about the geometry and arrangement of nucleotides
and the sugar-phosphate backbone. Second, they used the model to take precise measurements
of the atomic coordinates of the nucleotides by putting a plumb line and a measuring rod against
the double helix model and reading off the atomic coordinates. Third, Watson and Crick used
the model to enable other experts, such as Wilkins and Franklin, to visually inspect their proposed
structure. None of these uses by itself amounts to the achievement of the aim of Watson and Crick’s
research, but together these uses advanced their aim.4
4Other steps needed to accomplish their aim included detailed comparison with experimental evidence (see,
e.g.,Franklin and Gosling 1953a,b; Wilkins et al. 1953; Watson and Crick 1953b).
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In short, when a scientist uses a model in her research, she uses it to perform some action that
would promote the aim of her research. I refer to this action as a use of a model, and the brief
discussion of Watson and Crick’s research shows that a use of a model does not always amount
to the achievement of the aim of research. In such a case, it is important to distinguish uses of
a model from the aim of research in which the model is used so that we can be clear about what
scientists do with the model in order to advance the aim of their research.
3.2.3 Criteria of Success
By criteria of success, I mean criteria according to which scientists can evaluate how successful
their use of a model is. Some criteria apply to properties of a model itself, when the properties
affect the outcome of a use of the model. Other criteria apply to the properties of the outcome.
Let me illustrate these points with the Watson-Crick example. Recall that Watson used the
cardboard models of the bases to systematically check all the conceivable hydrogen-bonding pos-
sibilities. In Watson’s account quoted above, one criterion of success relevant for this use of the
cardboard models was how stereochemically accurate they were, because Watson says that he
purposefully designed them to be stereochemically accurate. This criterion applies to the spatial
properties of the models themselves, and this was a relevant criterion because spatial properties of
each model affect the spatial configurations they form when Watson moved them about to check
bonding possibilities. Recall also that one of Watson and Crick’s uses of the double helix model
was to take precise measurements of the atomic coordinates of the nucleotides with a plumb line
and a measuring rod. For this use, stereochemical accuracy just mentioned was relevant, but we
can think of other relevant criteria. First, the metal plates and rods making up the double helix
model had to be rigid so that the model does not collapse while Watson and Crick take measure-
ments. Second, the parts of the double helix model had to be adequately spaced so that Watson
and Crick can access all parts by hand and take measurements. Note that this last criterion had to
be met without violating the criterion of stereochemical accuracy. Both of these additional criteria
apply to the properties of the model, because if the model met these criteria as well as the stereo-
chemical accuracy criterion, Watson and Crick would be able to successfully use the model to take
precise measurements. Finally, given the aim of their research, it was reasonable to require as a
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criterion of success that the measurements taken from the double helix model be consistent with
the experimental evidence. This criterion applies to the outcome of the use of the model.
3.3 DYNAMICS OF RESEARCH: A CASE STUDY
The central theses of this chapter are that criteria of success for one use of a model can be different
from those for another use of the same model and that the relationship between uses of a model and
particular aims of research is dynamic: uses of the model can shift over the course of scientists’
research in response to the shift in aim.
Scientific research can take many different trajectories. For example, consider a scientist work-
ing on her side project. She develops a model during her work on this project, but the project turns
out to be more important than she initially imagined. Over time the project grew to one of her main
projects, and along the way her specific research questions changed. In this case, we might find
that the same model was put to different uses at different phases of her project; we might also find
that the model was put to the same use throughout the project.5 At any given point in the project,
the model might or might not have met the criteria of success for one or more of uses.
To analyze the dynamics of research, it is necessary to follow the development of research over
time. To do this, I provide a detailed historical analysis of Wright’s research. It turns out that his
research took a trajectory like the one just described.
Here is an outline of the case study: In Section 3.4, I provide background to Wright’s research
and identify three temporal phases of his project. I will then devote one section to each phase
(Sections 3.5–3.7). Each section presents a historical narrative followed by an analysis of the aims
of Wright’s research, his uses of models, and criteria of success.
5Other combinations are of course possible.
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3.4 BACKGROUND TO THE LINANTHUS RESEARCH
3.4.1 Linanthus Facts
Linanthus parryae is a diminutive desert annual in the Mojave Desert in California. It has blue and
white flower color morphs, the former being dominant to the latter (Epling et al. 1960, 238). It is
pollinated exclusively by a species of soft-winged flower beetles, whose flight distance is one to ten
feet, and seeds are dispersed passively (Epling et al. 1960, 240, 243; Schemske and Bierzychudek
2001, 1270).
The life cycle of Linanthus shows two patterns. In wet years, when there is enough rainfall
in winter, seed germination occurs, and plants flower in early to late April, shedding seeds in late
May to early June. In dry years, no seed germination occurs although seeds can remain dormant
in the soil for seven years or longer (Epling et al. 1960, 240, 250; Schemske and Bierzychudek
2001, 1270). In a favorable wet year, thousands of plants bloom and cover the desert as if snow
has fallen: hence the common name “desert snow” (Epling and Dobzhansky 1942, 318).
3.4.2 1941 Survey
In April 1941, the population of 10 to 100 billion blooming Linanthus plants covered an 840-
square-mile region of the Mojave Desert (Epling and Dobzhansky 1942, 329–330; Wright 1943a,
141). The distribution of flower color exhibited interesting patterns. Overall white flowers were
most abundant, and in some areas there were only white flowers. But in three separate areas–
referred to as the “variable areas” (Epling and Dobzhansky 1942, 323)—blue and white flowers
coexisted. There were no obvious geographical barriers that might have been responsible for these
patterns.
Carl Epling and his students did an extensive survey of this population. They created a station
every half-mile along the roads forming a rough grid in the desert and ran, at each station, a
transect at approximately right angles to the road. Along each transect, they made four equally
spaced sampling points, at each of which, when there were plants, they counted plants until 100
and recorded the numbers of blue and white. Epling and his students made 1261 sampling points,
counting a total of 113,955 whites and 12,145 blues (Epling and Dobzhansky 1942, 322–325).
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Station Number Numbers of Blues
14 39 58 57 52
19 0 0 0 0
20 – 86 72 4
Table 3.1: Three rows taken from Epling and Dobzhansky’s table. Redrawn from Epling and
Dobzhansky 1942, 324.
Between May and October 1941 Epling and Dobzhansky analyzed the data and prepared a
manuscript on Linanthus. In it they presented “a condensed summary of the data” (Epling and
Dobzhansky 1942, 323), using a table and a map. Together the table and the map summarize the
location of each sampling point and the proportion of blue and white recorded at each point. The
rows of the table looked like this (see Table 3.1). According to Epling and Dobzhansky, the table
is to be read as follows:
The numbers of the blue flowered plants found in the four samples at each station are
indicated consecutively from left to right [in a row of the table]. Thus, the numbers
39, 58, 57, and 52 at station No. 14 mean that 39 blue flowered plants were found in
the sample which was taken 70 paces on the left of the road, 58 in that 20 paces on
the left, 57 in that 20 paces on the right, and 52 in that 70 paces on the right of the
road. The corresponding numbers of the white flowered plants found, but not cited,
were hence, 61, 42, 43, and 48. Zero means that no blue flowered plants were found in
a given sample; the sign − means that no plants at all were encountered. (Epling and
Dobzhansky 1942, 323)
Epling and Dobzhansky gave the location of station No. 14 in the accompanying map (Epling
and Dobzhansky 1942, 320–321). The number 39 in the first row of Table 3.1 means that 39 blue
flowered plants were found in the sample of a hundred plants counted at 70 paces on the left of the
location marked 14 on the map.6
6It is a bit unclear which is the “left” of the road because there is no explicit mention of the direction of the road,
but if we assume that the direction is given by the way the number 14 is written on the map, then the left of station No.
14 is the south of the road (see Figure 3.1).
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Figure 3.1: A portion of Epling and Dobzhansky’s map of stations. Solid lines indicate the roads
traveled during the survey. The broken line marks the geographical limit of the occurrence of
Linanthus. Inside the dotted line is the variable area, where blue and white flowers coexisted.
Reproduced from Epling and Dobzhansky (1942, 320) with permission from the Genetics Society
of America.
Epling and Dobzhansky’s map and table were “a condensed summary” of the raw data in two
respects. First, Epling and Dobzhansky omitted the data on stations where no plants were observed,
so stations No. 15 through 18, which appear in Figure 3.1, are skipped in Table 3.1. Second, they
also omitted the numbers of whites although these numbers can easily be inferred from those of
blues given in the table.
3.4.3 Three Phases
With hindsight and with the surviving records of Wright’s work, we can identify three major phases
of Wright’s research on Linanthus.7 The first phase started when Wright was given the Linanthus
data in 1941 and ended with Wright’s paper on Linanthus, completed in 1942 and published in
1943. The second phase occurred between 1960 and 1962 when Wright wrote two unpublished
manuscripts on Linanthus in response to Epling and colleagues’ new paper, written in 1959 and
7For the basic history of the Linanthus research, see Provine (1986, 370–381, 484–488).
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published in 1960. The third phase occurred between 1972 and 1978 when Wright reanalyzed the
original Linanthus data and published the new analysis as part of his 1978 book.
3.5 FIRST PHASE: ISOLATION BY DISTANCE IN LINANTHUS
3.5.1 Wright’s 1941 Letter
In September and October 1941, Dobzhansky gave the Linanthus data, the map of some 400 sta-
tions, and the manuscript to his then collaborator Sewall Wright (Dobzhansky to Wright, October
17, 1941; Dobzhansky to Wright, October 30, 1941).8
In their manuscript Epling and Dobzhansky showed that the statistical distribution of samples
containing various proportions of blues resembled the U-shaped distribution of gene frequencies,
which, according to Wright (1931, 122–128), was expected if the effective population size and
mutation and migration rates were so small that change in gene frequency in each generation
was dominated by stochastic factors, such as genetic drift. Thus, Epling and Dobzhansky argued
that effective population size is quite small in Linanthus, thereby implying that effects of random
evolutionary factors are not negligible in this population (Dobzhansky to Wright, October 17, 1941;
Dobzhansky to Wright, October 30, 1941; Epling and Dobzhansky 1942, 331–332).
In November 1941 Wright wrote a detailed response to Dobzhansky, which began as follows:
I have gone over the manuscript on Linanthus that you sent me. It is certainly a very
interesting case. It appears to be a good example of isolation by distance that I discussed
in my symposium paper at the Columbus meeting (p. 244–246) (Wright to Dobzhansky,
November 1941).
The “symposium paper” refers to Wright’s paper on “Breeding Structure of Populations in Relation
to Speciation,” which Wright delivered at a symposium on speciation at the meeting of the Ameri-
can Association for the Advancement of Science on December 28, 1939. The paper was published
8Wright’s correspondence cited in this chapter is available in Sewall Wright Papers, Series I, American Philosoph-
ical Society, and it will be cited by the correspondent and date. By the time Dobzhansky sent the Linanthus data to
Wright, they had already published a paper in Dobzhansky’s Genetics of Natural Populations series (Dobzhansky and
Wright 1941) and were working on another paper to be published in 1942 (Wright et al. 1942). For a fine discussion
of the history of the collaboration between Dobzhansky and Wright, see Provine (1986, chs. 10 and 11).
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in the next year, and the page numbers given in the quote refers to the section on isolation by
distance in the published version (see Wright 1940, 244–246).
In the rest of the letter Wright presented his own analysis of the Linanthus data given in Epling
and Dobzhansky’s manuscript. To analyze the data, Wright immediately faced an obstacle. Epling
and Dobzhansky’s table and map of data summarized the geographical distribution of phenotype
frequencies in the Linanthus population. If the mode of inheritance of the flower color (e.g.,
whether blue is dominant and white is recessive) were known via breeding experiments, it would
have been relatively easy to infer gene or genotype frequencies from the table. However, in 1941,
Epling was not able to germinate seeds of Linanthus and determine the mode of inheritance of the
flower color (Epling and Dobzhansky 1942, 332, 332; Dobzhansky to Wright, October 3, 1941;
Dobzhansky to Wright, October 30, 1941).9
Proceeding without the knowledge of the mode of inheritance, Wright made different assump-
tions about which flower color is dominant and converted the distribution of phenotype frequencies
into that of gene frequencies. Under the assumption that blue was recessive and that mating was
random within each sample, according to Wright, the frequency of the recessive gene in a sample is
a square root of the frequency of blue phenotype in the sample (Wright to Dobzhansky, November
1941).10 Thus, Wright converted the phenotype frequency of 0.01 in a sample (i.e., 1% of a sample
was blue) into the gene frequency of 0.1 in the sample, the phenotype frequency of 0.02 into the
gene frequency of 0.141, and so on. In this way, Wright converted the phenotype frequency of
each sample recorded in Table 3.1 into the gene frequency.
Once he had the data in terms of gene frequency, Wright calculated the mean frequency q¯ of a
gene for blue and standard deviation σq of the frequencies of q in samples that characterized this
converted data under two different hypotheses about the mode of inheritance. He presented the
results in the first two rows of Table 3.2 (Wright to Dobzhansky, November 1941).11 From q¯ and
σq, Wright calculated the product Nm of population size N and migration rate m. But since no
separate measurement of N or m was available, Wright had to constrain the value of at least one
9It would take Epling twenty years to determine the mode of flower color inheritance. Blue turned out to be
dominant to white (Epling et al. 1960, 238).
10Let p be the phenotype frequency of blue in a sample and q the frequency of the gene for blue. Under the given
assumptions, the genotype of blue-flowered plants is homozygous recessive, and its frequency in a sample should be
q2 and equal to p, because there is only one genotype that is associated with blue phenotype. Hence, q is a square root
of p.
11Wright would try other assumptions in his published analysis (Wright 1943a).
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Blue Recessive White Recessive
q¯ = .1291 q¯ = .0718 (blues give)
σq = .2823 σq = .2056
σq√
q¯(1−q¯) = .8420
σq√
q¯(1−q¯) = .7962
Nm = 1
4
[ q¯(1−q¯)
σq
− 1] = .1026 Nm = .1443
If N = 100, m = .001026 If N = 100, m = .001443
If N = 10, m = .01026 If N = 10, m = .01443
Table 3.2: Wright’s 1941 analysis of the Linanthus data. q¯ is the mean gene frequency in the
total population, σq the standard deviation in the gene frequency q among smaller territories within
the total population, N the effective population size, and m the migration rate. The expression
σq/
√
q¯(1− q¯) is the square root of a statistic Wright would later call FIS . Redrawn from Wright
to Dobzhansky, November 1941 with permission from the American Philosophical Society.
of these parameters and calculate the value of the other. The bottom two rows of Table 3.2, Wright
considered two possible values of N , 10 and 100, and calculated the corresponding values of m.
These values of N refer to the effective size of a local population of breeding individuals rather
than the total population size, which was estimated to be 10 to 100 billion.
When Wright assumed the effective population size of 10 or 100 individuals, he was working
with the idea of isolation by distance. In the Symposium paper cited at the beginning of his letter,
Wright discussed, under the heading “Isolation by Distance,” a “model of breeding structure which
may be of considerable importance” (Wright 1940, 244–245). He said:
Suppose that a population is distributed uniformly over a large territory but that the
parents of any given individual are drawn from a small surrounding region (average
distance D, effective population N ). How much local differentiation is possible merely
from accidents of sampling? Obviously the grandparents were drawn from a larger
territory [defined in terms of D and N ]. The ancesters [sic] of generation n came from
an average distance
√
nD and from a population of average size nN . . . . If the parents
are drawn from local populations of effective size greater than 1,000, the situation differs
little from panmixia even over enormous areas. There is considerable fluctuating local
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differentiation of unit territories where their effective size is of the order of 100, but not
much differentiation of large regions unless effective N is much less. (Wright 1940,
245)
There are two key assumptions here: (1) Individuals in a population are uniformly distributed over
a large territory, and (2) individuals disperse over relatively short distances from their birthplaces
to locations where they produce offspring. As long as the geographical range of the population
is greater than a region from which parents of a given individual are drawn, there is a “unit”
population whose effective size is smaller than the total population size. In this Symposium paper
and an earlier 1938 note, Wright showed that if effective size of unit populations is small, say,
100 or less, frequencies of a gene in unit populations can exhibit considerable random fluctuations
(e.g., a gene may be fixed in some unit populations, lost in some, and in intermediate frequencies
in others) (Wright 1938, 1940).
Making assumptions (1) and (2) for the Linanthus population, Wright inferred that the total
Linanthus population was not a single population of billions of randomly mating individuals but
was composed of numerous, small local populations that were more or less isolated merely by
distance. Hence, he considered the effective population size of 10 and 100. Assumptions (1) and
(2) were reasonable for the population of insect-pollinated plants distributed over 840 sq mi. In
addition, Wright assumed that these local populations have the same effective population size N .
This assumption can be called the spatial homogeneity assumption, and at least in the early 1940s,
Wright made this assumption primarily because of its convenience, and he was aware that in reality
the assumption was almost certainly false (Dobzhansky and Wright 1941, 35).12
Wright then calculated the distribution of gene frequencies without selection and mutation
by substituting the parameter values given in Table 3.2 into the following equation (Wright to
Dobzhansky, November 1941):
12The assumption is actually more general and takes other parameters of interest, such as selection coefficient and
migration rate, to be spatially homogenous as well. That is, any parameter values in Equation (3.5.1) and the like are
constant throughout the geographical region occupied by the population in question.
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Blue (%) Observed Calculated Diff. Calculated Diff.
Number (blue recessive) (blue dominant)
0 987 982.6 +4.4 947.4 +39.6
1–10 68 88.6 -20.6 118.2 -50.2
10–20 28.5 26.0 +2.5 32.9 -4.4
20–30 19.5 17.6 +1.9 20.9 -1.4
30–40 17.5 14.4 +3.1 16.2 +1.3
40–50 23.5 13.0 +10.5 13.9 +9.6
50–60 28 12.5 +15.5 12.8 +15.2
60–70 20 12.7 +7.3 12.5 +7.5
70–80 10.5 14.0 -3.5 13.1 -2.6
80–90 8 17.9 -9.9 15.9 -7.9
90–99 16.5 37.1 -20.6 33.1 -16.6
100 34 24.6 +9.4 24.1 +9.9
Total 1261 1261 1261
Table 3.3: Wright’s comparison of the theoretical distribution of gene frequencies with the Linan-
thus data. Redrawn with modified labels from Wright to Dobzhansky, November 1941 with per-
mission from the American Philosophical Society.
ϕ(q¯) = Cq¯4Nmq¯−1(1− q¯)4Nm(1−q¯)−1. (3.5.1)
The calculated distribution of gene frequencies, however, could not be directly compared with
Epling and Dobzhansky’s data on Linanthus. The unit of the distribution was the mean gene
frequencies q¯, but the unit of Epling and Dobzhansky’s data was phenotype frequencies.13
To overcome this problem, Wright did two things. First, he constructed a frequency distribu-
tion of number of samples in Epling and Dobzhansky’s table. One dimension of this distribution
was percentages of blue divided into 12 classes, and the other dimension was the number of sam-
ples out of 1261 whose percentages of blue correspond to each class.14 He displayed it as what
statisticians call a contingency table (the left two columns of Table 3.3). Second, Wright converted
the calculated distribution of gene frequencies into the distribution with the same unit, domain, and
13Since the distribution of gene frequencies is supposed to be a probability distribution, the area under the curve
must be 1, the condition guaranteed by the coefficient C in Equation (3.5.1).
14If this array is presented by a two dimensional graph, the horizontal axis will be percentages of blue and the
vertical axis the number of samples having a given percentage of blue.
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range as the two-dimensional array. Wright referred to this conversion process as “retransforming
the scale [of the calculated distribution of gene frequencies] to phenotypes and groupings” (Wright
to Dobzhansky, November 1941). He displayed the converted distributions in the third and the fifth
columns from the left in Table 3.3 as well as the difference between the observed and calculated
distributions.
Referring to Table 3.3, Wright argued that the fit is not good “because of the hump at 40%
to 70%, the deficiencies at 1 to 10%, 80–99% and the excess at 100%” (Wright to Dobzhansky,
November 1941). However, he suggested that adding a slight selection for the heterozygotes to
the above equation would make the theoretical distribution exhibit a hump similar to the observed
(Wright to Dobzhansky, November 1941). He told Dobzhansky:
Such selection would account for the persistence of both blue and white in nature.
Minute differences in mutation rates in the two directions or in selection of the ho-
mozygotes could account for the value of q¯. The variability of gene frequency would
still be due to isolation by distance. (Wright to Dobzhansky, November 1941)
In other words, in Linanthus, σq had the value it did because local populations were isolated by
distance and ended up having widely different gene frequencies.
After presenting this argument, Wright gave another argument for the idea that effective pop-
ulation size was small (about 10) in the Linanthus population. For this argument, he presented a
new method of data analysis developed “shortly after” (Wright to Dobzhansky, November 1941)
he wrote the Symposium paper. According to Wright, the new method was “much more useful”
(Wright to Dobzhansky, November 1941) than the one given in the Symposium paper, because
whereas the latter required the knowledge of effective population size (or the size of the unit pop-
ulation) to begin with, the new method did not.15 To present this method, Wright drew a diagram
(Figure 3.2) and wrote:
Let Nt be the size of the total population and suppose this to be subdivided into K
territories of effective sizeNi = Nt/K and these into territories of sizeNu within which
there is random mating. Then the amount of variability of gene frequency calculated
for the territories of size Ni is a function of the unknown size of the random breeding
15Thus, the previous method was “not of much use” (Wright to Dobzhansky, November 1941) for the purpose of
inferring the effective population size.
68
Figure 3.2: Wright’s diagram of hierarchical population structure. Nt is the size of the total popula-
tion, and Nu is the size of a unit population. Ni is the size of an intermediate population within the
total and containing certain number of unit populations. Reproduced from Wright to Dobzhansky,
November 1941 with permission from the American Philosophical Society.
unit (actually the number of individuals from which the mate of any single individual
is drawn). Curiously enough Figure 3 [in the Symposium paper; see Figure 3.3] will
practically do for the case of area continuity [like the Linanthus case]. . . . (Wright to
Dobzhansky, November 1941)
Figure 3 of the Symposium paper (Figure 3.3 in this chapter) correlated effective population sizes
with values of the variability in gene frequency, measured by σq/
√
q¯(1− q¯). Following the above
passage, Wright argued that given plausible assumptions about the average distances among the
samples of each station and about the average number of possible samples within the area of a
station, the variability of gene frequencies in Linanthus will be the value given in the third row of
Table 3.2. Furthermore, given the assumptions, “generations” on the horizontal axis in Figure 3
of the Symposium paper would be on the order of 108 (Wright to Dobzhansky, November 1941).
Thus, in the figure Wright looked at the solid curves (i.e., area) (since the Linanthus population
occupies a continuous area rather than a linear range) and extrapolated them into the 108 region
lying to the right of the region actually displayed in the figure. He could then locate the value of
the variability in the x-axis and look to the right to see if any curve has or comes near that value.
Take, for example, σq/
√
q¯(1− q¯) = .8420. Wright was able to see that the solid line for N = 10
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would reach this value if the line were extrapolated into the 108 region. He thus concluded: “N of
the random breeding unit [i.e., Nu] is about 10” (Wright to Dobzhansky, November 1941).
3.5.2 Wright’s 1943 Papers
On November 5, 1942, Wright sent to Dobzhansky two manuscripts. The first paper, entitled
“Isolation by Distance,” according to Wright, “has been around in one form or another at least
since 1939 when I based my Symposium paper in part on it” (Wright to Dobzhansky, November
5, 1942). The second paper was on Linanthus. Write said:
The other manuscript is an account of an analysis which I made of the data which you
and Epling published on Linanthus Parryae. In view of your statement in a recent let-
ter [probably a reference to: Dobzhansky to Wright, October 16, 1942] that Epling is
continuing work on this, it becomes a question what I should do with it. There are
undoubtedly parts which should be modified in the light of his results although not nec-
essarily very much since the primary purpose is methodological, merely using Linanthus
as illustrative material. (Wright to Dobzhansky, November 5, 1942)
Wright intended the Linanthus paper to be an illustration of the methods developed in the Isolation
paper. Here I highlight the aspects of these two papers that will become important in my analysis
of Wright’s uses of models in his research.
In “Isolation by Distance,” Wright showed that isolation by distance has significant evolution-
ary consequences. For example, heterozygosity will decrease in a population under isolation by
distance because local individuals become more and more genetically related and thus tend to be
homozygous at a given locus. The degree of inbreeding increases in a population under isolation by
distance. To demonstrate these consequences, Wright adopted the inbreeding coefficient F , which
he introduced in 1921 (Wright 1921, 118), as a quantitative measure of the effect of population
structure on gene and genotype frequencies, especially local genetic differentiation.
The quantity F is defined as follows (Wright 1943b, 122):
F =
σx√
qy(1− qy)
(3.5.2)
where σx is the standard deviation of the frequencies of a gene of interest (say,A) among subgroups
x’s in a population. The total population or any subpopulation that contains x’s is referred to as
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Figure 3.3: The relationship between effective population size N and the amount of variability in
gene frequency σq/
√
q¯(1− q¯). The curves marked “area” are relevant to the Linanthus population.
Wright’s own caption is included. Reproduced from Wright (1940, 246) with permission from the
American Society of Naturalists and the University of Chicago Press.
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population y. qy is the frequency of A in y. 1 − qy is the frequency of the other allele (say, B)
at the same locus.
√
qy(1− qy) gives the limiting value of variability of genes in y: If a gene of
interest is fixed or lost in every x, then the distribution of gene frequencies in y has the greatest
spread (x’s are completely differentiated). And the standard deviation of such distribution is equal
to
√
qy(1− qy), for any given value of qy. If a gene is fixed in half of x’s and lost in the other half,
then qy = 0.5 and the distribution of gene frequencies in y has the greatest possible value among
all possible values of qy. In any case, F = 1 means that x’s are maximally differentiated for the
given value of qy.
An investigator can devise a hierarchy of F values. For example, in Figure 3.2, unit popula-
tions u’s would be the x’s, and the subpopulation i or the total population t would be the y. Or
subpopulations i’s can be taken to be the x’s and the total population t be the y. To avoid con-
fusion, as Wright would later do (Wright 1951, 1965), we can put subscripts to F , like Fxy, and
substitute appropriate symbols for x and y. In the example just given, we have Fui, Fut, and Fit,
which, in Wright’s later notations, correspond to FIS , FDT (= FIT ), and FST , respectively.16 These
notations are meant to be suggestive; T stands for a total population, S for subpopulations, D
for demes regarded as unit populations, and I for individuals (Wright 1965, 401). According to
Wright, FST = (FIT − FIS)/(1− FIS) (Wright 1965, 402).
Wright showed two results concerning FIS and FST that became relevant to his analysis of the
Linanthus data. First, for a given value of Nu, FIS increases as the number of unit populations
within a subpopulation increases or as the area occupied by a subpopulation increases. And for a
given number of unit populations within a subpopulation, FIS increases as Nu decreases (Figure
3.4). Second, for a given value of Nu, FST decreases as Ni increases, and for a given value
of Ni, FST increases as Nu decreases (Figure 3.5). Greater F values mean greater amount of
local genetic differentiation: unit populations have widely different frequencies of a given gene,
including fixation in one unit population and loss in another. In particular, Wright said that if the
gene frequency in the total population is 0.5, which gives the greatest value of the denominator in
Equation (3.5.2), the FIS value of greater than 0.577 means that the distribution of gene frequencies
16Technically, FDT is equivalent to FIT if there is, as usually assumed, random mating within the unit population
(Wright 1965, 401). In the later notations, I stands for individual, D for deme, S for subpopulation, and T for total
population.
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Figure 3.4: Theoretical curves of FIS . FIS (the vertical axis) is defined according to Equation
(3.5.2). Ki is the number of unit populations of size Nu within a subpopulation of size Ni. Repro-
duced from Wright (1943b, 122) with permission from the Genetics Society of America.
Figure 3.5: Theoretical curves of FST . FST (the vertical axis) is defined according to Equation
(3.5.2). The size Ni of the subpopulation under consideration (the horizontal axis) is equal to K
unit populations of size Nu. The total population Nt is constant. Reproduced from Wright (1943b,
122) with permission from the Genetics Society of America.
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Smaller Primary Subdivisions (East to West)
Subdivisions I II III IV V VI Total
Secondary 5 5 5 5 5 5 30
Tertiary 20 20 20 20 20 20 120
Stations 57 59 60 60 61 59 356
Samples 198 211 214 214 218 203 1258
Table 3.4: Wright’s hierarchy of subdivisions in the Linanthus data. Redrawn from Wright (1943a,
140) with permission from the Genetics Society of America.
among unit populations is U-shaped (Wright 1943b, 123–124). That is, in many unit populations,
the gene is fixed, and in equally many unit populations, it is lost.
Wright had been working on the paper on isolation by distance at least since 1939 (Wright to
Dobzhansky, November 5, 1942; for earlier publications, see Wright 1938, 1940). By the summer
of 1942 Wright was analyzing the Linanthus data, using the F values he described above. He
published the results in the companion paper to “Isolation by Distance.” In this paper, Wright
analyzed the 1941 Linanthus data in terms of isolation by distance and the method of analysis
based on FIS and FST . In addition to the hypotheses that blue is dominant and that it is recessive,
he also considered the possibilities of self-fertilization and no dominance.
As in 1941, the spatial homogeneity assumption—the assumption that Nu is constant through-
out the region occupied by the total population of Linanthus—underlay all aspects of Wright’s
analysis of the Linanthus data. Wright’s hierarchical division of the Linanthus population which
he used throughout his analysis was based on the spatial homogeneity assumption. As shown in Ta-
ble 3.4, Wright divided the total population into six primary subdivisions, each of which is divided
into five secondary subdivisions. Each secondary subdivision is divided into 20 tertiary subdivi-
sions, each of which contains about 60 sampling stations. Each station contains four samples (100
plants each) (Wright 1943a, 140). Each station is assumed to contain 200 random breeding units.
Wright also constructed a map of the primary and secondary subdivisions (Figure 3.6). He
apparently wanted to make these divisions as uniform as possible, and in the paper, he only says,
“For more detailed mathematical analysis, it is convenient to define a hierarchy of subdivisions”
(Wright 1943a, 140). Of course, uniform subdivisions would simplify computations and compar-
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Figure 3.6: Wright’s map of the distribution of flower colors in Linanthus. Frequencies of blue
in primary (I–VI) and secondary subdivisions are shown. Reproduced from Wright (1943a, 149)
with permission from the Genetics Society of America.
ison of the results, but if convenience were the only reason, he could be criticized for arbitrarily
dividing the population and hence the data. But we can see that his assumption of the spatial ho-
mogeneity of parameter values also supported uniform subdivisions. Under this assumption, each
random breeding unit is subject to the same conditions as any other, and the same must hold for
any population in the hierarchy of subdivisions. Thus, given the spatial homogeneity assumption,
it was reasonable for Wright to divide the Linanthus population uniformly.
Obviously there are many ways to divide the population uniformly, so it seems impossible
to eliminate an element of arbitrariness from the way in which the hierarchy of subdivisions was
created. The historical question that we can address is how Wright actually—arbitrarily or not—
created the map in Figure 3.6 from the map he received from Dobzhansky, which was like Figure
3.1. Consider Wright’s drafts of the map (Figure 3.7). I interpret Figure 3.7a to be earlier than Fig-
ure 3.7b for two reasons: First, Figure 3.7a shows the roads along which Epling created sampling
stations, and an area of the roads is circled to indicate a secondary subdivision. Compared to this
map, Figure 3.7b is more simplified and similar to Figure 3.6. Second, only in Figure 3.7b does
Wright directly refer to the manuscript (e.g., “A in paper,” “B in paper,” and so on), suggesting that
Figure 3.7b is later than Figure 3.7a. If this ordering is correct, Figure 3.7 suggests that Wright first
divided each primary subdivision into secondary subdivisions by following the grid of the roads
along which stations were created and by making divisions at each level as uniform as possible
(see Table 3.4).
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Figure 3.7: Wright’s drafts of the map of the distribution of flower colors in Linanthus. Each
represents the western half of the Linanthus population. The eastern side of each map is now
shown. Reproduced from Sewall Wright Papers, Series IIa, Folder 5 with permission from the
American Philosophical Society.
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In the 1943 paper, Wright used both FIS and FST to determine the size of a unit population in
Linanthus. For each hypothesis about the mode of inheritance, Wright computed the average FIS .
Table 3.5 shows the basic quantities derived from the data on the assumption that blue is dominant.
Wright calculated these quantities on September 18 and 19, 1942 (Figure 3.8, 3.9, 3.10). Wright
considered only those stations in which the mean frequency of the blue gene among samples within
a station was between 0.10 to 0.90. In the left column in Figure 3.8 (see the close-up in Figure 3.9),
he wrote down station numbers in the order of increasing values of gene frequency. In the second
column from the right, he recorded the value of FIS for each station where station was taken to be
the subpopulation (see the column indicated by the arrow in Figure 3.9).17
On September 19, 1942, Wright calculated the mean FIS of 0.2095 in the space on the right
of Figure 3.10 and rounded the value to 0.210 in Table 3.5. This is a squared value, and the value
that is directly comparable to Figure 3.4 is
√
0.210 = 0.46. As shown in the bottom two rows of
Table 3.5, Wright considered two hypotheses about the number of unit populations within a station:
2× 104 units per station (hypothesis A) and 2× 102 units per station (hypothesis B). Hypothesis A
was more plausible given the abundance of flowers in 1941, but in case 1941 was an exceptional
year, Wright considered the other hypothesis. Using these quantities, Wright interpolated the size
of Nu between the curves for Nu = 20 and 50 in Figure 3.4. He concluded that Nu would be about
45 under hypothesis A and 25 under B (Wright 1943a, 145–146).
Wright’s analysis of the Linanthus data in terms of FST was based on the data as organized
in Table 3.4 and Figure 3.6, both of which reflected the assumption of the spatial homogeneity
of parameter values (e.g., Wright 1943a, 149–155). Wright calculated the value of FST from the
Linanthus data by taking each level of the hierarchy in Table 4 as the subpopulation that FST
refers to. He then compared the values thus obtained with the predicted values of FST for Nu =
10 and 20 (Figure 3.11; Wright 1943a, 152). Wright concluded that the effective size of a unit
population is between 14 and 27. Such small size in turn implied that changes in gene frequency
among unit populations and possibly among stations (lower level of the hierarchy) are random.
Therefore, he argued that random changes in gene frequency in local populations could explain the
local patterns of the distribution of flower color (e.g., the fact that two adjacent stations had widely
different frequencies of blue). However, Wright also found that the variability among higher levels
17Note that FIS according to Equation (3.5.2) would be the square root of the values given in Figure 3.8.
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Cross Fertilization
Single Gene Difference
Blue Dominant
Range (q) .10 to .90
No. 47
q¯ .380
σq¯ .202√
F¯ .380
σ√F¯ .256
r +.56± .10
b +.70± .16
F¯ .210
N (A) 25
N (B) 14
Table 3.5: Selected columns from Wright’s table of values. Symbols used: q¯, mean gene frequency;
σq¯, standard deviation of the distribution of gene frequencies;
√
F¯ , mean F value; σ√F¯ , standard
deviation of the distribution of F values; r, correlation between
√
F¯ and q¯; b, regression of
√
F¯
on q¯; F¯ , mean F value (squared); N (A), effective size of a unit population under hypothesis A
(2× 104 units per station); N (B), effective size of a unit population under hypothesis B (2× 102
units per station). Redrawn from Wright (1943a, 145) with permission from the Genetics Society
of America.
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Figure 3.8: A page from Wright’s analysis of the Linanthus data. The page is dated September 18,
1942 (upper right). Reproduced from Sewall Wright Papers, Series IIa, Folder 11 with permission
from the American Philosophical Society.
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Figure 3.9: Close-up of Figure 3.8. Reproduced from Sewall Wright Papers, Series IIa, Folder 11
with permission from the American Philosophical Society.
of the hierarchy, measured by FST , was greater than could be explained by random gene frequency
changes alone. In other words, it was difficult to explain the global pattern of the distribution (e.g.,
the fact that there is a large area of all whites) by appealing solely to random drift. Wright thus
suggested that the cumulative effect of mutation between blue and white, occasional long-distance
migration, and slight selection for white could explain the global pattern (Wright 1943a, 155).
3.5.3 Aims of Research
Having reconstructed Wright’s research on Linanthus in the early 1940s, we can now take a deeper
look at his work. This subsection focuses on the aims of his research during this period and the
next subsection on his uses of models.
In the light of the above reconstruction, we can formulate two hypotheses about the aims of
the first phase of Wright’s research.
Illustration. Wright aimed to illustrate isolation by distance with a case from natural
populations, that is, to substantiate the idea that effective population size can be much
smaller than apparent population size even if there are no obvious geographical barriers.
Explanation. Wright aimed to explain how the observed geographical patterns of flower
color dimorphism are maintained in the Linanthus population.
These hypotheses are not mutually exclusive, and both are plausible.
Illustration gains support from Wright’s 1941 letter and his paper on Linanthus. Wright
took the Linanthus case to be “a good example of isolation by distance” (Wright to Dobzhan-
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Figure 3.10: A page from Wright’s analysis of the Linanthus data. The page is dated September 19,
1942 (upper right). Reproduced from Sewall Wright Papers, Series IIa, Folder 11 with permission
from the American Philosophical Society.
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Figure 3.11: Wright’s comparison of values of FST derived from the Linanthus data (dashed line)
and calculated on the assumption ofNu = 10 and 20 (solid lines). Reproduced from Wright (1943a,
152) with permission from the Genetics Society of America.
sky, November 1941) and that he wrote his own analysis of the Linanthus data as a potentially
interesting application of the technical results developed in his paper on isolation by distance (see,
especially, Wright 1943a, 139, 144, 155). As we saw above, Wright attempted to determine the ef-
fective population size of the Linanthus population and to estimate the amount of variability due to
random differentiation among unit populations (Wright to Dobzhansky, November 1941; Wright
1943a). His activities make sense as part of the strategy to show that the Linanthus case is an
example of isolation by distance in nature.
Explanation gains support from the fact that Wright did suggest possible evolutionary factors
which could explain the observed distribution of flower colors. Explanation here is to show how
the observed flower color distribution in the Linanthus population could be maintained, given a
combined influence of such evolutionary factors as selection, mutation, migration, and genetic
drift on frequencies of genes in the population.18 By 1941, Wright had already attempted to pro-
vide explanations in this sense for other natural populations. He addressed the distribution of
self-sterility alleles in populations of Oenothera organensis (the Organ Mountains evening prim-
18I do not mean that this is the only form of explanation in classical population genetics; there may be others (see
Plutynski 2004).
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rose) in New Mexico, using Sterling Emerson’s (1938, 1939) data (Wright 1939; see also Provine
1986, 488–491). And with Dobzhansky, he worked on the distribution of lethals in populations of
Drosophila pseudoobscura in California (Dobzhansky and Wright 1941). We can regard the first
phase of Wright’s Linanthus research as belonging to this series of work. In his letter to Dobzhan-
sky, Wright provided an explanation in the above sense, and he further elaborated it in his paper on
Linanthus. In each case, he suggested a set of evolutionary factors that could maintain the patterns
of flower color distribution observed in the 1941 survey (Wright to Dobzhansky, November 1941;
Wright 1943a, 155–156).
Given these considerations, we can say that Wright had a basic aim of illustrating isolation
by distance and a more ambitious aim of explaining the observed distribution of flower colors.
Moreover, we can also assume that in the first phase of his research, Wright primarily aimed to
investigate the patterns of the distribution of gene frequencies in the Linanthus population and their
evolutionary causes. I will use this assumption to identify models and analyze their uses.
3.5.4 Uses of Models and Criteria of Success
From the cognitive science based perspective on models, we can identify the following external
representations as some of the models in Wright’s research.19 For convenience, I refer to them by
suggestive names.
Steady State Equation (Equation 3.5.1)
Isolation-by-Distance Diagram (Figure 3.2)
F-Equation (Equation 3.5.2)
F-Curves (Figure 3.3, 3.4, 3.5)
Here I analyze the uses of these models. As we saw above, the first phase of Wright’s research
focused primarily on the patterns of the distribution of gene frequencies in the Linanthus population
and their evolutionary causes.
3.5.4.1 Steady State Equation In 1941 Wright used the steady state equation (Equation 3.5.1)
in three ways: to compute quantities that made up the distribution of gene frequencies, to predict
19The list is not meant to be exhaustive.
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the distribution of gene frequencies in the Linanthus population, and to infer a combination of
evolutionary factors that could explain the observed distribution of flower color (see Table 3.3).
Different criteria of success were likely to be relevant to these uses of the steady state equa-
tion. First, some reasonable criteria of success for the computational use of the equation were that
the equation should be mathematically well-defined and should enable Wright to do computation
efficiently and precisely within the available resources. Taking into account that Wright had to
do all the computations by hand, we can say that the steady state equation met these criteria well.
Second, for the predictive use, one reasonable criterion was that it should be possible to give a
biological interpretation of the equation. For example, the equation should give a value between 0
to 1 so that it can be interpreted as gene frequency, and it of course did. Another reasonable crite-
rion was that the predictive use of the equation should produce a pattern that could be compared
to the statistical pattern brought out in Table 3.3. For Wright’s strategy in his letter to Dobzhansky
was to use the comparison between the two patterns to infer the relevant evolutionary factors and
their magnitudes in maintaining the flower color dimorphism in Linanthus. As we saw above, the
predictive use of the steady state equation failed to meet this criterion in the sense that the distri-
bution of gene frequencies was not directly comparable to the frequency distribution of samples
given in Table 3.3. But Wright was able to convert the distribution of gene frequencies into the
same unit and scale of the other distribution, making the uses of the steady state model indirectly
meet the criterion of comparability. Third, for the use of the equation to infer evolutionary factors,
one reasonable criterion of success was that it should be possible to describe the effects of different
evolutionary factors by the equation. One of Wright’s major accomplishments in his 1931 paper
(Wright 1931) was to derive a steady state equation like Equation (3.5.1) that properly captured the
effects of various evolutionary factors, such as mutation, selection, migration, and genetic drift.
3.5.4.2 Isolation-by-Distance Diagram Wright used the diagram of isolation by distance (Fig-
ure 3.2) to describe a structure of population for the analysis of which he developed F -statistics.
No surviving notes from 1941 and 1942 contain a diagram like this. Wright’s early, surviving
notes on population structure, one of which is dated September 29, 1938, contain similar diagrams
(Sewall Wright Papers, Series IIa, Folder 9), but it is difficult to infer from the notes what he was
doing with the diagrams. Thus, we can only say that Wright put the isolation-by-distance diagram
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(Figure 3.2) to a descriptive use in his letter to Dobzhansky (Wright to Dobzhansky, November
1941).
Wright’s descriptive use of the diagram resulted in the following claims about the Linanthus
population:
Hierarchical. The total Linanthus population of size Nt is divided into subpopulations,
each of which has the size Ni and is further divided into unit populations of size Nu.
Circular. The geographical area occupied by the Linanthus population, subpopulations,
and unit populations is circular.
Wright clearly states Hierarchical by referring to Figure 3.2 (see the passage, quoted above, from
his letter to Dobzhansky). Circular also resulted from Wright’s use of the diagram as a description
of population structure, because Wright interpreted Nt, Ni, and Nu as an area occupied by a fixed
number of individuals. This latter point can be seen clearly in his interpretations of F values
explained above.
There were at least two reasonable criteria of success relevant to the descriptive use of the
isolation by distance diagram. One is suggestiveness: Wright was trying to communicate an idea
of isolation by distance to Dobzhansky, that is, the idea of hierarchical population structure, so the
diagram should suggest this idea. The nested figures in the diagram met this criterion well. Another
relevant criterion is consistency with Wright’s assumptions about the area of unit populations.
Wright assumed that the area of a unit population was circular, so the diagram should be consistent
with this assumption. The circular figures in the diagram met this criterion.
3.5.4.3 F -Equation and F -Curves Wright put the F -Equation and F -Curves to a variety of
uses. First, as we saw in his notes (Figure 3.8 and 3.10), Wright used the F -Equation (Equation
3.5.2) to calculate values of F from Epling and Dobzhansky’s data. Let us take a closer look at
Figure 3.9. Wright wrote the right hand side of the squared F equation in the second column from
the right. To the left of this column he wrote the quantities to be substituted into the equation. He
wrote the value of the numerator of the F -Equation in the third column from the right and the value
of the denominator in the fourth column from the left. Following the F -Equation, Wright divided
the former by the latter and recorded the result in the second column from the right. Second,
Wright took quantities computed according to the F -Equation as points on F -Curves shown in
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Figures 3.4 and 3.5. He used these F -values to describe genetic characteristics of the Linanthus
population, in particular, the extent of local genetic differentiation relative to the limiting value.
Third, Wright used the F -Curves to infer the effective population size (i.e., the size of the unit
population).
Like the steady state equation, different criteria of success were likely to be relevant to these
uses of the F -Equation. First, reasonable criteria of success for the computational use of the F -
Equation included that the equation should be mathematically well-defined and enable Wright to
do computation efficiently and precisely. Second, for the descriptive use, one reasonable criterion
was that the F -Equation should make biological sense: the right hand side of the equation should
admit a biologically reasonable interpretation. The equation did have such an interpretation, for
the right hand side was the ratio of the actual spread of the distribution of gene frequencies among
subgroups to its limiting value. In other words, the value of F means how far subgroups are
differentiated: the closer the value is to 1, the more differentiated subgroups are. Third, for the
use of the F -Curves to infer the effective population size, one reasonable criterion was that it
discriminates different effective sizes. The F -Curves met this criterion as Wright showed that
distinct F -Curves arise for different effective sizes (e.g., Figure 3.4).
I have just given an analysis of Wright’s uses of models and criteria of success that would have
been relevant to his uses of models. In the following sections I focus on his uses of the steady state
equation, the F -Equation, and the F -Curves in the second and third phases of his research. But
it is important to emphasize that by the end of 1942 Wright had no plan of continuing to work on
Linanthus. How he would work on Linanthus was open-ended, but as we shall see, he decided to
use the same models while his specific aims changed.
3.6 SECOND PHASE: EPLING, WRIGHT, AND THE HARDENING OF THE
MODERN SYNTHESIS
In 1944, Epling began a long-term study of Linanthus. In each year he collected data at transects
set up in an area much smaller (20 sq mi) than that surveyed in 1941 (840 sq mi) and periodi-
cally sent the new data to Wright (see, e.g., Dobzhansky to Wright, May 15, 1944; Sewall Wright
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Papers, Series IIa, Folder 10). Wright spent countless hours analyzing the new series of data.
Meanwhile, in 1959, the year of the Darwin Centennial, Epling and his collaborators Harlan Lewis
and Francis Ball submitted to Evolution a manuscript on their long-term study of Linanthus. Con-
trary to the conclusion reached by Epling, Dobzhansky, and Wright in the early 1940s, Epling and
colleagues argued that selection, rather than genetic drift, is the primary cause of the observed
patterns of distribution of flower colors (Epling et al. 1960, 254). Wright refereed the manuscript
and recommended it for publication (Provine 1986, 486).
In response to Epling and colleagues’ paper, Wright wrote two manuscripts, one in 1960 and
another in 1962. In both manuscripts, Wright criticized a particular form of inference to natural
selection Epling and colleagues used. The form of inference in question goes from the evidence
that the influence of random drift is not or cannot be strong in a population to the conclusion
that natural selection must be operating in that population. This form of inference reflected a
characteristic of the hardened evolutionary synthesis, and Wright’s response clarifies what, for
him, would count as an adequate explanation of the flower color dimorphism in Linanthus.
3.6.1 Hardening of the Modern Synthesis
According to Stephen Jay Gould, in its early days (1930s), the so-called modern synthesis in
evolutionary biology was pluralistic in that a range of mechanisms, including Darwinian natural
selection and random genetic drift, was accepted as legitimate explanations of evolutionary phe-
nomena. But Gould argued that the synthesis gradually hardened into a monistic view that took
natural selection as the primary, if not the only, mechanism of evolution. He wrote:
The original version of the synthesis . . . did not attempt to crown any particular cause
of change, but to insist that all permissible causes be based on known Mendelian mech-
anisms. In particular, it did not insist that adaptive, cumulative natural selection must
underlie nearly all, or even most, change—though many synthesists personally favored
this view. Any theory of change would be admitted, so long as its causal base lay in
known Mendelian genetics. In the 1930s, for example, genetic drift was often granted
a predominant role in phenotypic change, not only at the level of demes, but also in
the origin of many species. . . . I have called this original version “pluralistic” because
87
it admitted a range of theories about evolutionary change, Darwinian and otherwise,
and insisted only that explanations at all levels be based upon known genetic causes
operating within populations and laboratory stocks.
This pluralistic version was slowly and subtly altered, primarily during the 1940s
(and perhaps with the 1947 Princeton conference as a focal point), as the intent of
explanation by known genetics shifted to the content of one particular theory—neo-
Darwinism and its insistence that cumulative natural selection leading to adaptation be
granted pride of place as the mechanism of evolutionary change. The synthesis hard-
ened by elevating one theory to prominence among the several that supported the pri-
mary methodological claim of the original version—and eventually . . . by insisting to
the point of dogma and ridicule that selection and adaptation were just about everything.
(Gould 1983, 74–75)
Gould illustrates this “hardening of the modern synthesis” (Gould 1980, 1982, 1983) by showing
the hardening in Dobzhansky, Simpson, and Wright. It has also been documented by other histo-
rians (Provine 1986, Ch. 12; Smocovitis 1996, 146–147). The heyday of the hardened synthesis
was obvious at the 1959 Darwin Centennial Celebration held at the University of Chicago (Gould
1983, Smocovitis 1999).20
There is a particular form of inference to selection that was licensed by the hardened synthesis
and which Wright consistently resisted. According to the hardened synthesis, selection is the
most important and most prevalent mechanism of evolutionary change, so the following forms of
inference are all valid:
Selection only.
There is evidence for selection for a trait in a given population.
So:
20Provine has argued that Wright’s shifting balance theory hardened. This may seem counterintuitive because
throughout his career, Wright emphasized a balance of evolutionary factors, such as selection, mutation, migration,
and drift. Selection was always one of many factors of evolution. But, according to Provine, in the 1930s Wright held
that taxonomic differences above the species level were largely nonadaptive and therefore random in character, but by
the 1950s he held that only local differences within a species were random. Within Wright’s shifting balance theory,
the level at which random genetic drift played a role came to be more restricted than before (Provine 1986, 361–362).
The relation between Wright’s theory and the hardening of the modern synthesis is thus not straightforward: On the
one hand, Wright’s theory hardened in the way just described, but on the other hand, his theory did not harden because
he never regarded selection as the only important mechanism of evolution. As I show below, Wright’s response to
Epling and colleagues supports this latter point.
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Selection explains the origin and maintenance of the trait of interest.
No Drift then Selection.
There is no evidence for drift being a significant causal influence on the fre-
quency of a trait in a given population.
So:
Selection explains the origin and maintenance of the trait of interest.
To reject both Selection only and No Drift then Selection, one may point out that selection is not
the only cause of evolutionary change and that a combination of different causes may explain the
origin and maintenance of a trait. In addition, to reject No Drift then Selection, one may argue
that the lack of evidence for one evolutionary factor is not evidence for some other factor. To
emphasize a combination of different causes is to reject the central commitment of the hardened
synthesis that natural selection is the only, most important, or most prevalent evolutionary mech-
anism. The rejection of the hardened synthesis just outlined, however, is not exactly a reversion
to what Gould calls the original, pluralistic version of the synthesis. For the rejection is based not
only on the idea that there are selective (or adaptive) and non-selective (or non-adaptive) evolution-
ary mechanisms—the central idea of the original version of the synthesis—but also on the idea that
there are different evolutionary mechanisms operating in concert to produce whatever phenomena
we find in a given population. This latter idea, for example, is invoked in the rejection of Selection
only. To distinguish these ideas, we can call the former pluralism and the latter interactionism.
Wright’s view was interactionism, and he strongly resisted No Drift then Selection when it was
employed by Epling and colleagues in their 1959 paper.
3.6.2 Epling and the Hardening of the Modern Synthesis
After the original 1941 survey, Epling launched what would become more than twenty years of ob-
servational and experimental studies of Linanthus. In the spring of 1944 Epling and his associates
set up a permanently marked transect in the area where both blue and white had coexisted at least
since the 1941 survey. The area was located in the western part of the Mojave Desert, near Pear-
blossom, California. The transect was a half mile long and ten feet wide, running from west to east.
It was further divided into 260 quadrats (10 ft 10 ft each) (Epling et al. 1960, 241–242). In 1944,
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the density of Linanthus was not uniform in each quadrat, and Epling and his associates recorded
the locations of the areas of greater density for each quadrat. They also sampled the frequencies of
blue and white by first determining, for each quadrat, the densest square foot area and then record-
ing the numbers of blue and white within that area. They recorded the location of the densest area
(that is, their sampling location) in each quadrat. Epling and his associates collected the data in
this way every year since 1944 except when there were no or too few plants to count (1950, 1951,
1955, 1956, and 1958).21 Epling and colleagues calculated the mean frequency of blue for each
quadrat over those ten years where counts were made. They also compared the mean frequencies
for the entire transect in the period 1944–1947 and that in the period 1953–1957 (excluding 1955
and 1956 as no counts were made in these years). According to Epling and colleagues, the compar-
ison showed that “the cline of frequencies illustrated has remained constant” (Epling et al. 1960,
245).
In their paper, Epling and colleagues made two arguments for the claim that selection, as
opposed to random genetic drift, is the primary cause of the observed distribution of flower color
in Linanthus. In the first argument, Epling and colleagues said that the stability of the cline of
phenotype frequencies suggests that “if genetic drift has played a role, it has been of only local
consequence and not persistent in its effects” (Epling et al. 1960, 254). “Conversely,” they claimed,
the stability of the cline suggests “an intense local selection because the blues are concentrated in
certain areas and because persisting clines of blue and white frequencies have been found” (Epling
et al. 1960, 254; emphasis mine). Note the pattern of inference here: According to Epling and
colleagues, the stability of the cline suggests that drift is not a significant factor, and it “conversely”
suggests that selection must be the main factor. This is a clear instance of the eliminative inference
to selection of the form referred to above as No Drift then Selection.
21In addition to this transect study, Epling and his associates did the following: In 1944, they established three
stations in the area where blue and white coexisted. Every year since 1944, they recorded the frequencies of blue and
white in these plots. In 1948, they established two new plots for the elimination experiment where plants of Linanthus
were removed before they left seeds in each year so that the next year’s plants had to grow from whatever seeds
dormant underground. In November 1954, they transplanted the seeds obtained from blue flowered plants living in an
all-blue area to an all-white area in order to test the viability of seeds in different areas. The results of all these studies
were reported in Epling and colleagues’ paper (1960).
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In the second argument, Epling and colleagues noted that seeds of Linanthus could remain
dormant at least seven years in the soil.22 After noting that the seed storage increases the effective
population size (Epling et al. 1960, 254), Epling and colleagues said:
The conclusion seems warranted, therefore, that the frequencies of blue and white flow-
ered plants are in the long run the product of selection operating at an intensity we have
been unable to measure; and that the large size of the effective population, and the local-
ized dispersion of pollen and seeds, has precluded significant changes in pattern during
15 seasons. (Epling et al. 1960, 254; emphasis mine)
Again note the form of inference: According to Epling and colleagues, the presumably large size
of the seed storage makes the effective population size large. In a large population, drift cannot
be a significant factor. “Therefore,” selection must be the main factor although its intensity is too
small to be detected. Like the first argument, the inference is eliminative: Epling and colleagues
infer selection from the fact that drift cannot be the main factor.
3.6.3 Wright’s Response
In response to Epling and colleagues, in January 1960, Wright began a manuscript on Linanthus,
an apparently unfinished, handwritten version of which has survived (Sewall Wright Papers, Series
IIa, Folder 29).23 In the introduction of the manuscript, Wright explicitly noted that Epling and
colleagues argued for selection only by elimination of random drift:
They [Epling, Lewis, and Ball] conclude that the frequencies of blue and white flowered
plants are in the long run the product of selection. This conclusion was however ar-
rived at only by elimination since studies of topography, soil samples, and of associated
vegetation in areas in which one or the other color predominates have given no indica-
tion of any basis for differential selection. (Sewall Wright Papers, Series IIa, Folder 29;
emphasis mine)
22This was found in the elimination experiments.
23Yet, by June 1962, he returned to Linanthus, producing a complete typescript with tables and figures (Sewall
Wright Papers, Series II, Box 2). In an interview with Provine, Wright said that in the 1960s he was planning to
publish his analysis in a joint paper with Epling but that the project stalled (Sewall Wright Papers, Series IIIa, Tape
11, 1979; Provine 1986, 486–488). Moreover, at that time, Wright devoted himself to writing his treatise Evolution
and the Genetics of Populations. He thus did not publish the Linanthus manuscripts.
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Epling and colleagues did not find any positive evidence for selection. But interpreting the ap-
parent stability of the frequencies of blue and white as evidence against drift, they concluded that
somehow selection must be in play. This reasoning was unacceptable for Wright. Thus he wrote:
The problem of finding positive evidence for any interpretation of the pattern thus re-
mains: The purpose of this paper is to consider whether statistical analysis of the new
data gives any positive evidence of any sort. (Sewall Wright Papers, Series IIa, Folder
29)
One section of the manuscript was entitled “The Problem,” and in it, Wright emphasized that
the important problem concerning Linanthus is far more complex than the problem of determining
whether selection or drift is responsible for the patterns of distribution of flower color. He wrote:
The problem presented by distribution of blue and white flowered plants is not as simple
as a decision between two sharply distinct alternative[s]: control by selection or by
random drift. Selection may be involved in diverse ways, there are different sorts of
random drift to be considered, and selection and random [drift] may be combined in
any degrees and may conceivably interact to produce a more heterogeneous pattern than
either by itself. (Sewall Wright Papers, Series IIa, Folder 29)
The first sentence criticizes Epling and colleagues’ eliminative inference, and the rest of the pas-
sage illustrates the way in which Wright’s evolutionary theory did not harden and what he regarded
as an adequate explanation of the flower color dimorphism in Linanthus. For Wright, selection was
not the only cause of evolution, and an adequate explanation would have to appeal to a particular
combination of evolutionary factors, notably selection and drift. The above passage does not refer
to mutation and migration, but these must also be considered (as Wright did in the early 1940s).
At some points in the 1962 manuscript, Wright used F -Curves and the 1941 data to argue for
an interactionist hypothesis that the observed pattern of distribution of flower color was the result of
interaction between random drift in subpopulations and migration (Sewall Wright Papers, Series II,
Box 2; see also Series IIa, Folder 29 for F -Curves Wright drew in 1962). He produced the curves
similar to Figure 3.5 and explained the idea of unit population (now called “neighborhood”) and
how the size of unit population changes the curves. He then showed the curves of FST for each
of the six primary subdivisions (see Table 3.4 and Figure 3.6). He showed that given the average
FST values for variable areas (primary subdivisions I, II, and VI), the best fit FST curves were
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those calculated according to the hypothesis that the size of a unit population is 10 and that there
is certain amount of migration closely (Sewall Wright Papers, Series II, Box 2).24
Wright paid special attention to clinal selection and contrasted it with an explanation based on
the interaction between random drift and dispersal. A cline, introduced by Julian Huxley (1938),
refers to a spatial gradient of the distribution of phenotypes or genotypes. Such gradient is sup-
posed to arise from corresponding differences in environmental conditions. Thus, the presence
of a cline can be taken to be an indication of spatially varying selection. Wright considered two
forms of a cline: plane cline (uniform gradient in one direction) and conical cline (gradient falling
off uniformly in all directions from a point). Wright tested how well the values of FST based on
interaction between drift and migration, the plane cline hypothesis, and the conical cline hypoth-
esis fit the 1941 Linanthus data. The interaction between drift and migration turned out to fit the
data better than clinal selection hypotheses. Moreover, Wright argued that it would be surprising
if there were fine-grained clinal selection in the areas where blue and white were mixed:
To account for the observed distribution of blue on a largely selective basis would re-
quire a distribution of selective values, favorable and unfavorable to blue, in a fine-
grained pattern that happens to simulate very closely that expected from random drift
and dispersion. This would be a surprising pattern of selection to find in an apparently
uniform environment since it requires such a delicate balance between opposed selec-
tive advantages that there is reversal an enormous number of times within any mixed
area. The evidence from the variance-area curve [i.e., FST curves] thus points strongly
toward the joint effects of random drift and dispersion as the principal explanation of
the pattern. (Sewall Wright Papers, Series II, Box 2)
Clinal selection is directional (for or against blue) so that in order for it to maintain dimorphism
within a small area, its direction needs to change from time to time. Since in the 1941 data there
were many such mixed areas in an apparently uniform environment, Wright argued that a kind of
selection that could maintain dimorphism in these areas would be a surprising form of selection.25
24According to Wright’s surviving notes, he calculated relevant F values in late June 1962 (Sewall Wright Papers,
Series IIa, Folder 29).
25This was not the first time Wright considered the hypothesis of local environmental selection with regard to
Linanthus. The hypothesis was suggested by William Hovanitz in 1942 after he saw Epling and Dobzhansky’s paper
(Hovanitz to Wright, May 28, 1942; Wright to Hovanitz, June 11, 1942; see also Provine 1986, 375–376). Wright
acknowledged Hovanitz’ suggestion in his 1943 paper on Linanthus (Wright 1943a, 155).
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In both of his unpublished manuscripts Wright explicitly stated that the problem of Linanthus
was not the simple choice between selection and drift as a main cause of the flower color distri-
bution but the determination of the balance or interaction among various factors, one of which is
selection, that can produce the observed pattern of distribution. He showed the weakness of the
eliminative inference used by Epling and colleagues (1960) and that in explaining the patterns of
the distribution of flower color, he appealed to the interaction between random drift and migration.
Wright’s manuscripts were a criticism of the eliminative inference and the hardened synthesis,
which took natural selection as the main mechanism of evolution.
3.6.4 Aims of Research and Uses of Models
In the second phase of his research on Linanthus, Wright primarily aimed to find any positive
evidence for evolutionary factors that can explain the observed patterns of the distribution of flower
colors. This had been a second, more ambitious aim of the first phase of his research, but it became
the central aim in the second phase.
To find positive evidence for evolutionary factors involved in Linanthus, Wright tried to show
that the patterns of the distribution of flower color were more likely to be the consequence of drift
and migration than selection alone. This was done by using models: He computed F values using
the F -Equation and constructed FST -curves under different hypotheses concerning evolutionary
factors and compared them against the FST values derived from the data. He found that the inter-
action of drift and migration gave the best fit result. He thus argued that there is evidence for drift
and migration as important evolutionary factors in the Linanthus population. In other words, in the
second phase, Wright used F -Curves to make a case for interactionism in Linanthus, whereas in
the first phase, he used F -Curves to make a case for isolation by distance in nature.
Like the first phase, Wright used values of FST to describe the extent of local genetic differ-
entiation. But in the second phase he put F -Curves to a new use. He used F -Curves to infer
evolutionary factors that could explain the observed patterns of the distribution of flower colors.26
In the first phase Wright used F -Curves to infer the effective population size of the Linanthus pop-
ulation, but given a more explanatory aim of the second phase, it made sense for Wright to exploit
26In the first phase Wright did this by using the steady state equation.
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the fact that F -Curves could be used to compare different explanatory hypotheses against F values
derived from data.
It appears that the change in the aim of research in the second phase did not demand change
in the criteria of success for the computational use of the F -Equation and the descriptive use of
F -Curves.27 That is, F -Equation had to be mathematically sound and computationally efficient in
order for Wright’s computational use of it to be successful, and it met this criterion well. Values of
F had to make biological sense in order for the descriptive use of F -Curves to be successful at all.
As we saw above, values of F met this criterion. But there was probably an additional criterion
of success for the computational use of the F -Equation and the inferential use of F -Curves in the
second phase. For F values had to be calculated not only for the hypothesis of drift and migration—
which Wright knew how to do in the early 1940s—but also for clinal selection hypotheses. That is,
it needed to be possible for Wright to manipulate the F -Equation in a mathematically sound way
to compute F values for different hypotheses. The success of this computation enabled inferential
uses of F -Curves in this phase.
3.7 FINAL PHASE: EXPLAINING GEOGRAPHICAL PATTERNS
Recall that in 1941 Wright found that the theoretical distribution of gene frequencies did not fit well
with the Linanthus data. Recall also that in his analysis of the Linanthus data in the 1940s, Wright
assumed that the parameter values are spatially homogenous. In the 1970s, he came to relax this
assumption and allowed the effective population size to vary from one locality to another. With
this relaxation of the spatial homogeneity assumption, he was able to improve the fit between
the theoretical and the observed distributions of gene frequencies (Wright 1978, 209–211). This
new development began in 1972 while Wright was preparing to include the Linanthus case in his
treatise.
27This does not mean that in general the same uses are associated with the same criteria; rather, this is the case
where change in the aim of research did not have impact on the uses of models and the criteria of success.
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Figure 3.12: Close-up of Figure 3.10. Reproduced from Sewall Wright Papers, Series IIa, Folder
11 with permission from the American Philosophical Society.
3.7.1 Wright’s 1972 Analysis
In September and October 1972, Wright reanalyzed the 1941 Linanthus data, referring back to his
notes from 1942 (Sewall Wright Papers, Series IIa, Folder 40). On September 16, he wrote a new
note on the table of F values he produced in 1942 (Figure 3.10 and 3.12). Various statistics derived
from the table, written on the right hand side of the page, were published in Wright’s 1943 paper
on Linanthus (see Table 3.5; Wright 1943a, 145). Figure 3.10 lists sampling stations (the first
column from the left) in the ascending order of frequencies of blue (the second column) together
with the values of F (the third column). Wright’s note on the bottom of the page, dated September
16, 1972, reads (Figure 3.12):
More blue when F is high: could imply that selection favors white slightly and that
only when effective N is very small (F high) can blue rise to high frequencies. (Sewall
Wright Papers, Series IIa, Folder 11)
Wright discovered a pattern in the 1941 data: the frequency of blue is correlated with the value of
F . He then inferred that blue may be slightly selected against and that its frequency can increase
only when the effective population size is so small that selection is ineffective.
Wright’s inference seems to be based on the following consideration. As can be seen in Equa-
tion (3.5.2), F is greater when the standard deviation σx of gene frequency q in a subgroup x is
greater. For Wright, greater σx implies that change in q is predominantly random, because σx rep-
resents random, as opposed to directional, change in q. Now if random change is due primarily
to accidents of sampling and directional change to selection, and if selection pressure is constant
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throughout the geographical range of the population in question, then greater F for a given sub-
group implies that the effective population sizeN of that group is smaller. Smaller F implies larger
N , which makes selection more effective. So the correlation between the frequency of blue and
the value of F suggested to Wright that N is not constant throughout the Linanthus population: N
may vary from place to place.28
Thus Wright’s notes suggest that he came to realize the possibility of the heterogeneity of the
parameter values in Linanthus when he was going over his original notes taken in 1942. After
September 16, Wright worked steadily. By September 29, he produced the table and graphs that
would appear in his last published analysis of the Linanthus data (Sewall Wright Papers, Series
IIa, Folder 40; Wright 1978, 207–212).
3.7.2 Wright’s Final Analysis
Wright’s final analysis, which addressed both the 1941 survey and Epling’s long-term study, was
published in the fourth volume of his treatise in 1978 (Wright 1978, 194–223).29 Like his first
analysis of the 1941 data, Wright compared the theoretical and the observed distributions of gene
frequencies. Unlike the first analysis, however, he did not require the parameter values to be
homogenous throughout the geographical range of Linanthus. Instead, he allowed the effective
population size to vary from one locality to another. With this relaxation of the spatial homogeneity
assumption, he was able to improve the fit between the theoretical and the observed distributions
of gene frequencies (Wright 1978, 209–211).
Wright began his new analysis by reproducing his 1941 result, using Equation (3.5.1) (Wright
1978, 209). He compared the theoretical and the observed distributions of gene frequencies under
the assumption of the spatial homogeneity of parameter values, failing to obtain a good fit between
the two distributions because of the same hump he emphasized in 1941 (Figure 3.13; Wright 1978,
207–209). However, in this analysis, by dividing the total population into western and eastern
regions, he was able to locate the hump in the western region: the theoretical and the observed
distributions fit relatively well for the eastern region, but they do not fit well for the western region.
28The spatial homogeneity of parameter values requires that all relevant parameter values be homogenous through-
out the population, but the spatial heterogeneity only requires that at least one of the relevant parameter values be
heterogeneous.
29Wright’s analysis of Epling’s long-term study is essentially the same as that found in Wright’s 1962 manuscript.
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Figure 3.13: The theoretical and observed distributions of gene frequencies in Linanthus under
the assumption of the spatial homogeneity of the parameter values. Frequencies of genes for blue
(assumed to be dominant) in western, eastern, and the total populations are shown. Reproduced
from Wright (1978, 207) with permission from the University of Chicago Press.
He then argued that such difference in the goodness of fit “could come about if the population
is heterogeneous with respect to the parameters” (Wright 1978, 209). Referring to Epling and
Dobzhansky’s map of the relative frequencies of blue and white in sample stations (Epling and
Dobzhansky 1942, 326; Wright 1978, 198), Wright argued that the data from the western region
can be divided into two components, western central, WC , and western peripheral, WP . The
frequency of blue was intermediate in sample stations in WC (that is, the variance in q and hence
F were low), whereas it was either high or low in those in WP (that is, the variance in q and F
were high). Relaxing now the spatial homogeneity assumption, Wright calculated the theoretical
distributions of gene frequencies for WC , WP , and WT (western total), using different values of
size Nu of a random breeding unit and the migration rate m for each (Figure 3.14). The theoretical
distribution now exhibited a hump like the observed distribution. From the values of F , Wright
estimated the effective population size forWP to be 7 or 8 and that forWC to be about 100 (Wright
1978, 209–211).
In the light of this analysis, Wright noted that the shifting balance theory offers a plausible
explanation of the observed patterns of flower color distribution in Linanthus. He said that it is
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Figure 3.14: The theoretical and observed distributions of gene frequencies in Linanthus under
the assumption of the spatial heterogeneity of the parameter values. Western central, peripheral,
and total populations are shown. Reproduced from Wright (1978, 212) with permission from the
University of Chicago Press.
plausible that among the continually varying genetic compositions of local populations,
arrived at by random drifting of the frequencies at all other heterallelic loci, favorable
interaction systems may be arrived at which spread over large areas by interdeme se-
lection and incidentally have some effect on the selective advantage of white over blue.
(Wright 1978, 223)
In other words, according to Wright, the interaction of random drift in local populations, migration
between local populations, and selection for favorable genotypes (i.e., individual selection) can
explain the observed patterns of flower color distribution at all levels from local patterns in the
variable areas to global patterns in the entire geographical range of Linanthus in the Mojave Desert.
3.7.3 Aims of Research and Uses of Models
In the final phase of his research on Linanthus, Wright aimed to revise his earlier analysis in order
to identify a more complete set of evolutionary factors that can explain the observed patterns of
the distribution of flower colors. He thus referred to the section on Linanthus as “a revision and
extension of my early analysis” (Wright 1978, 194).
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Wright used F values to make an inference to the spatial heterogeneity of Nu and selection for
white. That is, he realized that F values could be put to a new inferential use with respect to the
Linanthus data: positive correlation between frequency of blue and F could imply selection for
white and variation in the size of unit populations (Figure 3.12).
Like his earlier uses of the steady state equation, Wright put the equation to computational
and predictive uses. But he relaxed the homogeneity assumption so that different parameter values
can be used for different regions of the Linanthus territory. The curves shown in Figure 3.14
corresponded to three different sets of parameter values for the steady state equation.
One criterion of success relevant to the new inferential use of F values was the reliability of
making inferences about the effective population size from the values of F . Such reliability would
have been needed to support Wright’s inference to the heterogeneity of N from the correlated
change in F with respect to the frequency of blue. As Wright had shown in the 1940s, F values
vary with values of Nu (see Figure 3.4 and 3.5). Thus, it seems that Wright had good reason to
believe that F values met the above criterion of success for the inferential use to which he put
them.
For the predictive use of the steady state equation, in this final phase, Wright apparently had
a more stringent criterion of success, because he rejected the 1941 result of the predictive use as
inadequate. Consistent with his aim of revising the original analysis, he demanded more accuracy
in the fit between the theoretical and observed distributions of gene frequencies. It was not that
the steady state equation itself was inadequate in 1941; rather, it was the way he used the model
in 1941 that was inadequate. In 1941, Wright used the model by assuming the homogeneity of
parameter values and failed to produce a theoretical distribution of gene frequencies that fit well
with the data (see Figure 3.13). In the 1970s, he relaxed the homogeneity assumption, and for
different subdivision of the Linanthus population, he used different sets of parameter values for
the steady state equation. This use of the equation resulted in theoretical distributions of gene
frequencies that fit the data quite well (see Figure 3.14).
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3.8 CONCLUSION
The relationship between Wright’s uses of three models (steady state equation, F -equation, and
F -curves) that I have focused on and the aims of his research is summarized in Tables 3.6 and 3.7.
As we can see, uses of the same model can shift over the course of scientists’ research in response
to the shift in aim. We have also seen that for each use of a model, certain criteria of success were
relevant and that criteria of success for one use of a model can be different from those for another
use of the same model.
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Model: Steady State Equation
Phase Use Aim
1
To compute gene frequencies. To illustrate isolation
by distance and
explain the observed
patterns.
To predict the distribution of gene frequencies.
To infer evolutionary factors.
Not used.
To find evidence for
evolutionary factors
beside selection.
2
To compute gene frequencies. To revisit phase 1 and
explain the observed
patterns more fully.
3 To predict the distribution of gene frequencies.
To infer evolutionary factors.
Table 3.6: A summary of Wright’s uses of the steady state equation model and the aims of his
research.
Model: F -Equation and F -Curves
Phase Use Aim
1
To compute F values. To illustrate isolation
by distance and
explain the observed
patterns.
To describe the extent of local genetic differentiation.
To infer effective N (F -Curves).
2
To compute F values. To find evidence for
evolutionary factors
beside selection.
To describe the extent of local genetic differentiation.
To infer effective N (F -Curves).
To infer evolutionary factors (F -Curves).
3
To compute F values. To revisit phase 1 and
explain the observed
patterns more fully.
To describe the extent of local genetic differentiation.
To infer the spatial heterogeneity ofNu and selection.
(F -Curves not used.)
Table 3.7: A summary of Wright’s uses of F -Equation and F -Curves and the aims of his research.
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4.0 REALISM, INSTRUMENTALISM, AND USES OF MODELS IN SCIENCE
4.1 INTRODUCTION: STEIN’S CONJECTURE
In his 1989 paper, Howard Stein argues that James Clerk Maxwell was an instrumentalist when he
used his mechanical models of the electromagnetic field—the ether models—“as mere aids” (Stein
1989, 61) to develop a system of equations governing the dynamics of that field. At the same time,
according to Stein, Maxwell was also a realist when he saw the ether models as providing clues
about the true nature of the electromagnetic field (Stein 1989, 62–64). Referring to Maxwell’s
instrumentalist and realist attitudes toward the ether models, Stein says: “This dialectical tension
. . . between a realist and an instrumentalist attitude, existing together without contradiction, seems
to me characteristic of the deepest scientists” (Stein 1989, 64).1
Stein contrasts Maxwell with two other scientists, Henri Poincare´ and Lord Kelvin, and claims
that the latter two were not as successful as Maxwell in their work on electrodynamics because
of the strong adherence to instrumentalism—in the case of Poincare´—and realism—in the case
of Kelvin. According to Stein, Poincare´ regarded the ether as a useful fiction for organizing our
experience and did not take the ether model as a source of important hypotheses and questions
about the electromagnetic field—for example, whether momentum exchange occurs with the ether
(Stein 1989, 56). Kelvin, on the other hand, demanded that the ether model provide an accurate
description of the nature of the electromagnetic field and could not take the model merely as a tool
for developing a better system of equations. He remained skeptical of Maxwell’s equations since
he failed to find a satisfactory mechanical model of the ether (Stein 1989, 64).
1On Maxwell’s realist and instrumentalist attitudes, see also Cat (2001, 437).
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Unfortunately, Stein does not say exactly what he takes to be realism and instrumentalism, nor
does he clarify what he means by the dialectical tension between these two positions.2 But we can
glean from his paper an important conjecture about scientific practice:
STEIN’S CONJECTURE: In successful scientific research, a scientist uses a model ac-
cording to the methodological principles of realism and instrumentalism despite the
tension they create among the uses of the model.3
I will characterize this conjecture in detail shortly, but first let us ask why this conjecture would
be important if it were true. It implies that there are methodological principles of realism and
instrumentalism that are directly relevant to successful scientific practice. A philosophical task is
to examine these principles and explain how they create a a certain tension among the uses of a
model while contributing to the success of scientific research. But methodological principles of
realism and instrumentalism are unrecognized in the philosophical debate over scientific realism,
as the following list of representative formulations of various realist and instrumentalist positions
show.
Scientific realism standardly takes the form of a metaphysical, semantic, epistemic, or axio-
logical position:
2And he does not explain what he means by the “deepest” (Stein 1989, 64) scientists. Rather than try to make sense
of the thorny notion of depth (of a scientist, research, explanation, or something else), I will simply replace Stein’s
talk of the deepest scientists with the talk of successful scientific research and a scientist working in it. Throughout
this paper I only consider paradigmatically successful research, that is, research that should be regarded as successful
by any notion of successful research in science.
3By ‘successful scientific research’ I mean the sort of research that should count successful in anyone’s axiology,
whether realist or not. For example, if there is a case of scientific research that contemporary scientists themselves
regard as one of the most successful in history, we have prima facie reason to think that this case should count as
successful in anyone’s axiology. Thus, Stein’s conjecture should be compatible with both axiological realism and
instrumentalism that I present below.
In addition to his views on Maxwell, Poincare´, and Kelvin mentioned above, my formulation of the conjecture
is inspired by Stein’s remark that the true contrast between realism and instrumentalism is methodological rather
than metaphysical (Stein 1989, 56). Although I am using Stein’s work as an inspiration and do not claim that my
formulation is the correct interpretation of his view, here I offer a brief exegesis in favor of my formulation. I think
Stein sees realism and instrumentalism as being opposed because he says that they stand in a “dialectical tension”
(Stein 1989, 64; my emphasis) and thinks that Poincare´ and Kelvin exhibited the opposite attitudes. But it is misleading
to say that realism and instrumentalism coexist “without contradiction” (Stein 1989, 64; my emphasis), because this
locution may suggest that realism and instrumentalism are not opposed at all. I suggest we interpret Stein as saying that
realism and instrumentalism can coexist—hence there is no strict contradiction between them—despite the differences
that create a certain tension between them. Understood in this way, Stein’s conjecture is different from the view that
realism and instrumentalism amount to the same position (e.g., Nagel 1961).
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1. Metaphysical realism: The real world, which scientists investigate, exists independently
of how scientists theorize about it (Boyd 1983, 45; Psillos 1999, xix; Niiniluoto 1999,
21; Chakravartty 2013).4
2. Semantic realism: What a theory or model says about the world is to be interpreted as
truth-conditioned claims about the world (Boyd 1983, 45; Psillos 1999, xix; Chakravartty
2013).
3. Epistemic realism: Predictive success of a scientific theory or model is evidence that
when interpreted as describing the mind-independent world, the theory or model is ap-
proximately true of the world. Consequently, we are justified in believing what a pre-
dictively successful theory or model says about the world (Boyd 1983, 45; Psillos 1999,
xix).5
4. Axiological realism: The aim of science is to construct a theory or model that is true of
both observable and unobservable parts of the world (van Fraassen 1980, 8; Niiniluoto
1999, 160; Godfrey-Smith 2003, 176; Lyons 2005).6
Instrumentalism is compatible with metaphysical realism (Fine 1986, 156) but is opposed to one
or more of semantic, epistemic, and axiological realist positions:
1. Semantic instrumentalism: What a theory or model says about the unobservable part of
the world is not truth-conditioned and is merely a linguistic devise to efficiently make
inferences among claims about the observable part of the world (Stanford 2006, 191–
192).7
2. Epistemic instrumentalism: Predictive success of a scientific theory or model is evidence
that the theory or model is a reliable instrument for achieving our practical ends rather
than evidence that it is approximately true of the world. Consequently, we should only
4Alternatives to metaphysical realism are the views that reject the existence of the external world (e.g., idealism) or
the mind-independence of the world (e.g., neo-Kantianism and constructivism) (see Boyd 2010, Chakravartty 2013).
5For slightly different formulations, see Niiniluoto (1999, 79) and Chakravartty (2013). Since the epistemic realist
about a given scientific theory or model would believe that the entities posited by the theory or model exist, we can
say that she is also a metaphysical realist about those entities.
6In the context of the realism debate, this position is axiological because it is specifically about the aims of science.
This label should not imply that consideration of aims, norms, or values does not matter to other positions on the list.
Epistemic or cognitive norms matter to epistemic realism, but this fact does not turn epistemic realism into axiological
realism since epistemic or cognitive norms may be different from the aims of science.
7This is a rough statement of instrumentalism concerning the language of science, and the linguistic variety of
instrumentalism has met serious criticisms (see Psillos 1999, 17–39; Stanford 2006, 188–193.
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make practical use of a predictively successful theory or model without believing what
it says about the world (Fine 1986, 156–157; Stanford 2006, 193–194).8
3. Axiological instrumentalism: The aim of science is to construct a theory or model that
is instrumentally reliable (Fine 1986, 157).9
This list of familiar positions in the realism debate does not contain any distinctly methodologi-
cal principles.10 Their absence is noteworthy because one of the motivations behind the realism
debate is a desire to understand how successful science works. If Stein’s conjecture were true, it
would imply that there are methodological principles of realism and instrumentalism that matter to
successful scientific practice and which deserve careful philosophical analysis.
In this chapter I flesh out Stein’s conjecture, provide both philosophical and historical argu-
ments for it, and explore the implication of the conjecture for the realism debate. I shall begin by
characterizing the realist and instrumentalist methodological principles and the subtle tension that
emerges among a scientist’s uses of a model over time if the scientist adopts both principles (Sec-
tion 4.2). I then present a detailed case of successful scientific research—that of Seymour Benzer’s
in the 1950s and 60s—and argue that various uses of the very same model in this case followed
both the realist and instrumentalist methodological principles. I also show that the tension of the
sort I characterize in Section 4.2 emerged in Benzer’s case (Sections 4.3–4.5). Finally, I argue
8The very last clause of this formulation of epistemic instrumentalism faces a serious problem identified by Kyle
Stanford: “The central problem is that to use a theory for prediction, intervention, and other practical ends just is to
believe at least some of the things it tells us about the world” (Stanford 2006, 194). Stanford proposes an improved
version of epistemic instrumentalism according to which we are to believe what a given theory or model says about
the world insofar as we can understand it in terms of another theory or model—including our commonsense claims
about everyday experience—about which we are epistemic realists (Stanford 2006, 197–211). My argument in this
chapter works for either formulation of epistemic instrumentalism.
9This position assumes that an instrumentally reliable theory or model need not be true of the unobservable parts
of the world.
10The absence of methodological positions in the above list is not an oversight on my part. None of the most
comprehensive lists of realist theses includes a methodological thesis (see, e.g., Boyd 1983, 45; Leplin 1984, 1–2;
Fine 1986, 156–157; Kitcher 1993, 127; Psillos 1999, xix; Chakravartty 2013). Ilkka Niiniluoto’s (1999, Ch. 6)
discussion of methodology as part of his comprehensive account of realism appears to be an exception that proves
the rule. For Niiniluoto, methodological rules are realist insofar as they promote the attainment of truth, which is
the aim of science identified by axiological realism. To find out which methodological rule promotes the realist aim,
we have to be able to measure its effectiveness in attaining truth. Thus, Niiniluoto devotes much of his discussion
to various indicators of truth or truthlikeness. His conception of realist methodology is different from mine in that I
regard a methodological rule as realist if it tells a scientist to do things that display their commitment to investigating
the true nature of the world. More recently, Hasok Chang urges reconception of the realism debate in terms of what he
calls active scientific realism, according to which “science should strive to maximize our contact with reality and our
learning from it” (Chang 2012, 205). In discussing this axiological realism, Chang discusses controlled experiments
or tests and operationalization of concepts as methods for learning from reality (Chang 2012, 221–222).
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that epistemic realism or epistemic instrumentalism by itself prohibits a scientist from adopting
both the realist and instrumentalist methodological principles. Stein’s conjecture thus poses new
challenges to realists and instrumentalists, and I briefly suggest possible avenues of response that
realists and instrumentalists may take (Section 4.6).
4.2 REALISM AND INSTRUMENTALISM AS METHODOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES
The realism and instrumentalism relevant to Stein’s conjecture may be understood as methodolog-
ical principles about how a scientist should use a model in the ongoing process of research.11 I
formulate these principles, using the concept of scientific model developed in Chapter 2:
SCIENTIFIC MODELS AS EXTERNAL REPRESENTATIONS: A given external represen-
tation is a scientific model if a scientist interprets some part or property of the represen-
tation as representing (in the sense of carrying information about) some part or property
of the object of an investigation and if the scientist uses the representation as a tool to
approach the scientist’s specific research questions or aims.
The key part of this concept that becomes important below is that to count as a model, only some
part or property of an external representation needs to represent some part or property of the object
of an investigation. In other words, a model can have other parts or properties that are not or
have not yet been interpreted as representing something. This concept applies to a research project
in science that has an object of investigation, which I assume is a part or parts of the world—
such as entities, events, processes, or phenomena—and which a scientist involved in that project
primarily investigates. Her specific research questions and aims have to do with the object of her
investigation.12
11Stein says that his own analysis of Poincare´’s instrumentalism “could be recast in methodological terms—in effect,
that the true issue was not [metaphysical] realism vs. instrumentalism” (Stein 1989, 56; my emphasis).
12Our identification of the object of a given investigation should be specific enough to help us understand what
exactly a scientist is investigating, what questions she is trying to answer, and what research aims she has. For
example, to describe what a biologist running a cell biology lab investigates, it would be uninformative, though true,
to say that she studies cells; it would be more informative to say that she studies the process by which functional cells
become cancerous in adult human beings, that her question is what causes this process to stop, and that her aim is to
develop a technique to control this process. So, assuming that there are no better alternatives, we should say that this
process is the object of her investigation.
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With this characterization of model in mind and drawing on Stein’s remarks on Maxwell,
Kelvin, and Poincare´, I formulate two methodological principles:
THE REALIST METHODOLOGICAL PRINCIPLE: A scientist should use a model to make
claims—in the form of hypotheses, descriptions, or explanations—and generate ques-
tions about the true nature of the object of an investigation. To do this, whenever pos-
sible, the scientist should interpret parts and properties of the model as representing the
parts and properties of the object of the investigation.13
THE INSTRUMENTALIST METHODOLOGICAL PRINCIPLE: A scientist should use a
model to organize or predict observational and experimental results, to design new tech-
niques for intervention, and to do other tasks that address practical needs. To do this,
the scientist should interpret parts and properties of the model as representing things
other than the parts and properties of the object of their investigation whenever such
interpretation would help the scientist perform the task.14
The first principle is “realist” because it shares with other forms of realism the emphasis on truth
about the world, and the second principle is “instrumentalist” because it shares with other forms
of instrumentalism the emphasis on human needs.15 These principles tell a scientist how to use a
model as a tool in her research rather than what model to ultimately aim for. In this sense, these
principles are methodological rather than axiological.
A scientist’s use of a model, if guided by both the realist and instrumentalist methodological
principles, exhibits a characteristic tension that emerges in the ongoing process of her investiga-
tion. I will present an actual case of this tension in the subsequent sections, but to get an idea of
what this tension looks like, let us consider a scientist who interprets one of the properties of an
external representation as representing a property of the object of her investigation and uses the
representation to answer her research question. This external representation is her model. Suppose
13This does not tell a scientist to interpret every part and property of her model as representing the parts and
properties of the object of her investigation. She may simply ignore certain parts or properties of her model because
a model often has parts or properties that no scientist is likely to interpret as representing something. For example, a
scientist is likely to ignore ink and paper out of which a diagrammatic model is made.
14This does not tell a scientist to interpret every part and property of her model as representing things other than the
parts and properties of the object of her investigation. Doing so implies that the object she is using is not a model of the
object of her investigation. Thus, even if she follows the instrumentalist methodological principle, she still interprets
at least some part or property of her model as representing some part or property of the object of her investigation.
15Here I am following Arthur Fine’s discussion of the distinguishing themes of realism and instrumentalism (Fine
1986, 150–157; Fine 2001, 110–113).
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that at one point in the course of her investigation she uses her model to describe the true nature
of the object of her investigation by interpreting many parts and properties of her model as repre-
senting the parts and properties of the object of her investigation. We can say that she follows the
realist methodological principle. At some future point, however, she uses her model to organize ex-
perimental data by interpreting many of the properties of her model that she previously interpreted
as representing properties of the object of her investigation as representing things other than the
object of her investigation, such as quantities recorded in experiments or patterns of experimental
data. We can say that she follows the instrumentalist methodological principle. When we see the
temporal course of her research activities in this way, we can see a characteristic tension among
her uses of the model: After using her model according to the realist methodological principle,
she may cancel or disregard some of the interpretations she gave to her model when she uses her
model according to the instrumentalist methodological principle. Thus, while she is using a model
according to one of the methodological principles, she cannot use the same model to do things she
could do were she following the other principle. The adoption of both principles becomes apparent
when we study how a scientist’s interpretations of parts and properties of a model and her uses of
the model change over the course of research. Historical studies of scientific practice are thus use-
ful resources for philosophers of science interested in methodology, and below I shall use my own
historical study of scientific practice to show how the realist and instrumentalist methodological
principles were jointly adopted in actual scientific practice.
Stein’s conjecture says, then, that in successful scientific research, a scientist uses a model ac-
cording to both the realist and instrumentalist methodological principles formulated above despite
the tension the adoption of both principles creates among the uses of the model. Let us now turn
to a detailed case of successful scientific research that supports this conjecture.16
16In his Theory and Truth, Lawrence Sklar (2000) argues that the historical development of fundamental physics
owes much to anti-realist criticisms of realist attitudes towards fundamental theories. If Sklar is right, there appears
to be the coexistence of realism and anti-realism that mattered to the successful development of physical theories.
This thesis resembles Stein’s conjecture although Sklar does not cite Stein’s paper, and Sklar’s discussion can provide
additional support for Stein’s conjecture. I am grateful for Kyle Stanford for drawing my attention to the relevance of
Sklar’s work to Stein’s.
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4.3 EVALUATING STEIN’S CONJECTURE: THE CASE OF SEYMOUR BENZER’S
RESEARCH
A good case to evaluate Stein’s conjecture must meet two criteria. First, it must be an instance of
successful scientific research. To identify such a case, we can turn to the history of science and
identify past research projects that turned out to be uncontroversially successful. Second, detailed
historical records for the case must be available so that we can analyze how a scientist used a
model (or a family of models) over time. Stein’s conjecture becomes plausible to the extent that
the scientist’s uses of a model followed the realist and instrumentalist methodological principles
and exhibited the sort of tension described above. In what follows I present a detailed case that
meets these criteria, and in Section 4.4.3, I will return to the general philosophical argument that
this case supports.17
4.3.1 Background to Benzer’s Research
One year after Watson and Crick’s (1953a) development of the double helix model of DNA, Sey-
mour Benzer began experimental work that would produce a series of seminal contributions to
molecular biology.18 For example, Benzer showed experimentally that a gene identified by its
association with a physiological function has a fine, internal structure because mutation and re-
combination can occur within the gene. In other words, a gene has internal sites where mutation
and recombination can occur. This result was incompatible with the then traditional concept of a
gene as an indivisible unit of function, mutation, and recombination. Benzer thus suggested the
concepts of cistron, muton, and recon for units of function, mutation, and recombination, respec-
tively. He then went on to estimate the sizes of a cistron, muton, and recon in terms of the number
of base pairs in DNA. For instance, he estimated a recon to be no more than two base pairs (see,
e.g., Benzer 1957). That is, Benzer provided a thoroughly molecular characterization of what ge-
17My choice of a case reflects both my expertise in biology and my prior acquaintance with the case and the detailed
historical work by Holmes (2006). It should be possible to find additional cases.
18For excellent intellectual biographies of Benzer, see Weiner (1999) and Holmes (2006). Weiner gives a highly
accessible account of Benzer’s research on genetic fine structure (Weiner 1999, 46–60). Holmes has reconstructed in
great detail the first two years (1954–1956) of Benzer’s research on genetic fine structure (Holmes 2006, 179–298).
Holmes had access to Benzer’s personal papers before they were donated to the Caltech Archives, and my analysis of
Benzer’s research draws on the same personal papers as well as Holmes’s pioneering study.
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neticists had traditionally called the gene. Moreover, Benzer provided experimental evidence that
the structure of DNA is linear at the molecular level, which supported the Watson-Crick model of
DNA (see, e.g., Benzer 1960, 1962).19 Fortunately we can reconstruct Benzer’s research activities
in detail by using rich archival materials pertaining to his work.20 Benzer’s research is thus a good
case for evaluating Stein’s conjecture.
Benzer’s research began with his discovery of certain properties of bacteriophage T4, a virus
that infects and eventually kills Escherichia coli. Once a T4 phage infects a bacterium by injecting
its genetic material into the host cell, the genetic material is multiplied inside, and new T4 phages
develop. At the end of this life cycle, the phages make the host cell lyse (i.e., burst open) and
release them into the environment. When lysis occurs, the wild-type phage T4 produces small
plaques with rough edges.21 Some mutants of phage T4 make the host cell lyse rapidly and produce
large plaques with sharp edges (Figure 4.1). These mutants are called r mutants (r for rapid lysis)
and are results of mutations in certain regions of the genetic material of T4 (Benzer 1955, 346).22
Mutations in one region of the genetic material of T4, called the rII region, produce r mutants
with another trait that distinguishes them from the wild type: the rII mutants produce plaques
on E. coli strain B but not on strain K12(λ), whereas the wild type produces plaques on both
strains (Figure 4.1; Benzer 1955, 346). These properties of the rII mutants make them a useful
experimental system to carry out detailed genetic analysis. One can easily isolate r mutants on
strain B, where they produce distinctive plaques, and discriminate two r mutants by recombination
experiments in which one infects K12(λ) with the two r mutants and lets them exchange their
genetic material. If they are distinct r mutants, a wild-type recombinant will arise by genetic
recombination and produce the wild-type plaques on K12(λ). If they are identical mutants, no
plaques will form. K12(λ) thus serves as a highly selective host strain, enabling one to detect very
rare wild-type recombinants and hence subtly distinct r mutants (Benzer 1955, 346–347).
19The importance of Benzer’s research can also be gauged by the extent to which it was covered in the early
textbooks in molecular biology (see, e.g., Watson 1965, 231–237; Stent 1971, 362–375). For a summary of Benzer’s
important contributions to molecular biology by a contemporary biologist, see Greenspan (2009, 7–10).
20Seymour Benzer Papers, 10242-MS, Caltech Archives, California Institute of Technology. The collection
is organized into 126 boxes, each of which is organized into folders. The finding aid is available online
(http://www.oac.cdlib.org/findaid/ark:/13030/c8vh5ptc/). Hereafter when I cite Seymour Benzer Papers, I write “SBP”
followed by the box and folder numbers.
21A plaque is a clear area, that is, area without host cells, in the lawn of bacteria.
22Hershey (1946) first isolated r mutants in phage T2, which is related to T4.
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Figure 4.1: rII mutants. Left: Compared to the small wild-type plaques, rII mutants produce large
plaques on E. coli strain B. Right: But rII mutants do not produce any plaques on strain K12(λ).
Only the wild-type phages produce plaques. Reproduced, with permission, from Benzer (1962,
72). Copyright c© (1962) Scientific American, Inc. All rights reserved.
4.3.2 A Genetic Map as a Model of DNA
Recombination experiments can be used to construct what is called “a genetic map.” In a typical
linear map, each point on a line represents an organism that is genetically mutated from the wild
type, and a mutant is treated as a marker of that part of the genetic material which is altered from the
wild type. The distance between two points represents the observed frequency among the progeny
of the two mutants that exhibit the wild-type phenotype. Before Benzer began mapping the rII
region of T4, A. H. Doermann and M. B. Hill produced a linear map of two r mutants named r47
and r51 (Figure 4.2). The resolution of the map depends on the extent to which the experimental
system allows the researcher to detect rare wild-type recombinants. In this regard, Benzer’s rII
system was extremely powerful.23
Benzer made his first genetic map of rII mutants on May 10, 1954, displaying Doermann’s r47
and r51 and the new mutant Benzer isolated named “V” (Figure 4.3).24 Benzer’s rules of mapmak-
23Benzer discovered the above properties of the rII mutants in the first half of 1954. Because of the lack of space, I
will not describe Benzer’s early experiments with rII mutants. For a detailed account of his work during this period,
see Holmes (2006). Benzer also gave a brief autobiographical account (Benzer 1966).
24Doermann had sent Benzer his stocks of previously mapped mutants including r47 and r51 (A. H. Doermann to
Seymour Benzer, April 3, 1954, SBP 67.6).
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Figure 4.2: A genetic map of two r mutants of phage T4. “r47” and “r51” designate mutants and
the distance between them the percentage recombination frequency (5.4% here). Redrawn with
modification from Doermann and Hill (1953, 87).
ing are explained in Figure 4.4. According to these rules, every mutant was to be represented as a
point on the horizontal line.
Benzer consistently interpreted particular parts of a genetic map as representing parts of DNA
and their properties. Given a map like Figure 4.3, he interpreted the the point corresponding to a
mutant (say, r47) as representing a change in a particular part of DNA as well as that part which had
changed. The map point labeled r47 represented a part of DNA and its property of being mutated
from the wild type. In one paper Benzer described his interpretation of a map as follows:
A genetic map is an image composed of individual points. Each point represents a
mutation [i.e., a change in a part of DNA] which has been localized with respect to
other mutations by recombination experiments. The image thus obtained is a highly
colored representation of the hereditary material.25 (Benzer 1957, 72)
A genetic map was thus Benzer’s model of DNA.
4.4 ANOMALOUS MUTANTS, USES OF A GENETIC MAP, AND THE
INSTRUMENTALIST METHODOLOGICAL PRINCIPLE
By the end of 1954 Benzer was immersed in the project of bringing the resolution of a genetic map
down to the molecular level. In particular he was trying to estimate in molecular terms the lengths
of the genetic units of recombination, mutation, and physiological function and was trying to do
25It is not clear to me what he means by “highly colored” here, but this does not affect the main point I am making.
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Figure 4.3: Benzer’s first genetic map. The recombination frequency between r47 and r51 that
Benzer obtained from his experiments was slightly different from the value Doermann and Hill
reported (Figure 4.2). Reproduced from Seymour Benzer Papers, Box 67 Folder 6, 10242-MS,
Caltech Archives, California Institute of Technology. Courtesy of the Archives, California Institute
of Technology.
so by converting the length on a map, which was in the unit of recombination frequency, into the
length of DNA measured by the number of base pairs (Benzer 1955, 345).26 For this purpose he
needed to isolate and map a great number of rII mutants (Holmes 2006, 258).
In this and the next section I follow Benzer’s uses of a family of genetic maps in detail. In this
section I show that some of Benzer’s crucial uses of a genetic map followed the instrumentalist
methodological principle and emphasize that, without these uses of his model, Benzer’s research
would not have enjoyed the success it actually did. To do this, I have to describe Benzer’s discovery
of the so-called “anomalous mutants” and how Benzer accounted for them in his map. Then in
the next section I show that some of Benzer’s crucial uses of a genetic map followed the realist
methodological principle, and at the end of that section I discuss the characteristic tension among
Benzer’s uses of a genetic map created by his adoption of both the realist and instrumentalist
methodological principles.
26Benzer thought about the correspondence between map distance and physical distance as early as May 28, 1954
when he wrote “thoughts on the gene” (SBP 67.6). For discussion of his early thoughts on this topic, see Holmes
(2006, 212–220).
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Figure 4.4: Rules of mapmaking. (A) Benzer frequently used a table to summarize recombination
data obtained from crosses between mutants on the top row and those on the left column. The table
is an abbreviated version of Benzer’s table made on May 17, 1954 (SBP 67.6). (B) Rule 1: Draw
a horizontal line and two vertical lines near the ends. Let the vertical lines represent two mutants
that exhibited the greatest recombination frequency on the table, and draw a double-headed arrow
between the vertical lines with a label indicating the recombination frequency between the mutants
represented. (C) Rule 2: Consider other mutants that were crossed with one of the two mutants
just put on the map, say, r47, and find the mutant that showed the greatest recombination frequency
with r47. In this case, this mutant is the one named “II,” and it is to be put on the map as before.
Since the recombination frequency between II and r51 is also shown on the table, this fact is also on
the map. (D) Rule 3: Apply Rule 2 to the mutants not yet put on the map and repeat the procedure
until all the mutants and data shown on the table are put on the map. Note that the resulting map
fails to show strict additivity of distances, but Benzer’s practice was not to make the map show
additivity and instead to make the map faithful to the data.
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4.4.1 Anomalous Mutants
On February 23, 1955, Benzer crossed four rII mutants: 47 and 168 with 295 and 312. These
double crosses showed few plaques, making Benzer write: “obviously the four mutants are not
all allelic” (SBP 67.8). In other words, these mutants were not identical. On the 24th, Benzer
performed “allelism tests” (SBP 67.8). In these tests, he made ten crosses among five rII mutants—
47, 168, 295, 312, and 145—and counted the number of wild-type plaques. No plaques were
observed in four of the ten crosses, namely, those between 47 and 168, 47 and 295, 47 and 312,
as well as 295 and 312. According to the basic rules of mapmaking (Figure 4.4), these four
mutants should occupy the same point on a genetic map. But two crosses among these mutants,
namely, those between 168 and 295, and 168 and 312, did produce plaques: 168, 295, and 312
should occupy different points on a map. These four mutants showed, to use Benzer’s own word,
“anomalies” (Benzer 1955, 351).27
Benzer put these results on a map (Figure 4.5), and it showed nonzero distances within zero
distances. For example, in the left part of the map, Benzer placed 168 in between 312 and 47. He
drew 312 and 47 as well as 168 and 47 as having zero distances, but he drew 312 and 168 as having
a non-zero distance. As noted above, for Benzer, a genetic map was a model of DNA; in particular,
the space between two points on a genetic map was a representation of the physical space between
two mutational sites of DNA. Thus, a genetic map showing nonzero distances within zero distances
was suggesting a physical impossibility.
Apparently realizing this potential problem, Benzer drew a revised map on a piece of paper
and stapled it over the original map (Figure 4.5).28 In this map he drew 47, 312, 295, and 168 as
overlapping horizontal bars. He put 47 at the very bottom and drew 295 above it. Leaving some
space next to 295, he drew 168, making it overlap with 47. He drew 312 as overlapping with 295
and 47, but not 168.29
27Anomalous mutants also exhibited little or no tendency to revert to the wild type (Benzer 1955, 351).
28This revised map was Benzer’s second attempt, and underneath this map we can find his first attempt where he
drew r47 as a horizontal bar at the bottom and 312, 295, and 168 as vertical lines above it. He indicated that each of
these three mutants had a zero distance to different positions of the horizontal bar that represented 47.
29Referring to the revised map, Holmes says: “This critical move appears to mark the point at which Benzer
recognized that these four mutants could not be point mutations but must be alterations extending along a portion of
the chromosome” (Holmes 2006, 271–272).
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Figure 4.5: Benzer’s map of anomalous mutants drawn on February 24, 1955. Reproduced from
Seymour Benzer Papers, Box 67 Folder 8, 10242-MS, Caltech Archives, California Institute of
Technology. Courtesy of the Archives, California Institute of Technology.
On the 26th, Benzer did the same ten crosses he had done on the 24th, and this time he calcu-
lated recombination frequencies. Crosses among the four anomalous mutants—47, 312, 295, and
168—still showed incoherent results. Benzer drew a map on a graph paper (Figure 4.6). He repre-
sented anomalous mutants as horizontal bars at the top of the map, the practice he would continue
to use. But he also noted that the distance between 295 and 145 “does not fit this scheme” (SBP
67.8), because the map represented the distance of 0.78% between 295 and 145 as longer than that
of 0.99% between 47 and 145 as well as 1% between 168 and 145.30
4.4.2 Mapping Anomalous Mutants
Benzer’s response to the discovery of anomalous mutants was to change the rules of mapmaking
so that the experimental results concerning these mutants can be represented differently than those
concerning other mutants that he was interested in. That is, he changed the rules for making his
model of DNA. The new rules are explained in Figure 4.7; the most important change is Rule 2*,
30At the bottom of this map, Benzer provided a tentative physical interpretation of map distances by indicating that
1 cm on this map corresponded to the maximum of 25 nucleotide pairs. Alternatively, Holmes (2006, 272) interpreted
that Benzer meant that the distance between 295 and 168 is 25 nucleotide pairs, but Benzer’s annotation at the bottom
of the page does not correspond to the gap between the horizontal bars representing 295 and 168 at the top of the page.
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Figure 4.6: Benzer’s genetic map dated February 26, 1955. Reproduced from Seymour Benzer Pa-
pers, Box 67 Folder 8, 10242-MS, Caltech Archives, California Institute of Technology. Courtesy
of the Archives, California Institute of Technology.
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Figure 4.7: Rules of mapmaking for anomalous mutants. (A) A subset of Benzer’s experimental
results on February 24, 1955 (SBP 67.8). The top row and the leftmost column show the mutants
crossed. The anomalous mutants are those that fail to recombine with two or more mutants: 47,
295, and 312. The data are presented (as Benzer did) in the observed number of wild-type plaques
rather than percentage recombination frequencies, but the unit of data does not affect the rules. (B)
Rule 1: Same as before (see Figure 4.4), but if a mutant being drawn is anomalous, then it should
be drawn as a bar. Here 168 is on the right of this map because of the results of crosses with 145
shown in Figure 4.5. (C) Rule 2*: Consider other mutants that produced wild-type plaques with
one of the two mutants just put on the map, say, 168, and find the mutant that produced most wild-
type recombinants with 168. In this case, the relevant mutant is 295. But 295 does not recombine
with the other mutant already mapped, namely, 312. Thus, 295 is to be drawn as a horizontal bar
above and covering 312, and the space between the right hand end of 295 and 168 is marked with
the number of wild-type plaques found in the cross between these two mutants. (D) Rule 3: Apply
Rule 2 or Rule 2* to the mutants not yet put on the map and repeat the procedure until all the
mutants and data shown on the table are put on the map. The new reading convention is that the
mutant represented as a bar does not produce wild-type recombinants with any of the mutants that
overlap with it. For Benzer’s published version of a map corresponding to (D), see Benzer (1955,
352, Figure 5 A).
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which, unlike Rule 2 in Figure 4.4, says that anomalous mutants should be drawn as horizontal
bars. Benzer did speculate about the nature of these anomalous mutants (e.g., these mutations ex-
tended over a long stretch of DNA). Although he had no evidence regarding any of the hypotheses
he came up with, he apparently assumed that anomalous mutants were unlikely to be “true ‘point’
mutations (i.e., involving an alteration of only one nucleotide pair)” (Benzer 1955, 351). Thus,
Benzer said that for the purpose of making a high resolution genetic map, that is, a map that would
resolve the distance between two neighboring “point” mutants, “it would seem well advised to
employ only mutants for which some reversion is observed [i.e., mutants that are not anomalous]”
(Benzer 1955, 351).
Since December of 1955, however, Benzer would find productive uses of the map of anoma-
lous mutants. On December 2, 1955, Benzer made crosses among some anomalous mutants.31 He
drew a diagram entitled “grouping up to date” (Figure 4.8). He found three mutants to be non-
overlapping, and six mutants to be overlapping. On December 5, he tested other mutants to see if
any of them are “under 196” (SBP 67.9), the anomalous mutant drawn on the left of Figure 4.8.
Benzer took twenty mutants, crossed them with 196, and classified mutants that showed low re-
combination frequencies as “under 196” and others as “not under 196.” Based on the surviving
notes, this was the first time Benzer used the phrase “under 196.” It referred to the way in which
mutants were represented on a map: 196 was an anomalous mutant represented as a horizontal bar
on top, and certain mutants were placed under it. In this sense, mutants were called “under 196.”
What Benzer invented was a way to organize anomalous mutants relative to each other on a
map. As shown in Figure 4.8, some anomalous mutants were represented as lying next to each
other on a map, while others were represented as lying under another mutant. Such map was
different from a map like Figure 4.2 in that it did not represent distances between mutants as
measured by recombination frequencies. Rather it represented which mutant is next to which one:
it represented relative positions of mutants. In the next several years, along with other experiments,
Benzer constantly looked for new anomalous mutants and tested them against existing anomalous
mutants.
Benzer eventually produced a genetic map with many segments, each of which is defined as the
stretch of the map that only one of a given set of anomalous mutants covers. Consider, for example,
31Benzer’s work described in the paragraph below was first reconstructed by Holmes (2006, 289–290).
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Figure 4.8: Anomalous mutants tested on December 2, 1955. Reproduced from Seymour Ben-
zer Papers, Box 67 Folder 9, 10242-MS, Caltech Archives, California Institute of Technology.
Courtesy of the Archives, California Institute of Technology.
the mutants 1272 and 1756 in Figure 4.9, which shows Benzer’s working map of new anomalous
mutants tested on September 21, 1959. For simplicity, assume that the right hand ends of these
mutants occupy the same map position. Given these two mutants, a map segment is defined as
the space that begins at the left end of 1272 and ends at the left end of 1756, that is, the space
covered only by 1272. This segment can be further divided if there is a mutant whose left end falls
in the middle of the segment. Thus, in Figure 4.9, Benzer indicated 1589 and 1605 as “exciting!”
because they appeared promising mutants to further divide the segment defined by 1272 and 1756.
Near the end of his mapping project Benzer had a map of anomalous mutants that divided the rII
region into 80 segments, which is too large to reproduce here (Benzer 1962, 78–79).32
32In this section I entirely glossed over Benzer’s idea that the rII region is divisible into two segments A and B,
which function differently during the growth of phages in E. coli K12(λ). These segments came to be called A and
B cistrons (Benzer 1957), and in Figure 4.9 their boundary was marked by a horizontal dashed line. Here I briefly
explain Benzer’s idea for the interested reader. Recall that unlike the wild type, the rII mutants do not produce progeny
on K12(λ). If a rII mutant and a wild-type phage together infected the same host cell, both types of phage were found
among the progeny. This suggested that the wild type supplied the necessary function for intracellular growth that
the rII mutant could not perform. By the beginning of 1955, Benzer found that some pairs of rII mutants, when they
together infected K12(λ), produced a lot of progeny, while other pairs produced little or none (Holmes 2006, 257–258).
This suggested that two mutants forming the former type of pair had different functional defects so that they could
supply each other, without recombination, the function that was defective in the other. On the other hand, two mutants
forming the latter type of pair had the same functional defect and could produce progeny only when recombination
occurred. Benzer thus concluded that the rII region has two functional segments. Doermann’s r47 is on segment A
and r51 on segment B (Benzer 1955).
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Benzer used the map of anomalous mutants to design a method for rapid mapping of rII mu-
tants. The new method allowed Benzer to classify a new rII mutant into a short segment of the
rII region, thereby eliminating the need to cross every new mutant with all the other mutants in
order to determine its position on a genetic map. Given the need to map thousands of mutants, this
method was crucial to the success of Benzer’s research.33 To understand this new method, let us
look at Figure 4.10, which is a published map of anomalous mutants as of April 1960.34 Suppose
we want to map a new rII mutant. Our first step is to cross the new mutant with the anomalous mu-
tants 1272, 1241, J3, PT1, PB242, A105, and 638—called “big seven” (Benzer 1961, 407)—which
were represented as very long bars at the top of Figure 4.10. If we find that the new mutant recom-
bines with all the mutants except 1272, then we classify it as being under 1272: the new mutant
belongs to the segment between the left end of 1271 and that of 1241, which is labeled as “A1” at
the bottom of Figure 4.10. Our second step is to construct another experiment with 1272, 1364, and
EM66, which divide segment A1 into three shorter segments. If we find, say, that the new mutant
recombines with EM66 but not with 1272 or 1364, then we say that the new mutant is under 1364:
the new mutant belongs to the segment between the left end of 1364 and that of EM66, which is
labeled as “A1b1” at the bottom of Figure 4.10 (Benzer 1961, 406–407). If we want to determine a
more precise map location of the new mutant, we only need to do recombination experiments with
the mutants that also belong to A1b1 and calculate recombination frequencies.
33If he had only a handful of mutants to map, it would not have been so important to eliminate the need to cross
every mutant with every other. But this was not the case, and Benzer’s new method was so important that Gunther
Stent later wrote:
It is fair to say that without this astute exploitation of deletion [i.e., anomalous] mutants for rapid mapping,
our knowledge of the genetic fine structure of the phage genome would still be very rudimentary; progress
would have been hamstrung by the geometric increase in the number of crosses required for the mapping
of an arithmetically increasing number of mutants available for study. (Stent 1971, 368)
34The paper in which this map was published appeared in the March 1961 issue of Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences of USA, but the paper was presented at the Academy on April 27, 1960.
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Figure 4.9: A working map of new anomalous mutants drawn on September 21, 1959. Reproduced from Seymour Benzer Papers, Box 70
Folder 2, 10242-MS, Caltech Archives, California Institute of Technology. Courtesy of the Archives, California Institute of Technology.
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Figure 4.10: A map of anomalous mutants as of April 1960. From Benzer (1961, 406)
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4.4.3 Uses of a Genetic Map and the Instrumentalist Methodological Principle
Benzer used a genetic map—his model of DNA—to organize the results of recombination exper-
iments and to design a new method for rapid mapping. I argue that these two crucial uses of a
genetic map followed the instrumentalist methodological principle.
To organize the results of recombination experiments, Benzer interpreted some parts and prop-
erties of the model as representing things other than the parts and properties of DNA.35 He inter-
preted the spatial relations exhibited by points and bars on a map—that one point was under a
bar or that one bar overlapped another bar—as representing the mutant phages’ behaviors during
experiments (i.e., whether and how much they produce wild-type recombinants), rather than as
representing, say, spatial relations of parts of DNA. Horizontal bars, for example, were interpreted
as representing mutated parts of DNA, but the length of each bar and overlaps among bars were
not interpreted as representing properties of DNA. Benzer’s interpretation of spatial properties of
a map made the rules of mapmaking efficient (Figure 4.4 and 4.7), because with this interpreta-
tion he was able to construct a map simply by reading off numbers from the table of experimental
results. Thus, Benzer’s use of a genetic map to organize the experimental results followed the
instrumentalist methodological principle.
To design a method for rapid mapping, Benzer interpreted a map segment as representing a part
of DNA. But again he interpreted the overlaps between bars on a map as representing the phages’
behaviors during experiments. This interpretation was crucial for designing a two-step method to
classify rII mutants into a segment on a map. Thus, Benzer’s use of a genetic map to design a
mapping method followed the instrumentalist methodological principle.
35While interpreting some parts and properties of his model as representing things other than the parts and properties
of DNA, Benzer also interpreted other parts and properties of his map as representing parts and properties of DNA. In
particular, he interpreted points and horizontal bars on a map as representing parts of DNA and their property of being
mutated from the wild type, and the linearity of a map as representing the linearity of the structure of DNA. And it was
because of this interpretation (or preference to give such an interpretation) that Benzer kept his map linear although
he knew that linearity was not strictly required by the results of recombination experiments (Benzer 1959). Thus, his
genetic map was a model of DNA while it was being used according to the instrumentalist methodological principle.
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4.5 THE NATURE OF DNA, USES OF A GENETIC MAP, AND THE REALIST
METHODOLOGICAL PRINCIPLE
We have seen how Benzer used his model according to the instrumentalist methodological princi-
ple. In this section I argue that Benzer’s uses of his model also followed the realist methodological
principle. To do this I begin by describing the overarching aim of Benzer’s research, which natu-
rally made Benzer use his model according to the realist methodological principle. At the end of
this section I show how a subtle tension emerged between his uses of a model because of his joint
adoption of the realist and instrumentalist methodological principles.
4.5.1 The Junkman’s Problem
The overarching aim of Benzer’s research was to gain deeper understanding of DNA. This aim
is evident in Benzer’s general characterization of his research. On December 4, 1956, in his bio-
physics seminar, Benzer gave a lecture entitled “Mutations and the Junkman’s Problem.” He began
by describing the processes of mutation and recombination and their relevance to his research on
genetic fine structure. He then described his research as concerning “the junkman’s problem,”
whose “objective” was “to determine something about the structure [of DNA] by these operations
[mutations and recombinations]” (SBP 82.1). The junk was mutations and recombinations, and
the value he wanted to get out of the junk was knowledge about the structure of DNA. His tool
was the genetic map, the model of DNA. Compared to other surviving statements of his research
aims, what Benzer called the junkman’s problem was a fair characterization of the overall aim of
his research.36
Benzer obtained many important solutions to the junkman’s problem (e.g., Benzer 1955, 1956,
1957, 1959, 1961, 1962). I discuss two of them that reveal how Benzer used his model according
to the realist methodological principle.
36For more detailed statements of his research aims, see Benzer’s “Application for Extension of Grant from Amer-
ican Cancer Society” (September 28, 1954, SBP 1.14); Benzer’s grant proposal to the National Science Foundation
entitled “Genetic Fine Structure and Its Relation to the Molecular Structure of DNA” (February 12, 1955, SBP 9.7); his
“Application for Extension of Grant from American Cancer Society” (September 21, 1955, SBP 1.15); and Benzer’s
NSF progress reports dated April 29, 1957 (SBP 9.7) and March 31, 1958 (SBP 9.8).
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4.5.2 Explaining the Nature of Anomalous Mutants
Benzer used his genetic map of anomalous mutants (e.g., Figure 4.5 and 4.6) to develop explana-
tory hypotheses about the molecular nature of mutation responsible for anomalous mutants. As we
saw, in February 1955 when Benzer found anomalous mutants, he changed the rules of mapmak-
ing so that he could represent anomalous mutants together with other mutants on the same map
(Figure 4.7). In addition, Benzer asked why anomalous mutants could not be drawn as points on
a map and considered the hypothesis that an anomalous mutant had a stretch of DNA deleted or
altered. But he did not have any evidence for a specific hypothesis about the nature of mutation
involved in anomalous mutants.37 Only in 1961, Benzer and his then postdoc Masayasu Nomura
developed an elegant test of the deletion hypothesis: if a stretch of DNA is physically deleted, then
the map distance between mutants outside of that stretch should become shorter. If the stretch is
altered but not deleted, the map distance between outside mutants should remain unchanged. No-
mura and Benzer’s experiments showed that the map distance of two mutants was indeed shorter
when anomalous mutation occurred between them (Nomura and Benzer 1961).
In conformity with the realist methodological principle, Benzer used his model to develop a
specific hypothesis about the nature of the object of his investigation, and to do so he interpreted
a horizontal bar on a map as representing a stretch of DNA with the length proportional to that of
the bar and its property of being deleted during the process of mutation. Benzer also interpreted
the distance between any two points on a map as representing the physical distance between parts
of DNA. As we saw, in making a map of anomalous mutants, Benzer interpreted a horizontal bar
as representing only a mutated part of DNA, and this interpretation was sufficient for doing the
things he was doing by following the instrumentalist methodological principle. But in formulating
the deletion hypothesis, Benzer gave the same part of his model a new interpretation that this
part represents a part of DNA and its property. This is evidence that he was following the realist
methodological principle.
37Benzer often called anomalous mutants “deletions,” writing the word in quotation marks to indicate the fact that
the term was merely a label (e.g., Benzer 1957, 76).
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4.5.3 The Genetic Map and the Watson-Crick Model
Benzer also used his genetic map to make specific inferences about the structure of DNA. By April
1957, he had a map that represented a very large number of rII mutants. On April 29, 1957, Benzer
wrote a progress report on his National Science Foundation grant that had begun in September of
1955. In it he said:
The fact that all mutations of the deletion type [i.e., anomalous mutants] can be ordered
in a linear framework has provided a rigorous demonstration that the genetic structure
is of linear topology down to its finest details. This is exactly the expectation from the
Watson-Crick structure of DNA. Furthermore, the finding that the genetic structure is
divisible by mutation and recombination down to a level corresponding to individual
nucleotides is also consistent with the Watson-Crick structure. (Seymour Benzer to W.
V. Consolazio, April 29, 1957, SBP 9.7)
By “a linear framework” he referred to the fact that in a map like Figure 4.10 all segments were
ordered next to each other on a line (Benzer 1959, 1607; Benzer 1961, 415). The above passage
contains two arguments for the structure of DNA as described by the Watson-Crick model. The
first argument can be reconstructed as follows:
1. If DNA has the linear structure as described by the Watson-Crick model, then it must be
possible to arrange all mutants in a linear topological order.
2. All anomalous mutants studied thus far can be arranged in a linear map.
3. Therefore, the map of anomalous mutants strongly supports the idea that the structure
of DNA is linear at the molecular level.
Benzer’s second argument can be reconstructed as follows:
1. If DNA is made up of a chain of bases as described by the Watson-Crick model, then in
principle mutation and recombination can occur at any point in DNA.
2. rII mutants are distributed throughout the genetic map, and the map has many segments
detectable by recombination experiments.
3. Therefore, the structure of the genetic map is consistent with the structure of DNA as
described by the Watson-Crick model.
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As can be seen in the second premise of each argument, Benzer took the properties of his model—
linearity and divisibility—as representing the properties of DNA predicted by the Watson-Crick
model. This interpretation allowed him to argue that the features of his model of DNA support
the Watson-Crick model.38 As noted above, Benzer consistently interpreted the linearity of a map
as representing a property of DNA, and this interpretation affected how he used his model to
organize the experimental results: it affected his use of a model according to the instrumentalist
methodological principle. Now, in using his model according to the instrumentalist methodological
principle, Benzer did not give any interpretation to the divisibility of a map, presumably because no
interpretation was necessary to do the particular tasks he was doing. But to make claims about the
structure of DNA, Benzer interpreted divisibility of a map as also representing a property of DNA.
His attempt to interpret a previously disregarded property of his model as representing a property
of the object of his investigation is evidence that he was following the realist methodological
principle.
* * *
Having seen how Benzer followed both the instrumentalist and realist methodological principles,
we are now in a good position to recognize the characteristic tension among Benzer’s uses of his
model that resulted from his adoption of these two methodological principles. I describe two places
where we can recognize this tension.
One place where we can see the characteristic tension is in his decision to change the rules
of mapmaking in response to the discovery of anomalous mutants. Benzer changed the rules of
mapmaking to put anomalous mutants on a map (cf. Figure 4.4 and 4.7) although the initial map
of anomalous mutants (on the left of Figure 4.5) was adequate for summarizing the results of ex-
periments. What, then, was Benzer’s motivation to change his model? Besides using his model to
organize the experimental results, Benzer used it to make claims about DNA. The initial genetic
map of anomalous mutants had properties, especially the presence of nonzero distances within
zero distances, that seemed hard to interpret as representing physical properties of DNA. But since
he followed the realist methodological principle, he would have preferred a model that exhibited
properties that he could interpret as representing properties of DNA. And he found such a model
38In later years when he obtained a more saturated map, Benzer would give these arguments with stronger support
(Benzer 1960, 17–20; Benzer 1962, 83–84).
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by changing the rules of mapmaking. Here we see some tension between using a model according
to the instrumentalist methodological principle and using it according to the realist methodological
principle. Benzer initially used a model to organize the experimental results even if the model
showed nonzero distances within zero distances: he was following the instrumentalist method-
ological principle. He then modified his model in order to eliminate a property that he could not
possibly interpret as representing a property of the object of his investigation: he prepared a model
that he could potentially use according to the realist methodological principle.
Another place where we can see the characteristic tension is in Benzer’s sustained attempt
to construct a saturated map of anomalous mutants (e.g., Figure 4.9 and 4.10). The first map of
anomalous mutant was a product of the tension I just described above, and Benzer’s adoption of
the realist methodological principle made it significant that a genetic map produced by the revised
rules of mapmaking had properties that could be interpreted as representing properties of DNA.
From 1955 Benzer continued making this model more detailed although it was only in 1961 that
he obtained evidence suggesting that he could successfully use his model to make claims about
the nature of mutations underlying anomalous mutants. During these years, Benzer could not have
sufficiently justified his continued use of his model by appealing to the fact that his model could be
used according to the realist methodological principle. Indeed, the realist methodological principle
could have motivated him to look for a radically different model. But he went on with his map of
anomalous mutants. What we see here is the characteristic tension: Benzer was not just following
the realist methodological principle, and his adoption of the instrumentalist methodological prin-
ciple allowed him to continue using and developing a map of anomalous mutants, for such a map
was crucial for rapidly mapping new rII mutants.
4.6 STEIN’S CONJECTURE AND THE REALISM DEBATE
My case study of Benzer’s uses of a model of DNA supports Stein’s conjecture. Using a model
according to both the realist and instrumentalist methodological principles can be crucial for the
success of scientific research. Thus, other things being equal, it is reasonable for a scientist to
adopt both methodological principles even if doing so may create tensions among her uses of a
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model. In my view, philosophers of science trying to understand how successful science works
will benefit from examining the realist and instrumentalist methodological principles with the help
of detailed historical studies of scientific practice.
Stein’s conjecture also matters to the realism debate. Although it is reasonable for a scientist
to adopt both the realist and instrumentalist methodological principles, I shall argue that some of
the currently most important positions in the realism debate prohibit a scientist from adopting both
methodological principles. This thesis, if true, matters to the realism debate because this debate
implicitly assumes that a correct position in the debate makes existing successful scientific methods
reasonable for a working scientist to follow. For brevity, let us restate the above assumption as
follows: a correct position in the realism debate makes sense of successful scientific methods.
Thus, if a scientist does successful research by following the method that is naturally suggested by
a given metaphysical, semantic, epistemic, or axiological position, then this fit constitutes prima
facie support for that position. And a mismatch counts against that position.39
My thesis is only that some positions in the realism debate cannot make sense of the adoption
of both the realist and instrumentalist methodological principles. My argument will focus on epis-
temic realism and instrumentalism, which are some of the most important positions in the realism
debate today. I argue as follows:
P1 Epistemic realism and epistemic instrumentalism contradict each other.
P2 Epistemic realism can make sense of the realist methodological principle, but not the
instrumentalist methodological principle.
P3 Epistemic instrumentalism can make sense of the instrumentalist methodological prin-
ciple, but not the realist methodological principle.
39To see the above assumption at play, consider, for example, one of Stathis Psillos’ arguments against semantic in-
strumentalism (as formulated in Section 4.1. For Psillos’ own formulation, see Psillos (1999, xix)). Following Duhem,
he argues that scientific theories are not only means for organizing our experience but also means for understanding
the world, and this latter use of theories does not make sense if theories are not truth-conditioned descriptions of the
world. Semantic instrumentalism thus contradicts what scientists do with theories (Psillos 1999, 34). Here the fea-
ture of successful methodology, in particular, what successful scientists do with theories, is used to criticize semantic
instrumentalism. Consider also Bas van Fraassen’s defense of constructive empiricism, which can be seen partly as a
version of epistemic instrumentalism (see Fine 1986, 157; Fine 2001). Van Fraassen defends constructive empiricism
by showing how it can help us make sense of the methodology of scientific experiments (van Fraassen 1980, 70, 73–
77). It is not difficult to find other examples: Richard Boyd argues that instrumental reliability of theory-dependent
scientific methods can only be explained by scientific realism consisting of the metaphysical, semantic, and epistemic
realist positions, which makes it the case that background theories on which scientific methods are dependent are
approximately true of the world (Boyd 1983, 64–65).
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P4 The conjunction of epistemic realism and epistemic instrumentalism can make sense of
both methodological principles, but the conjunction is a contradiction.
C1 Therefore, epistemic realism or epistemic instrumentalism by itself prohibits a scientist
from adopting both the realist and instrumentalist methodological principles.
C2 Therefore, some of the currently most important positions in the realism debate cannot
show that it is reasonable for a scientist to adopt both the realist and instrumentalist
methodological principles.
Below I argue primarily for P2 and P3, assuming that P1 is true and that P4 is obvious given
P1, P2, and P3. C1 says that epistemic realism or epistemic instrumentalism alone “prohibits”
a scientist from adopting both methodological principles in the sense that holding one of these
epistemic positions allows a scientist to adopt one of the methodological principles but not the
other principle on pain of contradiction.
To start, then, with P2: For the epistemic realist, the realist methodological principle is a rea-
sonable principle to follow. Her epistemic realism says that she should believe that her model is an
approximately accurate representation of the object of her investigation. It is thus reasonable for
her to use her model to make claims and generate questions about the object of her investigation
and to interpret, whenever possible, parts and properties of her model as representing the parts
and properties of the object of her investigation. But for the epistemic realist, the instrumentalist
methodological principle is not a reasonable principle to follow. To use her model according to
the instrumentalist methodological principle, she may have to reinterpret parts and properties of
her model that she has already interpreted as representing the parts and properties of the object
of her investigation: she may have to interpret some of these parts and properties of her model as
representing not the parts and properties of the object of her investigation but some other things
whenever this reinterpretation would help her perform practical tasks. If she reinterpreted parts
and properties of her model in this way, she would be violating the realist methodological princi-
ple. Thus, epistemic realism can make sense of the realist methodological principle, but not the
instrumentalist methodological principle.
Turning to P3, for the epistemic instrumentalist, the instrumentalist methodological principle
is a reasonable principle to follow. The epistemic instrumentalist believes that she should make
best practical use out of her model without believing what it says about the object of her investi-
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gation. Her epistemic instrumentalism thus justifies her use of a model to do tasks that address her
practical needs and to interpret parts and properties of her model as representing things other than
part and properties of her investigative target whenever such interpretation helps her perform the
practical tasks. But for the epistemic instrumentalist, the realist methodological principle is not a
reasonable principle to follow because she does not believe what her model says about the object
of her investigation. Thus, it is not reasonable for her to use her model to make claims about the
true nature of the object of her investigation.40 Epistemic instrumentalism can make sense of the
instrumentalist methodological principle, but not the realist methodological principle.
Now, as P4 says, the conjunction of epistemic realism and epistemic instrumentalism may
seem to be able to make sense of both methodological principles. But this amounts to accepting
contradictory epistemic positions: it is not a rational option for an individual scientist. There-
fore, accepting one of these epistemic positions prohibits a scientist from adopting both the realist
and instrumentalist methodological principles. Some of the currently most important positions in
the realism debate cannot show that it is reasonable for a scientist to adopt both the realist and
instrumentalist methodological principles.
Stein’s conjecture thus poses new challenges to epistemic realism and epistemic instrumental-
ism. The historical evidence presented above suggests that other things being equal it is reasonable
for a scientist to use a model according to both the realist and instrumentalist methodological prin-
ciples. But epistemic realism or epistemic instrumentalism by itself seems to prohibit a scientist
from following both these methodological principles.
The epistemic realist might point out that epistemic realism does allow a scientist to use a
model according to the instrumentalist methodological principle if doing so is a prerequisite for
using the model according to the realist methodological principle. But that instrumentalist method-
ological principle seems to be:
THE INSTRUMENTALIST METHODOLOGICAL PRINCIPLE*: A scientist should use a
model to organize or predict observational and experimental results, to design new tech-
niques for intervention, and to do other tasks that address practical needs only if the
scientist does not have to reinterpret parts and properties of the model—that have been
40But she would interpret parts and properties of her model as representing parts and properties of the object of her
investigation if such interpretation helped her to perform practical tasks by providing otherwise unavailable constraints
on certain parts or properties of her model.
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interpreted as representing parts and properties of the object of the investigation—as
representing things other than the parts and properties of the object of the investigation.
Epistemic realism can make sense of this version of the instrumentalist methodological principle.
But the italicized part of this principle restricts the range of permissible interpretations in ways that
the full-fledged instrumentalist methodological principle that I formulated does not.
The epistemic instrumentalist might point out that there is an important version of epistemic
instrumentalism to consider: the form of epistemic instrumentalism developed by Stanford (2006,
197–211; see footnote 8). The epistemic instrumentalist of this stripe would believe at least some
of what her model says about the object of her investigation.41 Her epistemic instrumentalism
would then allow her to use the model to make claims about the object of her investigation insofar
as doing so would help her do practical tasks. But here the relevant realist methodological principle
seems to be:
THE REALIST METHODOLOGICAL PRINCIPLE*: A scientist should use a model to
make claims—in the form of hypotheses, descriptions, or explanations—and generate
questions about the true nature of the object of an investigation only if doing so helps
the scientist perform tasks that address practical needs. To do this, the scientist should
interpret parts and properties of the model as representing the parts and properties of the
object of the investigation only if such interpretation help the scientist perform practical
tasks.
Stanford’s version of epistemic instrumentalism seems to be able to make sense of this version of
the realist methodological principle. But the first italicized part of this principle makes a scien-
tist’s adherence to this principle conditional on her successful use of her model according to the
instrumentalist methodological principle. Thus, this principle is realist in the sense that it tells her
to do the same things that the full-fledged realist methodological principle does, but it is deeply
instrumentalist since it ultimately concerns practical needs. In addition, the second italicized part
replaces “whenever possible” in the original version of the principle and makes the above version
of principle more restrained than the original.
41Insofar as she can understand what her model says in terms of another theory or model about which she is an
epistemic realist—this constraint is a distinguishing feature of Stanford’s version of epistemic instrumentalism (see
footnote 8). What I say here on behalf of Stanford’s version of epistemic instrumentalism assumes that this constraint
is always satisfied.
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I end this section by sketching other possible responses to the challenges posed by Stein’s
conjecture. First, the epistemic realist may respond to the challenges by showing that the instru-
mentalist methodological principle* is equivalent to the full-fledged instrumentalist methodolog-
ical principle. To do so, she may use a historical case, such as the Benzer case I presented, to
show how following both the realist methodological principle and the instrumentalist methodolog-
ical principle* can result in the same sort of tension among a scientist’s uses of a model that I
described above. Second, the epistemic instrumentalist may try to adopt Stanford’s version of
epistemic instrumentalism and show that the realist methodological principle* is equivalent to the
realist methodological principle. She can then use a historical case to show how following both the
realist methodological principle* and the instrumentalist methodological principle can result in the
same characteristic tension among a scientist’s uses of a model. Third, while accepting my thesis
that epistemic realism or instrumentalism by itself cannot make sense of a scientist’s adoption of
both the realist and instrumentalist methodological principles, the epistemic realist and instrumen-
talist may try to resolve the challenges by looking at a group of scientists instead of an individual
scientist. Suppose that some members of the group may adopt the realist methodological principle,
while others adopt the instrumentalist methodological principle. If no single member adopts both
principles, then Stein’s conjecture does not pose challenges to epistemic realism or instrumental-
ism.42
4.7 CONCLUSION
Stein conjectured that in successful scientific research, a scientist uses a model according to the
methodological principles of realism and instrumentalism despite the tension they create among
the uses of the model. In this chapter I formulated the relevant methodological principles of realism
and instrumentalism and argued that a detailed analysis of Benzer’s uses of his model of DNA—a
genetic map—indeed supports Stein’s conjecture. I then argued that epistemic realism or epistemic
42It is also possible, though may not be attractive, to simply acknowledge that epistemic realism or epistemic
instrumentalism is not in the business of making sense of successful scientific practice. This amounts to the rejection
of the implicit assumption of the realism debate that a correct position in the debate makes sense of successful scientific
methods.
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instrumentalism by itself prohibits a scientist from adopting both the realist and instrumentalist
methodological principles. Stein’s conjecture thus presents new challenges to some of the currently
most important positions in the realism debate, and I suggested some avenues that realists and
instrumentalists may pursue in response.
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5.0 CONCLUSION
What is a scientific model? I began Chapter 1 with this question, because in order to understand the
practice of modeling, we need to say what a model is. I surveyed four answers from the literature:
models are (i) mathematical entities, (ii) abstract entities, (iii) abstract or concrete entities, and
(iv) imagined concrete entities. I argued that except for (i), all these answers take the metaphysics
based perspective on models in the sense that they invoke the concepts of abstract and concrete
entities developed in metaphysics. The metaphysics based perspective sees models as first and
foremost objects that scientists use to represent parts of the world. Thus, to say what a model is, it
applies the concepts of objects—abstract and concrete entities—to models.
I sketched an alternative perspective that applies the concepts of internal and external represen-
tations from cognitive science. This perspective sees models as first and foremost representations
that scientists use for cognitive and epistemic purposes in research. Thus, to say what a model
is, I applied the concepts of representations—internal and external representations—to models. In
particular, my own perspective is the cognitive science based perspective with a focus on external
representations: I see models as external representations that scientists interact with via perceptual
and bodily processes in order to perform cognitive and epistemic tasks.
In Chapter 2, from the cognitive science based perspective, I developed a general account of
the practice of modeling. I began the chapter by examining influential accounts of modeling artic-
ulated by Giere and Weisberg. They take the metaphysics based perspective on models: for Giere
and Weisberg, some models, such as scale models, are concrete, physical entities, while other
models, such as mathematical models, are abstract, non-physical entities. Giere and Weisberg then
suggest that scientists use external representations like interpreted equations to construct, manipu-
late, and analyze abstract models. But I argued that the category of abstract models obscures rather
than illuminates the practice of modeling. I then developed an alternative account of mathematical
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modeling in which modeling is understood as a practice of constructing, manipulating, and ana-
lyzing external representations in service of cognitive and epistemic aims of research. I concluded
that to better understand the practice of modeling, including mathematical modeling, we should
see models as external representations.
In Chapter 3, I turned to the dynamics of research involving models. Focusing on the rela-
tionship among uses of a model, particular aims of research in which scientists use the model, and
criteria of success relevant to a given use of the model, I argued (i) that the relationship between
uses of a model and particular aims of research is dynamic in the sense that uses of the same model
can shift over the course of scientists’ research in response to the shift in aim, and (ii) that criteria
of success for one use of a model can be different from those for another use of the same model. I
presented a detailed case study of Wright’s research to support these claims.
In Chapter 4, developing Stein’s idea further, I argued that in successful scientific research, a
scientist uses a model according to the methodological principles of realism and instrumentalism
despite the tension that they create among the scientist’s uses of the model over time. I defended
this thesis through a detailed analysis of successful scientific research done by Benzer in the 1950s
and 60s. I showed that various uses of the very same model in this case followed both the realist and
instrumentalist methodological principles. These uses exhibited a characteristic tension between
the realist and instrumentalist uses of the model. I then argued that epistemic realism or epistemic
instrumentalism by itself prohibits a scientist from adopting both the realist and instrumentalist
methodological principles.
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